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Abstract
This dissertation presents empirical analysis of the capital structure, security issuance,
value creation, and valuation concepts of corporate finance. Two analysis examine
connections between firm capital structure and the use of convertible debt securities,
which have mixed debt and equity attributes. The third analysis examines the
valuation of implicit and explicit signals of firm quality.
Chapter 1, Convertible Debt & Target Leverage Adjustments, examines how does
convertible debt affects advances toward target capital structure. Convertibles may
improve leverage adjustments by providing capital that is less costly to issue and less
expensive to service. However, convertibles can be risky liabilities with uncertainty
around the achievement and timing of conversion events. I find that issuers - both
above and below respective target ratios - experience faster leverage adjustments
during the issuance window and throughout the active outstanding offer period.
Issuers realize faster adjustments by exercising call options and redemption exchanges.
Robust to concurrent capital structure changes, the results suggest convertible debt
can be an effective tool for target leverage adjustments.
Chapter 2, Target Leverage Deviations & Convertible Debt Design, examines
whether the terms and provisions of convertible bond offers are distinctly related
to the issuers’ ex-ante target capital structure needs? Accounting for market-wide
equity volatility and cumulative returns, aggregate investor demand, macroeconomic
conditions and firm-specific equity and growth characteristics, I find that drifts
(deviations) from target capital structure have a positive and significant effect on
convertible bond issuance. Yet, the magnitude and direction of target deviations
v
have varying effects on the sensitivity of conversion terms, principal offer amounts,
and the inclusion of call, put, and redemption provisions.
Chapter 3, Does the Market Value Innovative Ability? Evidence from M&A,
co-authored with Adam Usman and Jamie Weathers, analyzes M&A announcement
return effects when the acquirer displays a superior capability to convert investments
in innovation into tangible valued output. We find a positive relation between
acquirer innovation conversion (IC) ability and abnormal returns around M&A
announcements. Further, we use distinct measures of IC ability to compare internal
and external innovation investments. We find larger returns for the external measure
(Intangible Assets) relative to the internal measure (R&D), which is the typical proxy
for innovation investments. The results suggest IC ability type matters; market
perception of the value impact of an acquisition differ across the acquirers’ capability
to capitalize external innovation.
vi
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Chapter 1
Convertible Debt
& Target Leverage Adjustments
1
1.1 Introduction
Is the use of convertible debt consistent behavior for firms targeting an optimal
leverage ratio? If so, how does the hybrid debt-equity structure of convertible
bonds impact target leverage adjustments? I analyze these questions by studying
the target leverage and partial adjustment activity of firms that issue convertible
debt. By design convertible bonds provide immediate capital and the potential
for new equity, but convertibles may also be a tool to mitigate the cost of target
leverage adjustments. The relative ease of offering convertible debt may reduce a
firm’s sensitivity to the cost of accessing capital markets, a primary component of
leverage adjustment costs. Convertible bonds are debt securities with an embedded
equity option. If and when a predetermined strike price is met, bond-holders may
convert the debt into common stock. Compared to equity, convertibles can be a less
costly form of external financing as convertible bonds have lower issuance cost and
less extreme underpricing.2 Compared to straight debt, convertibles may mitigate
concerns about firm risk and reduce the cost of debt financing (Brennan and Kraus
1Eldemire-Poindexter, A. To be submitted.
2It is a stylized fact that convertible offers have less negative abnormal returns around the
announcement and issuance windows than those of equity offers (Dann and Mikkelson (1984) ,
Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999), Dutordoir and Van de Gucht
(2007), Henderson and Tookes (2012)).
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(1987), Brennan and Schwartz (1988)). If convertible issuance sufficiently lowers the
barriers to external financing, a firm could pay less to access capital markets and
simultaneously resolve its financing needs and target leverage deviation.
Issuing convertible debt, however, does not guarantee that a firm will immediately
reduce its leverage deviation. Since convertibles originate on the balance sheet as
liabilities, issuance inherently increases short-term book leverage and may, all else
equal, expand the deviation between an over-levered firm’s current and optimal
book leverage. Further, a convertible bond may take several years to convert into
equity, if at all. Volatility in the issuer’s stock price should encourage rational
bond-holders to abstain from pursuing conversion while the equity option on the
convertible continues to appreciate.3 Such behavior by bond-holders highlights the
potential for slow conversion events. The unknown time-to-conversion may skew
interim leverage levels and subsequently slow adjustment efforts (Tsyplakov (2008)).
Delayed conversion would extend the bond’s debt service and could force the firm to
revise other capital structure decisions (e.g. issuance of substitute or supplementary
capital). For example, consider an over-levered firm issuing a convertible bond with
the intent of quickly achieving conversion and making a large adjustment toward
its target leverage. The cost of seeking new capital, the risk of tripping preexisting
covenants, and the need to redirect cash are all possible risks if the stock price fails
to reach the conversion price.
In addition to the size and direction of target deviations, cash flow needs
also influence target leverage adjustments (Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and
Smith (2012)). Changes in leverage due to internal (passive) shifts in net income
have an independent and significant impact on overall leverage adjustment speeds.
Convertible bond-holders are typically willing to accept a lower coupon payment in
3Henderson and Zhao (2014) report a mean stock price volatility of 4.15% over the two hundred
trading days preceding issuance for a sample of convertibles offered between 2000-2010.
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exchange for the bond’s equity option (Brennan and Kraus (1987)). Accordingly,
convertibles tend to have a reduced interest expense proportional to the value
of their equity component. For this reason, outstanding convertibles may lower
the firm’s debt service burden and preserve cash holdings. If firms make faster
target adjustments when internally generated cash is available, the reduced interest
expense on convertible debt may increase net income and improve the issuer’s target
adjustments through this passive channel.
Due to the options embedded in convertible bonds, the principal of a convertible
offer can undergo several changes between issuance and maturity. Figure 1.1 presents
a diagram of the potential outcomes for convertible bonds. Call and/or put provisions
are often included in convertible offers. When an issuer exercises a call provision
bond-holders are typically forced to convert their debt into common stock. In
contrast, put provisions grant bond-holders the right to be refunded before maturity
if the issuer’s stock under-performs. Calling convertible debt can reduce the issuers’
liabilities but honoring putable bonds may deplete cash balances. It’s unclear how
changes in convertible debt, which can simultaneously effect debt and equity balances,
impact target leverage adjustments.
To shed light on the relations between the use of convertible debt and capital
structure, I construct a sample of convertible bond issuers from the Compustat
universe from 1990-2014. The sample includes 842 firms that issued 1,386 convertible
bonds. When issued, these bonds have a sizable impact on the firm’s overall capital
structure. At the means (medians) the convertibles constitute 76% (60%) of book
leverage and 24% (19%) of total assets at issuance. Convertible bonds tend to contain
provisions conducive to equity conversion. Roughly 65% of the bonds include call
provisions and a quarter of the offers include put provisions.
I account for offer-level calls, puts, and open market redemptions from issuance
through maturity to track changes to the principal of outstanding convertible bonds.
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Within the sample, redemption, call, and put events can affect a third to a half of
a convertible bond’s outstanding principal before maturity. Consistent with existing
literature, call and put events are not concentrated around the offer date but typically
occur three to four years after issuance. King and Mauer (2014) show that call events
are most likely to occur when the issuers’ stock price has consistently exceeded the
conversion price and the issuer has significant cash flow needs. Chemmanur and
Simonyan (2010) find that, relative to other issuers, larger, less-risky firms primarily
use put options. The stability of these firm’s preempt and delay the likelihood of put
events. Given that convertible offers make up a large proportion of cumulative debt,
the time gaps between issuance and a major call, put, or redemption event highlight
the importance of considering the entire duration of the bond.
To understand the impact of convertible debt on capital structure, I calculate
target leverage as in Flannery and Hankins (2013), and estimate standard adjustments
for book and market leverage as well as active adjustments for book leverage as in
Faulkender et al. (2012). Shifts in aggregate leverage levels (standard adjustments)
are decomposed relative to the source of the actions affecting capital structure. Active
adjustments capture leverage corrections made in excess of the firm’s internal changes
in net income (passive adjustments). Estimates across all extant models of the
determinants of target leverage are consistent with the expectations of targeting
behavior and verify that convertible issuers do target an optimal leverage ratio.4
Compared to non-issuers, firms issuing convertible debt have higher observed and
target leverage ratios and wider target leverage deviations in the time preceding
issuance.
Across the entire sample, the average firm has a standard book (market)
4Proxies for the determinants of target leverage have been identified and used to estimate optimal
leverage ratios by simple ols, least squares dependent variable (LSDV), and generalized method of
moments (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Hovakimian and Titman (2006), Korajczyk and
Levy (2003), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Faulkender et al. (2012)).
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adjustment speed of roughly 30% (37%) and an active book adjustment speeds of
62%. In other words, the average firm closes a third of the gap between its observed
and desired book (market) leverage levels irrespective of the sources of capital. After
incorporating internal shifts in net income and adjusting observed leverage, the
average firm closes two-thirds of the remaining gap between its observed and desired
leverage ratio with capital acquired externally. Despite spiking debt levels with a new
offer, convertible bond issuers subsequently experience faster leverage adjustments
than non-issuers. Across the three year window around a new convertible offer,
issuers close 24% (14%) more of their standard book (market) leverage deviations
and 11% more of their active book deviations.
Since partial adjustments are estimated as annual changes in aggregate leverage,
the effects of an individual convertible offer may be lost in, or overpowered by, other
activities that occur throughout the year. de Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren
(2011) and Henderson and Zhao (2014) document a recent but widespread pattern of
concurrent stock repurchase and seasoned equity issuance events alongside convertible
bond issuance. To isolate the influence of convertible offers I exclude firms with
concurrent offer-year changes to capital structure such as equity issuances, stock
repurchases, or non-convertible debt calls, puts, or redemptions. The offer-year
adjustment speed results are robust to controls for concurrent shifts in capital
structure.
Considering the entire time during which convertible debt is a part of the firm’s
capital structure, the average issuer closes 9% (14%) more of its book (market)
leverage deviations than non-issuers. However, active book adjustments trail those
of non-issuers by 4%. From the univariate data it is clear that calls, puts, and
redemptions can begin to affect a large portion of convertible offers years after
issuance. Although firms have to engage with capital markets to execute calls and
redemptions, these actions impact convertibles that are already a part of the firms
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balance sheet. In the decomposed setting of active and passive adjustments, these
reductions in outstanding convertibles are likely captured as passive adjustments if
net income is used to fund calls and redemptions. All else equal, larger passive
adjustments will reduce the need for and magnitude of active adjustments. Overall,
the results suggest that convertible debt helps improve the issuer’s target leverage
adjustments at issuance and throughout maturity.
1.2 Analytical Framework
In a frictionless static tradeoff theory world, firms have known target leverage ratios
and will immediately correct any deviations from the target (Modigliani and Miller
(1958)). In an imperfect world, optimal leverage varies as the balance between the
costs and benefits of debt changes over time. Yet, there is strong empirical evidence
that firms have long run target debt ratios. Several leverage studies have examined
historic and current debt ratios, earnings, expected growth, and access to external
financing to test and demonstrate targeting behavior (Hovakimian et al. (2001),
Fama and French (2002), Hovakimian and Titman (2006)). This literature primarily
examines the behavior of the universe of publicly traded firms. The generally observed
targeting and adjustment trends may not apply to convertible issuers, who are a small
sub-sample of all firms.
Consistent with a pecking order theory world, convertible issuers are often
described as opaque firms with high leverage and limited financial market access
(Mayers (1998)). In managerial surveys by Dong, Dutordoir, and Veld (2011)
managers characterized their decision to issue a convertible as their only option or last
resort to access external financing. Before scrutinizing convertible issuers adjustment
speeds, a necessary first step is to establish whether issuers strive for a long run
optimal leverage ratio.
To affirm whether convertible issuers have a long run optimal leverage, this paper’s
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first tests are for consistency within the determinants of target leverage. Following
the extant debt ratio literature, optimal leverage depends on a set of observable firm
characteristics:
L∗i,t = βXi,t−1 + ˜i,t (1.1)
where L∗i,t is target leverage, Xi,t−1 is a vector of lagged firm characteristics, and
β is a cross-sectional coefficient vector.
The primary characteristics in the vectorXi,t−1 are lagged book (market) leverage,
earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets (EBIT/TA),
market to book ratio of assets (MB), and the log of real total assets (LnTA).5
Higher profitability (EBIT/TA) may mechanically reduce leverage and high MB
firms may prefer to protect valuable growth opportunities by limiting or closely
monitoring leverage (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hovakimian et al. (2001)). Size may
imply higher leverage as size is closely related to transparency, asset volatility, and
access to public debt markets (Faulkender and Petersen (2006)). When considering
convertible bond issuers, the determinants of target leverage, particularly profitability
and market-to-book, may deviate from expectations. Convertible debt issuers have
been characterized as opaque, low-medium quality firms with positive prospects
(Stein (1992)). Empirical studies find that issuers tend to have higher leverage
than industry peers and are often considered over-levered given their asset set and
growth opportunities (Mayers (1998), Lewis et al. (1999)). High leverage and growth
potential are conflicting attributes in the target leverage literature. Thus, convertible
issuers may be a unique subset of firms with different target adjustment behavior or
no target leverage altogether.
If convertible issuer β estimates for the determinants of optimal leverage are
5A full list of firm characteristics is provided in Appendix A.
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consistent with theoretical expectations, we can infer that convertible issuers have a
target leverage. Specifically, βConvertible−Issuers should follow directional expectations
and be statistically significant.
Hypothesis 1| H0 : βNon−Issuers 6= βConvertible−Issuers
Hypothesis 1A| H0 : βConvertible−Issuers = 0
Convertible debt is not typically a part of a firm’s capital structure every year it
operates, therefore the primary analysis focuses on two definitions of convertible issuer
firm-years to capture periods relevant to, and impacted by convertible debt. The first
definition sets ( CBIssuerOfferY ear=1 ) for a three year window around the year in
which a convertible bond is issued. The second definition sets (CBIssuerCD>0 = 1
) from the year preceding the issuance of a convertible through the year following
its maturity. Figure 1.2 illustrates a time-line of firm-years for a typical convertible
bond issuer. A more detailed discussion of the identification strategy for convertible
issuer firm-years is presented after the discussion of target estimation and partial
adjustment estimates.
Estimating Partial Adjustment Speeds
Unlike the setting with frictionless transaction costs and instantaneous corrections,
firms have to minimize the real transaction costs of leverage changes. Since
adjustments become more costly as debt ratios move farther away from the target,
the specification in (2.9) is extended into a model of target leverage that accounts
for partial adjustments, removes the constraint that optimal leverage is equivalent
to observed leverage and incorporates firm fixed effects. Under the assumption that
L∗i,t = βXi,t−1, Leary and Roberts (2005) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) develop
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a standard model of partial leverage adjustments with the form:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = λ(L∗i,t − Li,t−1) + ˜i,t (1.2)
where Li,t and Li,t−1 are time t and lagged leverage, and L∗i,t is the estimated target
leverage. The speed of adjustment, λ, is the percentage of a typical firm’s target
deviation closed over a year (∆t). Rearranging (8) and substituting (2.9) yields the
estimable model:
Li,t = (λ)(βXi,t−1) + (1− λ)(Li,t−1) + ˜i,t (1.3)
The coefficient vectors β and λ are estimated concurrently by the Blundell and
Bond (1998) system GMM for dynamic panel models (Flannery and Hankins (2013)).
Assuming target leverage is truly a function of observable and unobservable firm
characteristics such that L∗i = βXi+Fi, the short panel bias model of target leverage
takes the form:
Li,t = λ(βXi,t−1) + λ(Fi) + (1− λ)(Li,t−1) + δ˜i,t (1.4)
Following Flannery and Hankins (2013), GMM estimated targets are adjusted by
firm level target leverage fixed effects to capture unobserved but inter-temporally
constant effects on a firm’s target leverage ratio. Firm fixed effects for target leverage
are calculated as the mean residual of the short panel bias model in (2.10). With
yearly target leverage estimates the standard partial adjustment model in (8) is
estimated by an ordinary least squares regression.
With yearly target leverage estimates the standard partial adjustment model in
(8) is estimated by an ordinary least squares regression.
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Active & Passive Leverage Adjustments
The standard partial adjustment model in (8) captures changes in leverage due
to broad changes in debt and equity but can underestimate the impact of
internally generated cashflows (Byoun (2008)). To differentiate between mechanical
adjustments due to changes in operating income (net income) and active adjustments
due to capital markets access, Faulkender et al. (2012) decompose leverage changes
into active and passive components. Passive book leverage (1.5) accounts for
internally financed adjustments:
LPi,t−1 =
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1+NIi,t (1.5)
where, NIi,t is net income for year t. Active adjustments capture changes in leverage
that result from external, open market activities. The standard adjustment model
is revised to reflect active adjustments (1.6) as book leverage at time t less passive
leverage:
Li,t − LPi,t−1 = γ(L∗i,t − LPi,t−1) + ˜i,t (1.6)
Decomposing leverage deviations and adjustment into active and passive
components is necessary to examine the potential of convertible debt’s interest
expense savings. Interest savings will materialize on the balance sheet as increased
net income and retained earnings. If the savings are large enough to be meaningful,
the need for active leverage adjustments should be mitigated.
Partial Adjustments & Convertible Issuers
Partial adjustment speeds are driven by the cost-benefit trade-offs of undertaking
actions that affect leverage and the convex nature of adjustment cost (Leary and
Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Huang and Ritter (2009)). As such,
10
adjustment speeds vary asymmetrically across firms and the direction of the target
deviation has been shown to greatly impact estimated adjustment speeds (DeAngelo,
DeAngelo, and Whited (2011)). Firms operating above their optimal leverage, i.e.
over-levered firms, make larger adjustments than under-levered firms operating below
their target (Hovakimian and Titman (2006), Faulkender et al. (2012)). All else equal,
over-levered firms are perceived to gain more from reducing leverage and lowering
distress risk than under-levered firms gain from increasing leverage and raising their
tax shelter.
The hybrid debt-equity nature and low issuance cost of convertible bonds may
make the security particularly appealing to over-levered firms trying to stay within
reach of target book and market leverage ratios. Over-levered firms can move toward
their target book-leverage by increasing profitability or issuing equity to retire debt.
However, it is difficult to improve profitability and equity issuance is the most
expensive form of external financing (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Further, volatility
in the firm’s stock price or prospects following an equity-offer may negatively impact
market-leverage adjustments. Over-levered firms that ultimately want to raise equity
may be attracted to the ability to determine the stock price that prompts conversion,
the conversion ratio, the conversion commodity, any call provisions, and the offer size
(Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003)). Firms may also be drawn to the relatively low
transaction costs associated with convertible issues, which are consistently found to
be less severe than those of equity issues (Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Mikkelson and
Partch (1986), Lewis et al. (1999), Lewis et al. (2003)).
Under-levered firms, that can make target adjustments by repurchasing equity or
issuing debt, may also be attracted to the terms or design flexibility of convertible
bonds. While under-levered firms generally have lower debt financing costs,
offering convertible debt with a moderate equity option could still provide a less
expensive form of debt financing. Theory argues that firms issue convertibles as a
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mechanism to limit adverse selection (back-door-equity hypothesis, Stein (1992)),
as a mechanism to mitigate managerial agency problems (sequential financing
hypothesis, Mayers (1998)), or as a mechanism to mitigate debt-equity holder agency
concerns (risk-shifting hypothesis, Brennan and Schwartz (1988)).6 The underlying
differentiator in the theories of issuance is the power of the bond’s equity option.
The equity option captures the likelihood of conversion and the upside potential of
the bond; if converted the holder is entitled to shareholder returns like dividends and
repurchases. The equity option is valued as a function of the bond’s features (e.g. the
spread between the stock price at issuance and the conversion strike price, coupon
rate, conversion ratio, call/put provisions, etc.). Issuers can typically achieve lower
coupon payments in exchange for offering valuable equity (conversion) options (Lewis
et al. (1999)).7
The partial adjustment models in (8) and (1.6) are extended to include an
interaction term for convertible issuers. Respectively, the coefficients η and δ capture
the differences in standard and active partial adjustment speeds between convertible
issuer firm-years and non-issuer firm years.
Li,t − Li,t−1 = λ(L∗i,t − Li,t−1) + η(L∗i,t − Li,t−1) ∗ CBIssuer + ˜i,t (1.7)
Li,t − LPi,t−1 = γ(L∗i,t − LPi,t−1) + δ(L∗i,t−1 − LPi,t−1) ∗ CBIssuer + ˜i,t (1.8)
Relative to the firm’s optimal leverage, both over and under-levered issuers should
experience some shifts in market and book leverage when a convertible note is offered.
Convertibles are typically offered when the firm’s stock price has a positive trajectory.
As such, market leverage is expected to decline prior to issuance. Decreases in market
leverage levels should result in faster market leverage adjustments for firms above their
6These are the primary theories of convertible issuance. More discussion is available in Dutordoir,
Lewis, Seward, and Veld (2014).
7If the value of the option is too low the subsequent coupon reduction may be negligible.
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market target and slower adjustments for firms below their market target. Holding
other capital structure activity constant, firms should have more book leverage upon
issuing convertible debt. Increases in book leverage levels should result in slower book
leverage adjustments for firms above their book target and faster adjustments for firms
below their book target. The expected differences in partial adjustment speeds for
under-levered and over-levered firms motivate Hypotheses 2 and 2A. Following the
partial adjustment models in (1.7) and (1.8):
Hypothesis 2| H0 : ηUnder−leveredCBIssuer = ηOver−leveredCBIssuers
Hypothesis 2A| H0 : δUnder−leveredCBIssuers = δOver−leveredCBIssuers
where η and δ are the difference in standard and active partial adjustments for a
typical convertible issuer firm-year.
Book adjustment speeds estimated during years when convertible debt is
outstanding should be driven by interim activities that reduce the amount of
outstanding convertible debt (e.g. calls, puts). All else equal, large declines in the
amount of outstanding convertible debt should impact both debt and equity levels.
Conversions that reduce leverage and increase equity should result in faster (slower)
adjustments for over (under) levered firms. The impact is reduced for puts and
bond redemption events that reduce both leverage and cash balances. Additionally,
maintaining un-modified convertible debt levels may keep over (under) levered firms
farther from (closer to) their book target but hold changes in leverage and subsequent
leverage adjustments constant.
The expected differences in partial adjustment speeds around issuance of a
convertible bond (OfferYear) and across years when convertible debt is outstanding
(CD>0 ) motivate Hypotheses 3-3A. Following the partial adjustment models in (1.7)
and (1.8):
Hypothesis 3| H0 : ηCBIssuers−window = 0
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Hypothesis 3A| H0 : δCBIssuers−window = 0
where η and δ are the difference in standard and active partial adjustments for
a typical firm convertible issuer firm-year. Window is either (CBIssuerOfferY ear)
or (CBIssuerCD>0). Recall that CBIssuerOfferY ear is a dummy variable equal to
one for a three year window around the year in which a convertible bond is issued.
Likewise, CBIssuerCD>0 is a dummy variable equal to one from the year preceding
issuance through the year following maturity (Figure 1.2).
The three year window around issuance is necessary for both target estimation and
adjustment speed measures. Recall that target leverage in the year of issuance, t, is a
function of the characteristics in t-1. In addition to the characteristics inXi,t, the year
preceding issuance, t−1, captures relevant conditions that influence the choice to offer
convertible debt (e.g. stock price growth). Issuing new convertible debt will affect the
characteristic vector of t and will subsequently impact the target for t + 1, the year
following issuance. Since offering convertible debt can impact leverage adjustments
between t−1 and t as well as adjustments between t and t+1, observing a three year
window around issuance more accurately captures the impact on capital structure
when convertible debt is offered. The same logic motivates the second definition of
convertible issuer firm-years. A window from the year preceding issuance through the
year following maturity captures conditions relevant to the issue year target as well
as the post-maturity target. Moreover, considering the entire time the convertible is
outstanding captures the time when interest expense savings materialize as part of
passive adjustments.
1.3 Data
The sample draws from several different data sources. Convertible bonds are available
in the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). FISD provides details on
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debt issues and issuers for publicly offered U.S. corporate, agency and treasury bonds.
Capital structure data is available through Compustat and historical stock prices are
available in CRSP. Changes in capital structure are aggregated from corporate action
announcements available in Bloomberg.
FISD provides complete coverage for bonds issued after January 1990. Screening
FISD for conventional convertible bonds results in 3,138 convertibles issued between
January 1990 and December 2014. FISD uses different issue identifiers (cusip8) to
record convertible bonds originally offered in the R144a market and later re-issued
as Exchange Traded Offers. To eliminate duplicate observations, I collapse offers
with identical issuer id’s (cusip6), offering amounts, coupon rates, conversion prices,
conversion ratios, and maturities. This filtering process refines the number of
convertible issues to 2,251. Additional offer details include indicators for covenants,
call, put, and redemption provisions, as well as information about the underlying
security, and the conversion commodity. Call provisions are not reported for 383
cases, I classify these bonds as non-callable.
The full sample consist of all Compustat firms with complete balance sheet data
and coverage in CRSP. To estimate target leverages and active partial adjustments,
firms must have at least two years of consecutive annual fundamentals and an
industry classification. The sample period is limited to 1989-2014 to align with the
available FISD sample of convertible bond offers. Regulated firms (SIC 4900-4999)
and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. These data requirements yield a
full sample of 10,929 firms spanning 106,618 firm-years and a sub-sample of 842 firms
offering 1,386 convertible bonds.
Firms are classified as convertible bond issuers from the firm-year preceding a new
convertible offer through the firm-year following scheduled maturity (Figure 1.2). The
year preceding issuance captures relevant conditions that influence the choice to offer
convertible debt and the year following maturity captures any impacts on capital
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structure that may not be observed until after the debt matures. This definition
identifies 7,294 convertible issuer firm-years from the sample of 842 firms with one or
more convertible bond offers.
Calls, repurchases, puts, and other activities that reduce the outstanding amount
of a convertible bond are aggregated from the corporate action announcements (cact)
data available in Bloomberg. FISD provides International Securities Identification
Numbers (ISIN) for individual convertible offers. I use the issue level ISINs to link
bonds to their issuer’s Bloomberg ID and collect all corporate action announcements
from 1/1/1990-12/31/2014. Open market debt repurchases, calls, and puts are the
most frequent and sizable events amongst the announcements related to convertible
bonds8. Corporate action announcements for open market debt repurchases, calls,
and puts are aggregated quarterly and yearly per bond.
1.3.1 Sample Description
Convertible Bond Terms
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the sample of convertible bonds from
FISD. The number of issues, offering amounts, and prevalence of provision terms are
comparable to convertible bond samples of related literature (Henderson and Zhao
(2014), King and Mauer (2014)). The average convertible issue has an important
and sizable impact on overall capital structure. The mean (median) offer size of
376M (200M) constitutes 76% (60%) of book leverage and 24% (19%) of total assets
at issuance. Offers have relatively low interest rates, the mean convertible coupon
rate of 3.87% is less than half of the average coupon (yield at par) of high yield
bonds and roughly 60% of the coupon rates on investment grade bonds issued during
the sample period. Table 1.1 also reports conversion terms for the sample. The
8Although immaterial, conversion term refixes are also quite common events. Refixes are
adjustments to the conversion strike price and/or conversion ratio and are most commonly due
to dividend payouts, stock splits, and stock distributions.
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mean conversion price is roughly equivalent to the firm’s high stock price from the
year preceding issuance, but is 38% higher than the high stock price for the month
preceding issuance. These statistics suggest that the equity or conversion option
on convertible bonds are likely to become in-the-money during the bonds’ lifetime.
Convertible bonds tend to contain provisions conducive to equity conversion. Roughly
65% of the bonds include call provisions intended to force bond-holders to convert
their debt into common stock before maturity. Nonetheless, a quarter of the offers
include put provisions that grant bond-holders the right to be refunded. Issuers
tend to offer 2-3 convertibles throughout a mean sample lifespan of 16 firm-years.
The average firm has operated within the sample for 9 years at the time of its first
convertible offer.
Firm characteristics
Table 1.2 summarizes the target estimation variables for the sample of convertible
issuers and a comparison sample of all Compustat firms exclusive of the excluded
industries. Convertible issuers generally resemble non-issuers and both samples are
consistent This sample of convertible issuers has mean book and market leverage
ratios of 31.7% and 27.1% respectively. Issuer leverage ratios are higher than
non-issuers book and market leverage ratios of 23.9% and 22.7%. Despite higher book
and market leverage levels, issuers have similar market-to-book ratios and median
profitability as non-issuers. Higher book leverage during firm-years with outstanding
convertible debt likely reflects the increase in liabilities from convertible issuance.
1.4 Key Findings
1.4.1 Changes in outstanding convertible debt
Table 1.3 summarizes the relative amount of cact events as a proportion of the
underlying bonds’ original offering amounts, the frequency of cact events per bond,
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and the time between issuance and the first cact event. These univariate results
suggest that convertible debt is strategically reduced. Consider call events where the
issuer demands that all or part of the bond be converted into equity. At the means, a
convertible bond will have at least one partial call event within 5 years of issuance for
approximately 33% of the original offering amount. These call events could reduce
$125M in outstanding debt and introduce more than 7M worth of new shares of
common stock.9 Similarly sized events occur for put events where bond-holders can
demand to return the debt to the issuer. Amongst the convertibles that have put
provisions, on average, bond-holders put 38% of the debt back to the issuer at least
once and often within 4 years of issuance. The desire to avoid liability for $143M
in refunds illustrates the characterization that put provisions are for more desperate
issuers .
Open market repurchases, or bond redemptions, are the most common firm
initiated corporate action that affect the amount of outstanding convertible debt.
On average, issuers repurchase 45-60% of their convertible debt across three to four
spaced out quarters with the redemptions beginning approximately 4 years after
issuance. Conversion term refixes are modifications to the bond’s conversion price or
conversion ratio.
1.4.2 Determinants of target leverage for convertible bond issuers
Econometric techniques used to estimate β for the determinants of target leverage
have evolved with the target leverage literature. Table A1 presents OLS coefficient
estimates for the characteristics vector (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hovakimian et al.
(2001)). Table A2 presents two-stage least squares coefficient estimates for the vector
of firm characteristics, lagged book (market) leverage, clustered standard errors, and
time fixed-effects as in Flannery and Rangan (2006). Discussion of the determinant
9The average conversion ratio is 59 shares per bond (FV=$1000)
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terms is focused on the BB-GMM estimates as this estimation method is the most
comprehensive model of target leverage. Table 1.4 present Blundell-Bond (BB) GMM
coefficient estimates for the vector of firm characteristics, lagged leverage, and time
fixed-effects as in Flannery and Hankins (2013). Results for the full samples of
non-issuers and issuers across each model of target determinants are consistent with
previous findings.
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) show that lagged leverage is a highly
persistent and dominant determinant of future leverage. For both definitions of
convertible issuer firm-years, lagged leverage is significant at the 1% level. Noteworthy
results during the three year window around a new convertible offer are the decline
in the coefficient on lagged leverage, the negative and significant coefficient on scaled
fixed assets, and the positive and significant coefficient on scaled R&D. The drop
in the coefficient for lagged leverage likely captures the effects of a large debt issue
and resulting gap to leverage levels. The positive coefficient on R&D reflects an
increase in R&D expenditures as well as upward pressure on optimal leverage. In
line with the sequential financing hypothesis, the increased sized and significance of
the coefficient on R&D is consistent with the use of convertibles debt to fund costly,
positive NPV investment prospects. The negative coefficient on offer-year FA/TA
likely captures the decline in the the relative proportion of FA/TA when convertible
issuance increases the set of total assets.
Blundell-Bond (BB) GMM estimates can diminish the significance of independent
variable coefficients as the panel length shortens (Flannery and Hankins (2013)).
This effect is observable in the smaller and shorter subsamples of convertible
issuer firm-years. Even though the BB estimates reduce the significance of some
characteristics, the signs and magnitudes of the marginal effect terms are as expected
for the full samples of issuers and non-issuers. The primary determinant, lagged
leverage, and the marginal determinants of profitability, total assets, and scaled fixed
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assets, are statistically significant for both book and market measures of leverage
across both non-issuer and issuer sample sets. Altogether, results across the extant
models of the determinants of target leverage are consistent with the expectations
of targeting behavior. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis of Hypothesis-1 and
Hypothesis-1A and affirm that convertible issuers strive for a long run optimal
leverage.
1.4.3 Target leverage and deviations from target leverage
Table 1.5 reports target leverage and target deviation estimates for the samples of
non-issuers and issuers respectively. Target estimates and calculated target deviations
are consistent with other BB-GMM estimated ratios.10 When convertible debt is
outstanding both under-levered and over-levered issuer’s have a higher target leverage
ratio than non-issuers. Higher targets are consistent with the finding that convertible
issuers generally operate with more debt.
Book and market target deviations are calculated as the difference between the
estimated target and lagged leverage. On average, over-levered firms in the full sample
exceeds their optimal book leverage by 4.71% and under-levered firms trail their target
book leverage by 7.49%. When convertible debt is outstanding, issuers have smaller
book and market deviations than the non-issuers, over-levered (under-levered) issuer’s
have deviation of 1.82% (5.52%). Smaller target deviations during firm years when
convertible debt is outstanding provide univariate support that convertible debt has
a positive influence on target leverage adjustments.
Active book deviations are the difference between firms’ target leverage and
passive leverage ratios. Recall that passive leverage is the ratio of lagged total debt
to the sum of lagged total assets plus current net income. Over-levered non-issuers
10Target deviations are larger in extant studies that cover a sample spanning 1965-2007. These
samples have higher levels of market leverage, book leverage, and profitability but lower MB
measures, less total assets and fewer R&D expenditures relative to the sample spanning 1990-2014.
20
tend to have an active book deviation of 5.05% while over-levered issuers have a
mean active book deviation of 2.70%. Active deviations exclude mechanical changes
to leverage so, all else equal, a larger active deviation implies that the firm had less
net income to apply to passive adjustment efforts.
1.5 Results & Discussion
1.5.1 The effects of convertible bonds on partial adjustments
Table 1.6 reports base partial adjustment estimates for the regression in model (1.3)
using market value leverage. The typical firm closes 37% of the deviation between
its market target leverage and its observed market leverage. Column 2 of Table 1.6
reports adjustment speeds for convertible issuers during firm-years when convertible
debt is outstanding. While the bonds are outstanding issuers above and below
their target market-leverages have faster partial adjustments than non-issuers; issuers
above (below) their target adjust market leverage 29.3% (8.98%) faster. Column 3
of Table 1.6 reports market partial adjustment speeds across the three year window
around the offer-year of a new convertible bond. Issuers above and below their target
market leverage experience much faster partial adjustments around new convertible
offers, firms above (below) their target close 51.6% (6.64%) more of their book target
deviation than non-issuers. These results suggest that the market value of the issuer’s
equity improves more than the relative value of the debt.
Table 1.7 reports base partial adjustments for book value leverages. The typical
firm closes 30% of the deviation between its book target leverage and its observed
book leverage. Issuers above their target book-leverage have adjustment speeds
approximately 35.2% faster than non-issuers. However, issuers below their book
target do not have significantly different adjustment speeds. Around the offer year
issuers both above and below their target book leverage experience faster partial
adjustments; firms above (below) their target close 82.8% (10.2%) more of their book
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target deviation than non-issuers.
The base adjustment speeds are faster than previous literature covering a different
sample period. Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Faulkender et al. (2012)) find partial
adjustment speeds of 22% for a sample spanning from 1965-2006 with higher book
and market leverages, more fixed assets, and less R&D expenditures. Accordingly,
the earlier sample’s book target leverage is slightly higher than the current sample.
Operating at a lower leverage ratio and making larger corrections to maintain a lower
target appears to be more prevalent over time.
Table 1.8 presents active partial adjustment speeds for the regression in model
(1.6) using active book leverage. Active adjustments capture changes in leverage that
result from external financing activities in excess of mechanical changes in leverage
due to retained earnings. Issuers’ active adjustments are faster than non-issuers’
across the three year window around a new bond offer but lag non-issuers on average
during the convertibles’ lifespan. The typical firm closes 61.7% of the deviation
between its active book target leverage and its calculated active-book leverage.
Issuers below their target book-leverages have partial adjustments 5.9% slower
than non-issuers while convertible bonds are outstanding and do not make
significantly different adjustments around the offer year. Issuers above their target
exhibit the opposite behavior, they do not make significantly different adjustments
during the going concern period but make adjustments 30% faster across the three
year window around a new convertible offer. Recall that calls, puts, and redemptions
begin to affect a large portion of convertible offers three to four year after issuance.
These delayed reductions in outstanding convertible debt reduce the firms existing
debt liabilities but are likely captured as passive adjustments. All else equal, larger
passive adjustments reduce the need for and magnitude of active adjustments.
Considering the magnitudes of market, book, and active book adjustments,
under-levered and over-levered issuers experience very different adjustment speeds
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around the issuance and throughout the lifespan of convertible debt. In unreported
results, difference test for under-levered and over-levered firm’s standard and active
adjustments are significant at the 1% level respectively. These results reject the
null hypothesis of Hypothesis-2 and Hypothesis-3 and provide evidence that when
convertible debt is used over-levered and under-levered issuers experience different
adjustment speeds.
This analysis adds to two ongoing discussions in the convertible debt and capital
structure literature. The frequency and size of issuer elected call events support
Stein’s back-door equity hypothesis of convertible issuance. Additionally, the high
proportion of under-levered firms issuing convertibles may be motivated by Brennan
and Kraus’s risk-shifting hypothesis, future work could address this trend could
provide more explicit support. Within the broader capital structure literature, this
paper supports the notion that leverage adjustments and adjustment transaction cost
are a function of the firm’s distance from its target leverage as well as its concurrent
cash flow needs.
1.5.2 Robustness
The adjustment speed results are robust to several changes in capital structure that
occur within the same year of a convertible offer. Partial adjustment speeds are
estimated annually. As such, it is necessary to consider a number of open market
activities that could also occur throughout a given year. I account for firms that
issue equity or buy-back stock. I also control for firms that call, put, or redeem
portions of their convertible offers or portions of other non-convertible, straight debt.
These actions have different directional impacts on leverage, for clarity I will first
discuss the events that can increase assets, then discuss the events that require an
outflow of capital or increase in liabilities.
Concurrent equity issuance can counter the leverage effects of convertible debt and
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have a positive net effect on capital structure. The subset of firms issuing both equity
and convertible debt may drive the large adjustment speeds observed during offer
years. Columns 1-2 of Table 1.10 presents results for offer-year partial adjustments
for the sub-sample of convertible issuers without concurrent equity issuance. The
sub-sample excludes 172 unique firms, roughly 20% of the pool of issuers, that had
at least one year with concurrent convertible and seasoned equity offerings. Partial
adjustment speeds for this equity controlled subsample are very similar to the original
sample. Concurrent equity issuance does not appear to dominate the high offer year
adjustment speeds.
With similar effects on leverage as an equity offer, a successful convertible call
is effectively a forced conversion events. Firms with a convertible call events, or
forced equity inflow, can increase assets within the offer year may disproportionately
drive-up adjustment speed estimates. Convertible bond call events are identified
throughout the bonds maturity. While I find that roughly 42% of the convertible
bonds in the sample experience at least one call event before maturity, less than 1%
of the sample of convertibles undergo a call event within the offer year. It is unlikely
that bond-level calls significantly impact offer year adjustment speeds.
Open market redemptions of convertible and straight debt both require an outflow
of capital. Likewise, firms will lose capital to honor put provisions on convertible and
straight debt. Unlike convertible debt, straight debt call provisions give the issuer the
right recall and settle, not convert, outstanding straight bonds. With the exception
of puts, redemptions and non-convertible calls can be a useful and meaningful way for
firms to refinance expensive debt. If the proceeds from convertible offers are used to
fund the open market redemptions and calls of straight debt, then offer year partial
adjustments may be driven by the net shifts in debt levels and retained earnings.
Likewise, firms may use the proceed from a convertible offer to balance or fund
stock repurchases. Issuers who simultaneously repurchase stock and issue equity
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may bias the partial adjustment speeds observed during the offer year. Columns
3-4 of Table 1.10 presents results for offer-year partial adjustments for the sample of
convertible issuers without concurrent repurchase events. 162 firms, roughly 19% of
the sample, with at least one year of convertible issuance and stock repurchase events
are excluded from the regression. Given small differences in adjustment speeds, stock
repurchases do not appear to dominate the high offer year adjustment speeds.
While only 4% of the sample of convertible bonds are repurchased in the bonds’
offer year, 17% of the sample of issuers repurchase portions of their non-convertible
debt during the year of a convertible offer. Additionally, 15% of the sample of issuers
call some portion of their non-convertible debt during the year of a new convertible
offer. Columns 1-2 of Table 1.9 presents results for offer-year partial adjustments for
the sample of convertible issuers without concurrent calls on straight debt. Columns
3-4 of Table 1.9 presents results for offer-year partial adjustments for the sample of
convertible issuers without concurrent repurchases of straight debt. Concurrent shifts
in debt capital structure do not greatly diminish the offer-year adjustment speeds.
These tests suggest that offer year partial adjustments are not driven by external
activities that shift the firm’s equity and debt levels.
1.6 Summary
If tradeoff theory holds and firms target an optimal leverage ratio, firms should only
undertake capital structure decisions that help maintain or achieve target leverage.
Securities issuance and leverage adjustments are important corporate decisions and
are closely related. Although convertible bonds are widely used and are a critical
component of securities issuance and capital market access, little is known about
these bond’s effect on capital structure and leverage adjustments. This paper fills the
gap in the literature by examining the relationship between convertible bonds and
firm leverage- both the observed and modeled target leverage ratios.
25
Specifically, I examine how convertible debt securities help or hurt the issuing
firm’s effort to operate at its target leverage. Unlike other securities that only effect
one side of the balance sheet as pure debt or equity, convertible bonds consist of both
debt and equity components. This hybrid status complicates natural inferences on
how convertible bonds should impact leverage ratios and target leverage adjustments.
I find that the use of convertible debt is consistent with target leverage behavior and,
given the situational use of specific bond features, convertibles can be very effective
tools to limit adjustment cost without limiting adjustment speeds.
In line with recent capital structure literature, I use the Blundell-Bond GMM
to estimate target leverage ratios and ordinary least squares regressions to estimate
partial adjustment speeds. Compared to firms that do not offer convertible debt, I find
that convertible issuers undergo faster partial adjustments when a new convertible
bond is offered. These results hold when firms are split according to the direction of
their target leverage deviation, i.e. separated as being above or below their leverage
target.
The persistent result of positive adjustment speeds around issuance, despite
increased debt levels, is intriguing. Target leverage adjustments are a function of
annual changes in aggregate capital structure, and it is difficult to capture the
impact of an individual convertible bond on overall firm leverage. To isolate the
influence of convertible debt I control for other changes to the issuers’ capital structure
such as new equity issuance, stock repurchases, and calls, puts, and redemptions of
traditional and convertible debt. After excluding firms that undertake concurrent
capital structure shifts, the magnitude and statistical significance of the partial
adjustment speeds for convertible issuers are consistent with the main results.
26
Figure 1.1: Convertible Bond Outcomes
27
Figure 1.2: Convertible Issuer Firm-years
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Convertible Bond Terms at Issuance
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the sample of convertible bonds from
Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) with at least two years of
complete fundamentals in Compustat and coverage in CRSP. The sample consist of
corporate convertible bonds issued between 1/1/1990-12/31/2014 by unregulated,
non-financial firms. Bond terms include the offering amount, offering amount
proportional to total assets during the issuing year, offering amount proportional to
the sum of long term debt and current liabilities (total debt) during the issuing year,
coupon rates, and years to maturity. Per issuer bond terms include the number of
bonds issued per firm, time elapsed between consecutive convertible offers, firm age
at time of the first convertible offer, and total firm age. Conversion terms include
the quantity of the conversion commodity bond-holders receive upon conversion
(conversion ratio) and the stock price required for the bond to be eligible for
conversion (conversion price) relative to the end month and annual high stock prices
preceding issuance. Conversion terms are winsorized at the 1% level. Provision terms
indicate whether the issuing firm granted bond-holders the right to return the bond
(putable) or reserved the right to make conversion forcing ultimatums (callable).
Offer Terms mean median sd
Offering Amount (M) 376.0 200 516.8
Offer Amount/Total Assets 0.24 0.19 0.22
Offer Amount/Total Debt 0.76 0.60 0.91
Maturity (Yrs) 11.4 7 8.16
Coupon Rate 3.87 3.77 2.48
Conversion Premium 36.4 26.0 47.8
Prevalence
Num. Bonds Issued 2.43 2 1.73
Time Btwn Issues (Yrs) 3.49 2.76 2.97
Age-First Issue (Yrs) 8.60 8 5.29
Provisions Yes No
Not
Reported
Callable 901 102 383
Putable 433 953 0
Observations 1386
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Table 1.2: Firm Characteristics Used in Target Leverage Estimations
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for the firm characteristics used to estimate
target leverage. The full sample consist of Compustat firms with at least two years
of complete balance sheet data and coverage in CRSP. The sample period is limited
to 1989-2014 to align with available data for convertible debt issuance. Regulated
and financial firms are excluded. Issuers are firm-years where at least one convertible
bond is outstanding. Firms operating below the optimal book leverage are classified
as under-levered and firms operating above the optimal leverage are classified as
over-levered. U.L and O.L. are the subsets of under-levered and over-levered firm
years respectively. Book Leverage is total debt normalized by the book value of
assets. Market leverage is the book value of short-term plus long-term debt relative
to the market value of assets. EBIT/ TA is the income before extraordinary items
plus interest expense plus income taxes all normalized by total assets. Market to
book is the sum of book liabilities and the market value of equity normalized by
total assets. Depreciation/TA is depreciation and amortization normalized by total
assets. Log total assets is the natural log of total assets deflated by the consumer
price index to 1983 dollars. Fixed Assets/ TA is net property, plant, and equipment
normalized by total assets. R&D expense/TA is research and development expense
normalized by total assets. R&D dummy is equal to 1 if research and development
expense is greater than zero and zero otherwise. Industry Median Book Leverage
is the Fama and French (1997) industry average book leverage. Further discussion
of the characteristics vector is provided in Appendix A. Medians in parentheses,
standard deviation in brackets.
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
-All- -U.L.- -O.L.- -All -U.L.- -O.L.-
Book Leverage 0.239 0.212 0.274 0.317 0.280 0.362
(0.196) (0.165) (0.243) (0.287) (0.247) (0.326)
[0.23] [0.22] [0.24] [0.21] [0.21] [0.21]
Market Leverage 0.227 0.206 0.261 0.271 0.240 0.309
(0.154) (0.128) (0.201) (0.221) (0.188) (0.263)
[0.24] [0.23] [0.24] [0.21] [0.21] [0.21]
EBIT/TA -0.0219 -0.0150 -0.0191 0.0301 0.0433 0.0173
(0.0632) (0.0678) (0.0607) (0.0661) (0.0740) (0.0580)
[0.32] [0.32] [0.30] [0.18] [0.17] [0.18]
Market to book 1.849 1.836 1.706 1.711 1.780 1.580
(1.215) (1.226) (1.149) (1.278) (1.319) (1.211)
[1.96] [1.93] [1.77] [1.48] [1.55] [1.31]
Market to book 1.849 1.836 1.706 1.711 1.780 1.580
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Table 1.2 – continued: Firm Characteristics Used in Target Leverage Estimations
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
-All- -U.L.- -O.L.- -All -U.L.- -O.L.-
(1.215) (1.226) (1.149) (1.278) (1.319) (1.211)
[1.96] [1.93] [1.77] [1.48] [1.55] [1.31]
Depreciation/TA 0.0490 0.0500 0.0492 0.0440 0.0440 0.0445
(0.0403) (0.0414) (0.0405) (0.0367) (0.0369) (0.0369)
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Ln(Total Assets) 19.18 19.30 19.34 21.22 21.20 21.29
(19.13) (19.28) (19.29) (21.15) (21.15) (21.22)
[2.29] [2.29] [2.25] [1.53] [1.54] [1.49]
Fixed Assets/TA 0.320 0.329 0.313 0.273 0.277 0.271
(0.244) (0.250) (0.243) (0.189) (0.186) (0.196)
[0.26] [0.27] [0.25] [0.23] [0.24] [0.23]
R&D expense/TA 0.0461 0.0457 0.0452 0.0484 0.0503 0.0450
(0) (0) (0) (0.00773) (0.00512) (0.00970)
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08]
R&D dummy 0.443 0.430 0.462 0.538 0.524 0.552
(0) (0) (0) (1) (1) (1)
[0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50]
Industry Median 0.193 0.195 0.191 0.180 0.182 0.178
Book Leverage (0.201) (0.204) (0.198) (0.180) (0.185) (0.178)
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]
Observations 106618 49550 44284 7294 3755 3377
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Table 1.3: Bond Level Changes in Outstanding Convertible Debt
Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for call, put, and redemption corporate
action announcement (cact) events that effect the outstanding amount of an
individual convertible bond. Amongst bonds that experience a particular cact,
Relative Amounts report quarterly and yearly aggregated call, put, and redemption
events as a proportion of the underlying principal offering amount. Frequency per
Bond reports the number of call, put, and redemption events per quarter throughout
the bond’s life. Time After Issuance reports the number of months between issuance
and the first call, put, or redemption. Calls are firm initiated conversion ultimatums,
called amounts are the amount of the bond successfully called (converted). Puts are
bondholder initiated refunds. Redemptions are firm initiated tender offers or open
market repurchases.
Bond Changes mean p50 sd
Relative Amounts
Called/Offer_Amt, Q 0.33 0.10 0.40
Called/Offer_Amt, Y 0.34 0.11 0.40
Put/Offer_Amt, Q 0.38 0.26 0.39
Put/Offer_Amt, Y 0.38 0.26 0.39
Redeemed /Offer_Amt, Q 0.15 0.042 0.22
Redeemed /Offer_Amt, Y 0.24 0.10 0.30
Observations 1145
Frequency per bond mean median max
Call events 1.10 1 4
Put events 1.16 1 2
Redemptions 3.57 3 18
Observations 1602
Time after issuance mean median sd
Time to Call 56.7 54.9 24.6
Time to Put 49.4 54.8 23.4
Time to OM-Repurch. 46.3 44.9 24.6
Observations 1600
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Table 1.4: Estimating Target Leverage (GMM)
With the restriction that Li,t∗ = βXi,t−1, this table presents Blundel-Bond coefficient estimates for the partial adjustment
model: Li,t+1 = (γβ)(Xi,t) − (1 − γ)(Li,t) + ˜i,t where, the coefficient vectors β and γ are estimated concurrently by Blundell
and Bond (1998) system GMM for dynamic panel models. Xi,t−1 is the vector of firm characteristics summarized in Table
1.1. Columns 1-3 report book-leverage estimates and columns 4-6 report market-leverage estimates for the full sample (1,4),
firm-years where at least one convertible bond is contractually outstanding (2,5), and the firm-year of a new convertible offer
(3,6). Standard errors are reported in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Book Leverage 0.748∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.037) (0.084)
Market Leverage 0.725∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.262∗
(0.008) (0.030) (0.104)
EBIT/TA -0.028∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ 0.092 -0.019∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗ 0.023
(0.007) (0.034) (0.088) (0.005) (0.026) (0.085)
Market to book -0.002∗ -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.011∗∗ -0.019∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.012) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009)
Depreciation/TA -0.106 -0.406 -0.243 -0.218∗∗∗ -0.407 -0.004
(0.054) (0.328) (0.548) (0.045) (0.248) (0.556)
Log total assets -0.004 -0.106∗∗∗ 0.009 0.010∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.003) (0.016) (0.023) (0.002) (0.010) (0.018)
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Table 1.4 – continued: Estimating Target Leverage (GMM)
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Fixed assets/TA 0.069∗∗∗ 0.083 -0.307∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.119 -0.116
(0.015) (0.099) (0.146) (0.012) (0.068) (0.163)
R&D expense/TA -0.049 -0.234 0.599∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.378∗∗ 0.684∗
(0.029) (0.191) (0.292) (0.019) (0.116) (0.287)
R&D dummy -0.019∗∗ 0.047 -0.071 -0.015∗ -0.071 -0.075
(0.007) (0.054) (0.075) (0.007) (0.038) (0.083)
Industry Median
Book Leverage 0.075∗ -0.684∗∗ 0.379
(0.035) (0.258) (0.443)
Industry Median
Market Leverage 0.100∗∗∗ -0.090 0.542
(0.023) (0.100) (0.347)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 93,872 6,412 1,436 93,872 6,412 1,436
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Table 1.5: Target Deviation Variables
Table 1.5 presents summary statistics for the mean and median estimated target leverage ratios and target leverage
deviations. Columns 1-3 details estimates for the full sample, columns 4-6 report estimates for the sample of convertible issuers
during years when no convertible debt is outstanding, and columns 7-9 report estimates for the sample of convertible issuers
during years when at least one convertible bond is outstanding. U.L and O.L. are the subsets of under-levered and over-levered
firm years respectively. Book Dev is the book target less the book leverage from the previous year. Book Active Dev is the
book target less the book leverage adjustment which is defined as the previous period’s total debt divided by the sum of the
previous period’s book assets plus net income for the current period. Market Dev is the market target less the market leverage
from the previous year. Medians in brackets.
Full Sample Issuers(CD>0) Issuers(CD>0), Offer Year
All U.L. O.L. All U.L. O.L. All U.L. O.L.
Book Target 0.254 0.318 0.183 0.257 0.253 0.264 0.327 0.371 0.277
[0.211] [0.257] [0.160] [0.232] [0.220] [0.251] [0.285] [0.320] [0.249]
Book Dev 0.0173 0.0749 -0.0471 0.0281 0.0552 -0.0182 0.0173 0.0510 -0.0201
[0.00203] [0.0301] [-0.0264] [0.0199] [0.0394] [-0.0138] [0.00378] [0.0210] [-0.0181]
Book Active Dev 0.0130 0.0697 -0.0505 0.0264 0.0576 -0.0270 0.00838 0.0465 -0.0340
[0.00615] [0.0363] [-0.0261] [0.0262] [0.0447] [-0.0139] [0.00880] [0.0293] [-0.0185]
Market Target 0.250 0.293 0.202 0.234 0.221 0.256 0.280 0.305 0.251
[0.185] [0.218] [0.148] [0.186] [0.169] [0.215] [0.232] [0.250] [0.212]
Market Dev 0.0247 0.0662 -0.0217 0.0185 0.0361 -0.0119 0.0135 0.0351 -0.0105
[0.00570] [0.0295] [-0.0187] [0.0188] [0.0314] [-0.0104] [0.00414] [0.0163] [-0.0113]
Observations 93,872 49,550 44,284 5,546 3,503 2,043 7,132 3,755 3,377
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Table 1.6: Partial Adjustment Speeds- Market Deviations
Panels A-C report coefficients for the base partial adjustment model:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = Di,tAi,t −
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1 = λ(L
∗
i,t − Li,t−1) + η(L∗i,t − Li,t−1) ∗ CBIssuer + ˜i,t
∆Market Lev is difference between current and lagged market leverage. Column
1 reports estimates for the full sample, Column 2 reports estimates for the full
sample with interaction terms for convertible issuers during years when at least one
convertible bond is outstanding, and Column 3 reports estimates for the full sample
with interaction terms for convertible issuers during the three year window around a
new convertible offer. Standard errors in parentheses,∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year
∆ Market Lev ∆ Market Lev ∆ Market Lev
Panel A: All Firms
Market Dev 0.372∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(0.00252) (0.00257) (0.00254)
MkDev_CD 0.143∗∗∗
(0.0132)
MkDev_OfferY 0.129∗∗∗
(0.0212)
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.190 0.189
Observations 93872 93872 93872
Panel B: Under-levered Firms
Market Dev 0.329∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.00286) (0.00292) (0.00288)
MkDev_CD 0.0898∗∗∗
(0.0151)
MkDev_OfferY 0.0664∗∗
(0.0229)
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.206 0.206
Observations 50874 50874 50874
Panel C: Over-levered Firms
Market Dev 0.500∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗
(0.00505) (0.00514) (0.00507)
MkDev_CD 0.293∗∗∗
(0.0264)
MkDev_OfferY 0.516∗∗∗
(0.0519)
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.188 0.188
Observations 42,970 42,970 42,970
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Table 1.7: Partial Adjustment Speeds- Book Deviations
Panels A-C present coefficients for the base partial adjustment model:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = Di,tAi,t −
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1 = λ(L
∗
i,t − Li,t−1) + η(L∗i,t − Li,t−1) ∗ CBIssuer + ˜i,t
∆Book Lev is the difference between current and lagged book leverage. Column
1 reports estimates for the full sample, Column 2 reports estimates for the full
sample with interaction terms for convertible issuers during years when at least one
convertible bond is outstanding, and Column 3 reports estimates for the full sample
with interaction terms for convertible issuers during the three year window around a
new convertible offer. Standard errors in parentheses,∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year
∆ Book Lev ∆ Book Lev ∆ Book Lev
Panel A: All Firms
Book Dev 0.303∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.00217) (0.00221) (0.00218)
BkDev_CD 0.0902∗∗∗
(0.0114)
BkDev_OfferY 0.238∗∗∗
(0.0178)
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.173 0.174
Observations 93872 93872 93872
Panel B: Under-levered Firms
Book Dev 0.279∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.00258) (0.00264) (0.00260)
BkDev_CD 0.0178
(0.0128)
BkDev_OfferY 0.102∗∗∗
(0.0195)
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.191 0.191
Observations 49550 49550 49550
Panel C: Over-levered Firms
Book Dev 0.352∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(0.00388) (0.00392) (0.00388)
BkDev_CD 0.352∗∗∗
(0.0239)
BkDev_OfferY 0.828∗∗∗
(0.0406)
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.161 0.165
Observations 44,284 44,284 44,284
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Table 1.8: Partial Adjustment Speeds- Active Book Deviations
Panels A-C present coefficients for the active partial adjustment model:
Li,t − LPi,t−1 = Di,tAi,t −
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1+NIi,t = γ(L
∗
i,t−1 − LPi,t−1) + δ(L∗i,t−1 − LPi,t−1) ∗ CBIssuer + ˜i,t
∆Active Book Dev is the difference between book leverage and the passive leverage
adjustment which is defined as lagged total debt divided by the sum of lagged
total assets and the current period’s net income. Column 1 reports estimates for
the full sample, Column 2 reports estimates for the full sample with interaction
terms for convertible issuers during years when at least one convertible bond is
outstanding, and Column 3 reports estimates for the full sample with interaction
terms for convertible issuers during the three year window around a new convertible
offer.Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year
∆ Active BkLev ∆ Active BkLev ∆ Active BkLev
Panel A: All Firms
Active Bk Dev 0.617∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗
(0.00275) (0.00281) (0.00276)
ActBkDev_CD -0.0399∗∗
(0.0129)
ActBkDev_OfferY 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0231)
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.350 0.350
Observations 93871 93871 93871
Panel B: Under-levered Firms
Active Bk Dev 0.566∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗
(0.00361) (0.00370) (0.00364)
ActBkDev_CD -0.0594∗∗∗
(0.0171)
ActBkDev_OfferY -0.00335
(0.0302)
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.331 0.331
Observations 49549 49549 49549
Panel C: Over-levered Firms
Active Bk Dev 0.693∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
(0.00423) (0.00434) (0.00426)
ActBkDev_CD -0.00950
(0.0195)
ActBkDev_OfferY 0.300∗∗∗
(0.0360)
Adjusted R2 0.377 0.377 0.378
Observations 44,284 44,284 44,284
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Table 1.9: Partial Adjustment Speeds- Excluding Concurrent Straight Debt Calls,
Redemptions
Table1.9 presents coefficients for the active partial adjustment model:
Li,t − Lpi,t−1 = Di,tAi,t −
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1+NIi,t = γ(L
∗
i,t−1 − Lpi,t−1) + δ(L∗i,t−1 − LPi,t−1) ∗ CBIssuer + ˜i,t
∆Book Lev is the difference between current and lagged book leverage. ∆Active
Book Dev is the difference between current book and passive leverage adjustments.
Columns 1-2 present offer-year partial adjustment estimates for the full sample
with interaction terms for the sub-sample of convertible issuers without concurrent
straight-debt calls (SDC=0). This sub-sample excludes roughly 17% of the
sample of convertible issuers with concurrent straight-debt calls that could bias
adjustment speed estimates. Columns 3-4 present offer-year partial adjustments
for the full sample with interaction terms for the sub-sample of convertible
issuers without concurrent straight debt redemptions (SDR=0). This sub-sample
excludes roughly 15% of the sample of convertible issuers with concurrent straight
debt redemptions that could bias adjustment speed estimates.Standard errors in
parentheses,∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year, SDC=0
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year, SDR=0
∆ Book Lev ∆ Active BkLev ∆ Book Lev ∆ Active BkLev
Panel A: All Firms
Book Dev 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.00219) (0.00219)
BkDevOfferY 0.225∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0187)
Active Bk Dev 0.616∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗
(0.00279) (0.00279)
ActBkDevOfferY 0.0833∗∗∗ 0.0853∗∗∗
(0.0252) (0.0256)
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.350 0.175 0.350
Observations 92008 92007 91740 91739
Panel B: Under-levered Firms
Book Dev 0.277∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.00261) (0.00262)
BkDevOfferY 0.0962∗∗∗ 0.0809∗∗∗
(0.0200) (0.0203)
Active Bk Dev 0.566∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗
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Table 1.9 – continued: Partial Adjustment Speeds- Excluding Concurrent
Straight Debt Calls, Redemptions
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year, SDC=0
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year, SDR=0
∆ Book Lev ∆ Active BkLev ∆ Book Lev ∆ Active BkLev
(0.00367) (0.00367)
ActBkDevOfferY -0.0638∗ -0.0635
(0.0321) (0.0328)
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.331 0.193 0.332
Observations 48533 48532 48353 48352
Panel C: Over-levered Firms
Book Dev 0.343∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.00389) (0.00389)
BkDevs 0.849∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗
(0.0437) (0.0442)
Active Bk Dev 0.690∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.00429) (0.00430)
ActBkDevOfferY 0.383∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0414)
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.380 0.165 0.379
Observations 43,437 43,437 43,349 43,349
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Table 1.10: Partial Adjustment Speeds-Excluding Concurrent Equity Actions
Table1.10 presents coefficients for the active partial adjustment model:
Li,t − Lpi,t−1 = Di,tAi,t −
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1+NIi,t = γ(L
∗
i,t−1 − Lpi,t−1) + δ(L∗i,t−1 − LPi,t−1) ∗ CBIssuer + ˜i,t
∆Book Lev is the difference between current and lagged book leverage. ∆Active
Book Dev is the difference between current book and passive leverage adjustments.
Columns 1-2 present offer-year partial adjustment estimates for the full sample
with interaction terms for the sub-sample of convertible issuers without concurrent
equity issuance (SEO=0). This sub-sample excludes roughly 20% of the sample of
convertible issuers with concurrent equity issuance that could bias adjustment speed
estimates. Columns 3-4 present offer-year partial adjustments for the full sample
with interaction terms for the sub-sample of convertible issuers without concurrent
stock buy-backs (SBB=0). This sub-sample excludes roughly 19% of the sample
of convertible issuers with concurrent stock buy-backs that could bias adjustment
speed estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001).
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year, SEO=0
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year, SBB=0
∆ Book Lev ∆ Active BkLev ∆ Book Lev ∆ Active BkLev
Panel A: All Firms
Book Dev 0.299∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.00219) (0.00220)
BkDevOfferY 0.247∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0183)
Active Bk Dev 0.616∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.00279) (0.00279)
ActBkDevOfferY 0.0940∗∗∗ 0.0991∗∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0241)
Adjusted R2 0.175 0.351 0.175 0.351
Observations 91474 91473 91487 91486
Panel B: Under-levered Firms
Book Dev 0.277∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.00262) (0.00262)
BkDevOfferY 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0983∗∗∗
(0.0210) (0.0199)
Active Bk Dev 0.565∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(0.00367) (0.00368)
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Table 1.10 – continued: Partial Adjustment Speeds-Excluding Concurrent
Equity Actions
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year, SEO=0
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year, SBB=0
∆ Book Lev ∆ Active BkLev ∆ Book Lev ∆ Active BkLev
ActBkDevOfferY -0.0648 -0.00681
(0.0338) (0.0312)
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.332 0.193 0.332
Observations 48166 48165 48189 48188
Panel C: Over-levered Firms
Book Dev 0.342∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(0.00389) (0.00390)
BkDevOfferY 0.902∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗
(0.0445) (0.0433)
Active Bk Dev 0.690∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.00430) (0.00430)
ActBkDevOfferY 0.364∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.0403) (0.0380)
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.379 0.165 0.379
Observations 43,270 43,270 43,260 43,260
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Chapter 2
Target Leverage Deviations
& Convertible Debt Design
1
2.1 Introduction
How do firms design convertible bonds? A large literature has theorized and
empirically shown the effects of information asymmetries, real investment options,
and demand market characteristics on the design of convertible bonds2. However,
target leverage objectives, which capture a wide range of firm characteristics and
financing needs, have not been examined as a determinant of convertible bond
issuance and design. Prior work shows that firms quickly correct target leverage
deviations following the issuance of convertible debt, often through reliance on the
bond’s equity features (Eldemire-Poindexter (2016)). This trend raises questions
about manager’s ex ante intentions to rely on conversion terms and provisions to
address target leverage objectives.
Firms often drift away from the target capital structures that represent an optimal
balance of the cost and benefits of debt financing 3. The resulting target leverage
deviations affect a number of firm activities, ranging from security issuance and
1Eldemire-Poindexter, A. To be submitted.
2See Lewis et al. (1999), Lewis et al. (2003),Korkeamaki and Moore (2004), Krishnaswami and
Yaman (2008), de Jong, Duca, and Dutordoir (2013), Grundy and Verwijmeren (2018)
3The existence of target leverage ratios is well documented, most notably by Rajan and Zingales
(1995), Hovakimian et al. (2001), Flannery and Rangan (2006), DeAngelo et al. (2011). Leary and
Roberts (2005) and Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) highlight patterns of target
leverage deviations and suggest adverse selection cost may dominate capital structure decisions
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repurchase decisions to merger and acquisition activities (Hovakimian et al. (2001),
Warr, Elliott, Koëter-Kant, and Öztekin (2012), Uysal (2011), Harford, Klasa,
and Walcott (2009)). Generally, adjustments to leverage are costly, so without
an expectation of positive net benefits, managers will not pursue equity or debt
offerings Leary and Roberts (2005). The fore-mentioned studies consistently find
that over-levered firms are less likely to issue debt in form of straight bonds, noting
the cost of financing- which include high solicitation and underwriting transaction
costs, and concerns about negative reputation or performance signals.
In this paper, I examine how the design features in convertible bonds are related to
a firm’s need to move towards a more optimal capital structure. With evidence that
target deviations directly influence managerial decisions on straight debt and equity
issuance, we should also expect to observe a significant relationship between target
leverage deviations and convertible bond issuance4. Moreover, for firms trying to
maintain or reach an optimal capital structure, the leverage dynamics that motivate
security issuance should also affect security design as a necessary step in the issuance
process. That is, firms issuing convertible bonds to close the gap between target and
current leverage would be expected to carefully choose the features of the offer. These
features include the conversion price (premium), conversion option delta, provisions
for call, put, and redemption options, and maturity.
Univariate results show significant differences between the target capital structures
and leverage deviations of firms that do and do not seek external financing. Three
groups of firms (firm-year panels) are evident throughout the sample period of
4Chapter 1 tests for consistency across the determinants of target leverage verify that convertible
issuers do target optimal leverage ratios. Replicating established literature, proxy determinants of
target leverage were used to estimate optimal leverage ratios by simple ols, least squares dependent
variable (LSDV), and generalized method of moments as in (Hovakimian et al. (2001), Hovakimian,
Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004), Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and
Faulkender et al. (2012)). Estimates across all extant models are consistent with the expectations of
targeting behavior. Compared to non-issuers, firms issuing convertible debt tend to have higher real
and target leverage ratios, as well as wider target leverage deviations in the time preceding issuance.
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1990-2015: firms that do not pursue any public security issuance, firms that publicly
issue equity, and firms that publicly issue both equity and debt. Compared to
inactive issuers, both firms raising equity only and firms raising debt capital have
meaningfully higher target leverage ratios but only slightly larger target leverage
deviations. However, relative to each other, active issuers of debt financing have
higher targets and meaningfully larger target deviations. Logistic regression results
confirm a positive relationship between larger target leverage deviations the decisions
to pursue public security issuance. Moreover, amongst active issuers, firms with
larger target deviations more likely to choose a convertible bond offer instead of
issuing equity, straight debt, or abstaining from issuance.
To examine the relationship between capital structure objectives and convertible
design I examine the cross-section of at-issuance terms and provisions of convertible
bond offers. For each offer, I estimate the at-issuance sensitivity of the conversion
option (delta), likelihood of achieving conversion, and the standalone conversion
option value as in Black and Scholes (1973) and Lewis et al. (1999). Consistent with
the security issuance literature, namely de Jong et al. (2013), Lewis and Verwijmeren
(2011), and Grundy and Verwijmeren (2018), this analysis includes several market
conditions and macroeconomic conditions known to affect issuance decisions.
In addition to contract provisions, structural differences in security registration
methods can also provide managers the ability to affect outstanding bonds.
Convertible bonds often originate in the Rule-144a (R144a) market and are re-issued
as Exchange Traded offers at a later date. Re-issued public bonds typically retain
the original R144a offer terms (e.g. maturity, coupon, provisions), but the conversion
terms and principal offer amount may be adjusted to reflect current conditions.
Moreover, in both the R114a and public markets, following well received offers, firm’s
may pursue expansion offers containing identical bond and conversion terms but
differing principal amounts (e.g. Series A, Series B). Likewise for Rule-415 offers,
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the half-life of shelf registered convertible bonds may allow issuers to delay formal
issuance for more favorable timing, for instance, a time when the stock price is within
close range of the conversion price.
I find that issuance strategies tend to vary with both the size and direction of
the target leverage deviations. Over-levered firms issuing in the R144A market tend
to have longer maturity periods and include put provisions, but do not face higher
coupon expenses or reduced principal amounts than under-levered R144A issuers.
Alternatively, under-levered firms issuing convertibles in exchange traded markets
offer more callable bonds and tend to sell at a sizable discount (29%).
The following discussion summarizes the theoretical motivations and empirical
studies surrounding the topics of optimal capital structure, convertible debt, and
utility maximizing security choice. Sample data, summary statistics, and regression
analysis are reported in the Data, Key Findings, and Results sections, respectively.
2.2 Analytical Framework
2.2.1 Convertible Design
It is a stylized fact that managers influence several design aspects of convertible
bond offers (Lewis and Verwijmeren (2011), Dutordoir et al. (2014))5. Managers
directly impact the conversion exercise price (premium) and maturity period to
mimic straight debt or common equity (Brennan and Kraus (1987), Brennan and
Schwartz (1988), Lewis et al. (1999), Lewis et al. (2003)) Moreover, there is strong
evidence that the inclusion of provisions such as dilution protections, calls, and puts
are related to asymmetric information barriers and financing constraints, (Mayers
(1998), Korkeamaki and Moore (2004), Chemmanur and Simonyan (2010)).
5The primary theories of convertible issuance suggests that well positioned firms use convertibles
as a mechanism to overcome adverse selection barriers (back-door-equity hypothesis, Stein (1992),
or as a mechanism to mitigate managerial agency problems (sequential financing hypothesis, Mayers
(1998).
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Another line of literature examining the external drivers of convertible issuance
highlights macroeconomic and market fluctuations which are highly correlated with
convertible issuance (Krishnaswami and Yaman (2008), Dutordoir and Van de Gucht
(2007), Mann, Moore, and Ramanlal (1999)) stream also highlights particular periods
and conditions when counter-party purchasers have had a dominant influence over
issuance trends Choi, Getmansky, Henderson, and Tookes (2010), de Jong et al.
(2013), Grundy and Verwijmeren (2018). To capture the impact of target leverage
deviations on the convertible bond design features, I account for market wide
equity volatility and cumulative returns, aggregate investor demand, macroeconomic
conditions and firm-specific equity and growth characteristics. These controls help
distinguish the connections between a firms need to move towards target leverage
and the delta, post-conversion equity, maturity, and provision design features of
convertible bonds.
A combination of explicit and implicit features shape the design characteristics
of convertible bonds. Explicit terms, like the conversion premium and maturity
date, become determining factors of implied conversion (equity) option features.
As such, individual components either provide too little information for relevant
comparisons, or provide biased information when considered without the context
of the additional components. Building on the insights and methodologies from the
highlighted literature, my proxies for convertible design include the implied Delta
measure as well as the explicit maturity, conversion ratio (new equity), and call
protection period terms.
Delta
Examining the chosen conversion strike price, conversion ratio, and bond provisions
can reveal how much alignment exist between convertible bond offers and broader
capital structure objectives Mayers (1998). The firm’s choice of strike price and
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conversion ratio determines the conversion-option delta value, a measure of the
sensitivity of the conversion option to the underlying commodity (common stock).
These terms also directly influence the value of the conversion-option (equity-option)
as well as the likelihood of achieving conversion at the time of issuance 6. I examine
the following proposition using the Black-Scholes option pricing model, detailed
in Appendix A, for measures of at-issuance conversion option deltas, conversion
likelihoods, and conversion option values:
Proposition 1. If capital structure objectives are a determinant of at-issuance
conversion option value,
i. Over-levered firms concerned with levering down will be more prone to offer
in-the-money (ITM) or at-the-money (ATM) convertible bond
ii. Under-levered firms concerned with levering-up will be more prone to issuing
out-of-the-money (OTM) bonds
New Equity, Maturity, Call Protections
The standard B.S. model, which best fits non-callable options, can yield noisy
estimates of the implied delta and conversion likelihood measures for callable
convertible bonds Lewis and Verwijmeren (2011). As in Lewis et al. (1999) and
de Jong et al. (2013), I use a simultaneous equations framework with two-stage least
squares to examine the amount of post-conversion (new) equity, maturity, and call
protection period design features. I extend the model and the set of instrumental
6Poindexter (2014) provides a detailed literature review.
48
variables used throughout the system to incorporate the target deviation measure:
NewEquity = a0 + a1LogBookDev + a2Maturity + a3CallPP
+ a4FC + a5OC + a6MP + a7MD + a8MC (2.1)
Maturity = b0 + b1LogBookDev + b2NewEquity + b3CallPP
+ b4FC + b5OC + b6MP + b7MD + b8MC (2.2)
CallProtection = c0 + c1LogBookDev + c2NewEquity + c3Maturity
+ c4FC + c5OC + c6MP + c7MD + c8MC (2.3)
with the instrumental variables,
ˆLogBookDev =pi00+pi01Pr(NoPublicOffer)+pi02CAPXAT+Π0X + v1 (2.4)
ˆNewEquity =pi10+pi11ConvPremium+Π1X + v2 (2.5)
ˆMaturity =pi20+pi21TermSpread+pi32DebtMaturity+Π2X + v2 (2.6)
ˆCallPP =pi30+pi31EPSgrowth+Π3X + v3 (2.7)
NewEquity is calculated as the natural log of number of new shares issued
to convertible bondholders under full conversion normalized by the total shares
outstanding on the month-end prior to issuance.Maturity is years to maturity
measured at issuance, CallProtection is calculated as the length of the call protection
period divided by maturity. CallProtection is equal to one for non-callable
convertibles. The instrument Pr(NoPublicOffer) is the one minus the probability
of seeking public financing estimated in equation 2.11 of the following discussion.
The market performance variables, MP, include measures of market wide equity
run-ups, volatility, and sentiment. Following Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and
Lowry (2003) market runup (MarketRunup), calculated as the return on the
S&P 500 index over the quarter preceding the offer, accounts for general market
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conditions. Annualized return volatility from daily returns on the S&P 500 index
(MarketVolatility) over the quarter preceding an offer captures uncertainty about
market returns as in de Jong et al. (2013). Following Lowry (2003) and Helwege and
Liang (2004), to capture general investor sentiments that effect issuance decisions I
use a measure of the VIXindex, calculated as the annual averages of the daily S&P
500 volatility index for year preceding issuance.
The market demand variables, MD, include measures of aggregate interest in
equity, straight debt, and convertible securities. Aggregate capital inflows to mutual
funds proxy market demand (supply of capital), as in Choi et al. (2010) and de Jong
et al. (2013), to distinguish between issuance decisions that are motivated by internal
willingness or desire to raise capital and decisions motivated by external shocks to the
availability of time-sensitive capital. Aggregate flows to funds with majority holdings
of equity, straight debt, and convertible debt are specified as:
MFF = Percentage F lowt =
∑N
i=1Dollar F lowit∑N
i=1Assetsi,t−1
(2.8)
Dollar F lowi,t = Assetsi,t − Assetsi,t−1(1 + ri,t)
The macroeconomic variables, MC, include the real interest rate (InterestRate)
and term speard (TermSpread). Following Krishnaswami and Yaman (2008), the real
interest rate (InterestRate) serves as a proxy for bankruptcy risk. Interest rates are
calculated as the difference between the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds and the
inflation rate from the continuously compounded annual change in the U.S. consumer
price index. Term spread(TermSpread), which is defined as the difference between
yields on 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds and 3-month U.S. Treasury Bills, accounts for
business conditions and expected investment opportunities, as in Korajczyk and Levy
(2003) and Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2012).
Proposition 2. If capital structure objectives are a determinant of convertible bond
50
design,
i. A positive relationship exist between deviation size and the amount of potential
new equity
ii. A positive relationship exist between both of the size and direction deviations
and maturity length
ii. A negative relationship exist between both of the size and direction deviations
and call protection periods
Call Provisions
Amongst the additional features of convertible bonds, call options are the most noted
provision as callability can affect every aspect of the offering and also impact the
equity and capital structure of the issuer. While bond call options grant issuers
the right to enter early settlement with bondholders, convertible bond call options
are distinct because the settlement request is effectively an ultimatum on equity
conversion 7. Cash flow concerns and back-door equity motivations dominate the
likelihood of including call provisions (King and Mauer (2014), Bechmann, Lunde, and
Zebedee (2014)). Moreover, firms with in-the-money convertible issues typically take
little delay to call outstanding bonds (Grundy and Verwijmeren (2018)). Accordingly,
over-levered firms with capital structure objectives to reduce leverage may be most
inclined to include call option provisions.
However, including call option provisions can be costly for issuers as bondholders
typically require higher coupons to compensate for uncertainty around call events.
Since the mid 1990s, the use of call provisions has steadily declined, especially
7When called, convertible bondholders can choose between settlement in the form of new equity,
with shares proportional to the conversion rate, or a cash refund of the initial purchase (offering)
price, which is typically below par value.
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amongst firms relying on issuance under Rule-144A (Grundy and Verwijmeren (2018),
Grundy and Verwijmeren (2016)). Amongst convertible bond issuers that do include
call provisions, firms with short horizon investment opportunities are less likely to
include call provisions than firms with longer investment horizons (Korkeamaki and
Moore (2004), Mayers (1998)). Issuers with relatively small target leverage deviations,
due to intermediate/mature capital expenditures or other interim activities, may have
less demand for an explicit call option provision.
Proposition 3. If the potential benefits of convertible bond call provisions are related
to the firms target leverage objectives,
i. A positive relationship exist between deviation size and the likelihood of call
option provisions
ii. A negative relationship exist between deviation direction (from under to over)
and the likelihood of call option provisions
iii. A negative relationship exist between negotiated offers, particularly Rule-144A
offers, and the likelihood of call option provisions
Focusing on the connections between the design features of convertible bonds and
a firms need to move towards target leverage, analysis ultimately begins with a model
of firm-level target leverage ratios and target leverage deviations. Next, to disentangle
the relationship between convertible bond design and target leverage deviations, the
effects of target leverage deviations are examined across three key stages of security
issuance: security choice, security design, and market choice (issuance strategy).
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2.2.2 Target Leverage Ratios and Deviations
Consistent with Flannery and Hankins (2013), optimal leverage, L∗i,t, is a function of
observable and unobservable firm characteristics with the form:
L∗i =β Xi + Fi (2.9)
whereXi is a vector of firm characteristics and Fi is a firm level fixed effect. Firm fixed
effects capture unobserved but inter-temporally constant effects on a firm’s leverage
ratio and target capital structure. To empirically estimate L∗i,t and incorporate firm
fixed effects, the specification in (2.9) is extended to account for partial leverage
adjustments and short panel bias 8. Target leverage is estimated under the model:
Li,t+1 =λ(β Xi,t)+λ(Fi) + (1−λ)(Li,t) + δi,t (2.10)
The coefficient vectors β and λ are estimated concurrently by the Blundell and
Bond (1998) system GMM for dynamic panel models. GMM estimated target ratios
are adjusted with firm fixed effects, which are calculated as the mean residual of the
short panel bias model in (2.10).
Following Flannery and Rangan (2006) the characteristics vector includes lagged
book (market) leverage, earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total
assets (EBIT/TA), market to book ratio of assets (MB), and the log of real total assets
(LnTA).9 Higher profitability (EBIT/TA) may mechanically reduce leverage and high
8Leary and Roberts (2005) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) develop a standard model of partial
leverage adjustments with the form
Li,t −Li,t−1 = λ(L∗i,t −Li,t−1) + ˜i,t ; where Li,t and Li,t−1 are time t and lagged leverage, and the
speed of adjustment, λ, is the percentage of a typical firm’s target deviation closed over a year (δ
t).
9A full list of firm characteristics is provided in Appendix A.
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MB firms may prefer to protect valuable growth opportunities by limiting or closely
monitoring leverage (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hovakimian et al. (2001)). Size
may imply higher leverage as size is closely related to transparency, asset volatility,
and access to public debt markets (Faulkender et al. (2012)). When considering
convertible bond issuers, the determinants of target leverage, particularly profitability
and market-to-book, may deviate from expectations. Convertible debt issuers have
been characterized as opaque, low-medium quality firms with positive prospects
(Stein (1992)). Empirical studies find that issuers tend to have higher leverage
than industry peers and are often considered over-levered given their asset set and
growth opportunities (Mayers (1998), Lewis et al. (1999)). High leverage and growth
potential are conflicting attributes in the target leverage literature.
2.2.3 Target Deviations and Security Issuance, Security Choice
Firm characteristics, security attributes, market conditions, or overlaps across and
within these factors may influence security issuance decisions. Standard in the
issuance literature, binomial logit regressions model initial public financing decisions
across firms. I use quarterly and annual measures of demand for each security to
incorporate the different circumstances tied to each option. Time specific demand for
each security differentiates each alternative security option and also reflects variation
in external factors surrounding the individual decision events within a firm.
Public Financing
In general, firms have access to several capital markets. In addition to public
exchanges, managers can often rely on quicker and less costly financing methods
such as private placements or bank lending. Since alternatives for external capital
exist, the choice to engage in expensive public offerings may reflect key information
about the underlying capital structure needs and objectives of the issuing firm. If so,
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what is the shape of the relationship between target deviation levels and the decisions
to seek public financing? Is there anything inconsistent or special about the capital
structure of firms that do not regularly offer public securities?
Model 2.11 presents a multi-level logistic regression model of annual target
leverage deviations on public issuance events:
Pr(PubIssueijk = 1) =β0+δijk ∗ |Dev|ijk+β FCijk+α*MCi + ujk + vk (2.11)
for k=1,..., L independent industry clusters with j=1,...,mk nested firm clusters that
contain i=1,...,njk yearly observations. PubIssue is the binary outcome equal to one if
the firm publicly issued equity, straight debt, or convertible debt. |Dev|, FC, and MC
are fixed effects covariates for deviation size, firm-specific characteristics, as well as
market and macroeconomic conditions. In conditioning on two sets of random effects
across industry clusters, vj, and firm clusters, ujk, the multi-level model accounts for
endogeneity concerns in the issuance decision and modeled deviation measure through
firm-level random effects.
Security Choice
In-line with the multinomial security choice analysis of Erel et al. (2012), discrete
alternative-specific multinomial logit regressions (McFadden’s Choice) model the
security selection decision between equity, straight debt, convertible debt, or
non-issuance. Under the standard multinomial logistic model, selecting between
equity, straight debt, or convertible debt does not satisfy the assumptions of
independent and irrelevant alternatives (i.i.a) for the sample of firms with observable
capital structure determinants and stock price histories10. The alternative-specific
10Although i.i.a. assumptions are weakly violated, security choice is also modeled under a
variation of McFadden’s Choice, the alternative specific conditional logit model:
Pr(yij = 1) = Xiβ + (ziA)′ (2.12)
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McFadden’s Choice model incorporates attributes of each alternative option and
accounts for correlations across selected outcomes to relax the i.i.a. assumptions.
In this discrete model each observed security issuance event is expanded to
explicitly capture the contemporaneous characteristics of the alternative securities.
Within this analysis, firm-years without observable equity, debt, or convertible
debt offerings are classified as a No Issuance alternative. Subsequently, every
firm-year has a minimum of one issuance event spanning the four discrete
alternatives with identical contemporaneous firm characteristics, market conditions,
and macroeconomic conditions, excluding security-specific market demand.
Since conditions surrounding and within the firm remain fixed throughout each
discrete decision event, selection and rejection outcomes reveal information about the
determinant factors of the utility maximizing choice. The utility function for optimal
security issuance is modeled as:
Uia =βixia+α wia+δazi+ia (2.13)
=βiMD(CapitalSupply)ia+α SecurityOptionia+δa[FCi,MPi,MCi]+ia
for i-firms and a=1,2,3,4 alternative outcomes.βi case-specific random coefficients
and α fixed coefficients load on the alternative-specific (security-specific) variable
vectors xia and wia respectively. deltaa security-specific fixed coefficients load on
the vector of case-specific (firm-specific) variables zi. This mixed multinomial logit
model is approximated by maximum simulated likelihood; the process first estimates
the density function f(β) and then determines choice probabilities under the standard
For i-firms and j=1,2,3,4 alternative outcomes, yij = 1 when security j is chosen and yij = 0
otherwise. Results for the alternative specific conditional model, reported in Appendix D.1, show
similar factor loadings (direction and significance) of deviation size on security choice.
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logistic probability function:
Pia(β) =
e(xiaβi+wiaα+ziδa)∑A
α=1 e
xiaβi+wiaα+iδa
(2.14)
Since the design features of a convertible bond give the offer more debt-like or
equity-like attributes, the discrete choice setting is particularly useful to distinguish
the selection of a convertible bond over a straight bond or equity offering.
Proposition 4. If capital structure objectives are a determinant of convertible
issuance,
i. A positive relationship exist between deviation size and the likelihood of issuing
convertible debt
ii. A positive relationship exist between deviation direction (from under to over)
and the likelihood of issuing convertible debt
2.3 Data
I examine the features of all corporate convertible bond offers (CCOV) between
1990-2015 with known coupon rates and maturities as recorded and available in
Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). FISD maintains details on debt
issues and issuers of U.S. corporate, agency, and treasury bonds. The sample excludes
non-conventional convertibles such as Medium Term Notes (MTN) and Contingent
Convertibles (CoCo). I draw from several additional data sources to incorporate
equity and straight debt offerings, estimate capital structure ratios, and account for
the firm-specific characteristics, market conditions, and macroeconomic factors known
to effect issuance activity.
Screening for securities from U.S. corporates, Thompson Reuters-SDC provided
equity offerings of common stock (Common Shares, Ord/Common Shs.), and FISD
57
provided data for straight bond issues (CDEB). To construct target capital structure
estimates, firms must have at least two years of consecutive annual fundamental
financial data in Compustat as well as an industry classification. Given the scope of
FISD’s bond coverage, sample firms require annual financials between 1989-2015. The
sample excludes regulated firms (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999).
CRSP provided daily stock prices and S&P 500 returns to calculate market and
firm-specific equity volatilities11. The CRSP-Survivorship-Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database provided monthly fund flow data used to proxy market demand for equity
and debt securities. Aggregated fund flows between 1989-2015 include corporate
convertible bond mutual funds with a 50% convertible bond basis or Strategic Index
(SI)/Lipper Objective (LO) codes CVR and CV. As well as corporate straight bond
mutual funds with a 50% straight bond basis or SI/LO codes CHQ, CMQ, CSM,
CIM, CHY, CGN, CPR, A, BBB, CPB, and equity mutual funds with a 50% equity
basis or SI/LO codes AGG, GRO, GRI, BAL, G, GI, B, I. Federal Reserve Bank
Reports (WRDS) provided interest rate and treasury yield data.
The full sample of firms with sufficient financial and stock price data include
10,373 firms spanning 95,851 firm-years. Within the full firm sample, no publicly
issued equity or debt is observed for 50,500 firm-years, and 20,230 firm-years report
public issuance of equity securities only. 3,679 unique firms spanning 45,351 firm-years
report at least one public issuance of debt or equity securities throughout the sample
period. The sample of new and unique security offerings includes 3,145 common
equity offers, 3,895 straight bond offers, and 1,219 convertible bond offers.
11To appropriately value most convertible bond features, CRSP’s daily stock prices must map to
several dates within sample period. The specific dates of interest include the offer date, delivery date,
any conversion term adjustment dates, the conversion option’s expiration date, and the maturity
date.Conversion term adjustments primarily result from stock splits or changes to the underlying
commodity due to merger and acquisition activities.
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2.3.1 Sample Description: Firm Characteristics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics and univariate analysis of target leverage ratios,
target deviations, and the vector of firm characteristics (Xi,t−1) used to estimate
target leverage ratios. Within the Summary Statistics panel, column one includes
the full sample of firm-years and column two contains the panel years of firms with
no security issuance events during the sample period. The full samples is consistent
with the Compustat universe samples presented in Flannery and Rangan (2006) and
Faulkender et al. (2012). Column three contains the panel years of firms with at least
one common equity, straight bond, or convertible bond issue, column four contains
the panel years of firms with only common equity issues, and column five contains
the panel years of firms issuing either straight or convertible bonds. The sample of
active debt and equity issuers is consistent with the subsample of convertible issuers
discussed in Chapter 1.
The sample statistics are consistent with prior literature modeling the optimal
capital structure of the Compustat universe of publicly traded firms. The sample’s
firm characteristics most closely resemble Danis, Rettl, and Whited (2014), who
examine a similar time period (1984-2011) and similar sample of non-regulated,
non-financial firms12. Firms with debt financing generate most of the variation
across the univariate analysis of target leverage determinants (firm characteristics).
Profitability and R&D, both scaled by total assets, are notable differences in the
respective t-test between inactive firms, firms actively issuing debt and equity
securities, and firms issuing common equity. Proportional to both inactive and equity
only firms, firms with debt financing are at least twice as profitable and spend three
times less on R&D expenditures. At the 1% significance level, firms with public debt
financing have larger target leverage deviations and are 40% more levered relative to
12Danis et al. (2014) report quarterly mean (median) book leverage ratios of 23.3% (19.6%). For
a sample spanning 1965-2006 Faulkender et al. (2012) report annual book leverage ratios of 25.3%
(22.8%) and book deviations of 3.3% (1.6%).
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firms that are inactive in the public capital markets and firms that only raise equity
publicly. These differences persist when inactive firms are excluded from comparison.
2.4 Key Findings
Convertible Bond Offer series, Market Strategy
Convertible bonds often originate in the Rule-144a (R144a) market and then later
re-issued as Exchange Traded offers. Re-issued public offers typically retain the
original R144a-bond’s terms (e.g. maturity, coupon, provisions) but the conversion
terms and principal offer amount may be adjusted to reflect current conditions. In
both the R114a and public markets, following well received offers, firm’s may pursue
expansion offers containing identical bond and conversion terms but different principal
amounts (e.g. Series A, Series B). Further, tender offers and rollovers can impact an
existing issue’s outstanding principal, conversion terms, or bond terms. As such, it is
important to identify and distinguish the original issue when firms can use re-issuance,
expansion series, or tender offers to modify a bond’s conversion terms and conversion
likelihood.
I consider convertible bonds with equivalent maturities, coupon rates, and
sequential offer descriptions (prospectus) to be separate series of one bond chain13.
Sequencing the full sample yields 1,852 convertible bond chains with 1,219 unique
offer chains(series) and a range of 1-4 issue series per chain. Across the sample period
786 firms issue an average of 2 separate convertible bond series. A large portion of
convertible bond chains originate on the R144a market (762), and more than 75%
of these chains become registered publicly issues. The remaining convertible bond
chains originate on exchange traded (public) markets, private markets, or as Rule-415
shelf-registrations.
13For a small set of bonds reissued with different coupon rates I exclusively rely on maturity
dates and prospectus details.
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2.5 Results & Discussion
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics and univariate analysis for the offer details,
conversion options terms, bond features, and provisions of convertible bonds issued
between 1990-2015. This is the first combined analysis for convertible bond terms
relative to target capital structure magnitudes. Univariate test of design terms across
the different issuer attributes highlight an important aspect of the deviation measure.
Target deviations contain two components, first is the relative direction around the
optimal level which distinguish under-levered and over-levered firms. Second is the
relative distance from the optimal level which differentiates a firms dealing with large
and small gaps between the current and optimal capital structure. Absolute values
of the size and an indicator variable for direction are both used through the analysis
to reflect the magnitude of target leverage deviations. The log transformed target
leverage deviation measure is also used throughout the analysis to succinctly capture
both the size and direction components.
Managers issuing convertible debt specify the offering amount, maturity, and
conversion premium- the difference between the strike price and the issue day stock
price. These bond features relay different information about the firm’s objectives. All
else equal, offering amounts reflect the amount of new equity the firm could realize,
and the conversion premium reflects the firm’s eagerness to be within range of realizing
the new equity. Likewise, the maturity periods reflect the window of opportunity for
conversion. Conversion premiums and maturity periods directly influence the value
of the conversion (equity) option as well as the likelihood of achieving conversion at
the time of issuance since. Using details from the initial (original) offers discussed in
Section 2.4, Column 7 of Table 2.2 details univariate test across the top and bottom
quartiles of book deviation size. Firms with larger deviations issue smaller (-91.8M)
more expensive convertible bonds (coupons +59bps), but those offers contain more
potential new equity (factor of 1.89) , have shorter maturities (-2.7years), and higher
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conversion probabilities (+3.4%).
Table 2.3 reports design feature summary statistics for Rule-144A private
placements, Rule-415 shelf-registrations, other private negotiations, and public
exchange market offers. For each market, means and proportions are reported across
market participation and within the market participation by the direction of the
firms leverage deviation. From the univariate test, over-levered firms issuing in the
R144A market tend to have longer maturity periods and include put provisions, but
do not face higher coupon expenses or reduced principal amounts than under-levered
R144A issuers. Alternatively, under-levered firms issuing convertibles in exchange
traded markets offer more callable bonds and tend to sell at a sizable discount (29%).
Further analysis of the differences between these markets follows in Table 2.8.
Table 2.5 reports binomial logit regression results for the security issuance choice
model in equation (2.11). Separate regressions model the determinants of pursuing
security issuance for all firms in the sample and firms classified as Active Issuers;
firms with at least one public offering of equity, straight debt, or convertible debt
during the 1990-2015 sample period. Consistent with prior security issuance studies,
the fully constrained model shows firm-specific characteristics, market demand,
market performance, and macroeconomic conditions are significant determinants of
public financing. Comparing regression results and summary statistics, reported
in columns 1-2 of Table 2.1 and Table 2.4, the inclusion of inactive issuers
greatly magnifies(diminishes) the influence of almost every covariate. These trends
suggest the models are appropriately capturing the higher(lower) bounds of internal
and external circumstances surrounding the decision to raise external financing.
Accordingly, the probability of public issuance, which serves as an instrument for
target leverage deviations, is predicted using the regression coefficients from the full
sample of inactive and active issuers.
The remainder of the analysis excludes all inactive issuers. The security choice and
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design questions examined in Tables 2.6 - 2.8 require at least one positive response
away from the base level. With no public offerings during the 25 year sample period,
inactive firms lack any observations selecting an alternative security to non-issuance,
and thus reveal no usable information in the positive response setting. The following
discussions are based on the active sample of firms that participate in observable
capital markets.
Table 2.6 reports regression results for McFadden’s mixed multinomial logit model
of security choice. Recalling equations (2.13) and (2.14), McFadden’s model uses fixed
characteristics and random attributes, factors which vary across decision events and
between alternative securities, to model correlated choices across equity, debt, and
convertible debt securities. Instead of restricting the model to uncorrelated choices or
ignoring these effects altogether, each choice is evaluated as discrete observations of
utility maximizing decisions. To construct the discrete setting forMcFadden’s Choice,
each observed security offering is duplicated four times to incorporate the three
alternative securities the firm could have issued but rejected instead. As required in
the model, all event-specific issue and issuer covariates are duplicated for each rejected
alternative in the event set. The dependent variable (Security Selected) has a base
value of 0 for each option and a single non-zero value (1) for the security the firm chose
to issue. Firm-years without an observable public equity, debt, or convertible debt
offers are categorized as selecting No Issuance. All regressions accounts for the market
performance, market demand, and macroeconomic conditions used throughout the
analysis.
Aggregate flows into mutual funds which have concentrated holdings of equity,
straight debt, and convertible debt, respectively, are the random alternative-specific
characteristics in the mixed multinomial model. Time-specific market demands for a
particular security can shift issuance preferences for all options. In the first model of
Table 2.6, the positive and significant coefficient for security specific market demand
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(MFFi=CD,SD,CD) is evidence that higher demand for a security increases the
likelihood it is chosen. The standard deviation coefficient captures variation in the
ways that firms respond to demand for a specific security. The coefficient on the
standard deviation of average market demand effects is significant at the 1% level,
indicating strong heterogeneity in the influence of market demand on security choice.
However, market demands alone have little impact on issuance when non-issuance
outcomes are excluded from the choice set in the second model. Taken together,
the models suggest that changing market demands do not independently influence
security choice once firms have decided to raise capital.
Considering the magnitude of target leverage deviations, firms with wider
deviations and over-levered firms are more likely to choose convertible debt relative
to non-issuance, straight debt, or equity. Significance on the squared deviation
term indicates a diminishing preference for both straight debt and convertible debt
as deviation gaps widen. This trend is consistent with the limited debt capacity
and lower credit quality associated with highly levered firms. The over/under
directional measure of target leverage deviations is negative and significant for the
full choice set in model 1 and insignificant for the reduced choice set in model 2. Yet,
deviation direction coefficients are significant for common equity, which suggest that
over-levered firms are more likely to choose equity than any form of debt, all else
equal.
Table 2.7 reports regression results for the system of equations in (2.1)-(2.3)
modeling the endogenous design terms maturity, new equity, and call protection
period. Using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework, models 1-3 report
second-stage coefficient results and first-stage fit statistics using the instrumental
variables in 2.4-2.7. The natural logarithmic measure of target leverage
deviations,Log(BookDev), is excluded from model-1, treated as an exogenous variable
in model-2, and instrumented as an endogenous variable in model-3. Repeating this
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structure for each design term’s independent 2SLS regression, Appendix D.2 reports
endogeneity test statistics for the instrumental variables. Consistent with Lewis and
Verwijmeren (2011) and Dutordoir et al. (2014), the instruments conversion premium
(new equity), term spread and debt maturity (maturity), and natural log of growth
in earnings per share (call protection period) are valid and exogenous in full form
equations. Within the simultaneous estimation results, coefficients on maturity, call
protection periods, overallotment allowances, and equity volatility are also consistent
with the findings in (Lewis and Verwijmeren (2011) and Dutordoir et al. (2014)). Log
scaled target leverage deviations do not significantly effect the new equity, maturity,
or call protection periods bond terms.
Both natural log and absolute value-directional indicator measure of target
leverage deviations are used to model the probabilities of including call, put, and
redemption options. Table 2.8 reports multinomial logit results for three types of call
options; non-callable, callable but not enforcible for three or more years, or callable
and enforcible within three years. Columns 5-6 and columns 7-8 report binomial
logit results for put and redemption options respectively. Consistent with Grundy
and Verwijmeren (2018), Rule-144A offers significant reduce the probability of issuing
a convertible bond callable within three years. The coefficients across IssueMarket, a
categorical ranking of exchange offers, other/private negotiated offers, rule-415 offers,
and rule-144A offers, respectively, suggests shelf registrations and negotiated offers
have call protection periods in general. Consistent with Chemmanur and Simonyan
(2010), longer maturity bonds from firms with better credit quality are more likely
to have put provisions. Covariate effects for redemption provisions, which allow for
to early repurchases and retirement, follow a similar trend as short call protected
offers. All else equal, firms with larger target leverage deviations are less likely to
offer callable bonds with short protection periods and over-levered firms are more
likely to extend put provisions.
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Considering the univariate test and multivariate regression results altogether,
target leverage deviations are a significant determinant in the decision to issue
convertible debt and a modest determinant of the subsequent design features. These
findings are robust to controls for market wide equity volatility and cumulative
returns, aggregate investor demand, macroeconomic conditions and firm-specific
equity and growth characteristics.
2.6 Summary
This analysis sits in the cross-sections of theoretical and empirical studies on
the existence and determinants of optimal capital structure, external financing,
convertible bond issuance, and convertible bond design. Within this setting, I
examine how the terms and provisions of convertible bond offers are related to
the target capital structure needs of the issuing firm. Modeling firm-level target
leverage ratios and target leverage deviations, the analysis focus on three key capital
structure decisions to disentangle the relations between target leverage objectives
and convertible design. Using frameworks motivated in the literature, security
issuance models test the likelihood of the first decision to undertake any public
security offerings, and the following decision to offer common equity, straight debt,
or convertible debt. The third decision(s) on security design address the influence of
existing annual target leverage deviations on the conversion terms, provisions, and
primary features (e.g. amount of potential new equity, maturity) written into new
convertible bond issues.
Accounting for market wide equity volatility and cumulative returns, aggregate
investor demand, macroeconomic conditions and firm-specific equity and growth
characteristics, I find that drifts (deviations) from target capital structure have a
positive and significant effect on convertible bond issuance. Yet, the magnitude and
direction of target deviations have varying effects on the sensitivity of conversion
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terms, principal offer amounts, and the inclusion of call, put, and redemption
provisions. Altogether, target leverage deviations are a significant determinant
in decisions to raise external financing through convertible debt and a modest
determinant of the subsequent design features.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Target Leverage Deviations
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Continuous Design Terms
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Firm Characteristics
Summary statistics and univariate analysis for target leverage ratios, target deviations, and the vector of firm characteristics
(Xi,t−1) used to estimate target leverage ratios. With the restriction that L∗i = βXi + Fi, annual target leverage ratios are
modeled as: Li,t+1 = (λβ)(Xi,t) − (1 − λ)(Li,t) + Fi + ˜i,t where, the coefficient vectors β and λ are estimated concurrently
by Blundell and Bond (1998) system-GMM for dynamic panel models. Following Flannery and Hankins (2013), firm fixed
effects Fi are equivalent to the mean within panel residuals. The full sample consist of all Compustat firms with at least two
years of complete balance sheet data and coverage in CRSP. Regulated and financial firms are excluded. The sample period is
1989-2016 to align with available data for bond issuances in Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). Thompson
Reuters-SDC provided common equity issues. Within the Summary Statistics panel: column one includes the full sample of
firm-years, column two contains the panel years of firms with no security issuance events during the sample period, column
three contains the panel years of firms with at least one common equity, straight bond, or convertible bond issue, column four
contains the panel years of firms with only common equity issues, and column five contains the panel years of firms issuing
either straight or convertible bonds. Within the Univariate Analysis panel: columns 1-3 present mean t-test between inactive
firms and all active firms, firms issuing common equity only, and firms issuing debt, respectively. Column four presents mean
t-test between firms issuing common equity only and firms issuing debt. Appendix A details variable descriptions. Medians in
brackets, standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Summary Statistics Univariate Analysis
Full Sample Inactive Active CE only CE&D Inact-Active Inact-CE Inact-CE&D CE-CE&D
L∗BDR 0.228 0.214 0.244 0.171 0.326 -0.030∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
[0.19] [0.17] [0.22] [0.13] [0.29] (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
|DevBDR| 0.091 0.087 0.096 0.083 0.095 -0.009∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
[0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
L∗MDR 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.166 0.315 0.000 0.064∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
[0.18] [0.17] [0.19] [0.11] [0.28] (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
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Table 2.1 – continued: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Firm Characteristics
Summary Statistics Univariate Analysis
Full Sample Inactive Active CE only CE&D Inact-Active Inact-CE Inact-CE&D CE-CE&D
|DevMDR| 0.101 0.102 0.100 0.086 0.112 0.002∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.08] (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Xit :
LBDR 0.226 0.213 0.242 0.171 0.327 -0.029∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
[0.18] [0.15] [0.21] [0.10] [0.31] (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LMDR 0.219 0.218 0.220 0.156 0.311 -0.002 0.063∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
[0.14] [0.12] [0.15] [0.06] [0.26] (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PROF/TA 0.039 0.023 0.057 -0.002 0.134 -0.034∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
[0.10] [0.09] [0.11] [0.09] [0.13] (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
MB 1.821 1.749 1.901 2.129 1.494 -0.152∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗
[1.23] [1.14] [1.32] [1.44] [1.16] (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
DEP/TA 0.048 0.050 0.047 0.046 0.048 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LnTA 5.171 4.423 6.005 4.848 7.386 -1.581∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -2.963∗∗∗ 2.088∗∗∗
[5.09] [4.32] [5.98] [4.85] [7.41] (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
FA/TA 0.267 0.258 0.276 0.236 0.352 -0.018∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
[0.19] [0.19] [0.20] [0.16] [0.29] (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R&D Ex/TA 0.058 0.055 0.062 0.087 0.018 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R&D 0.486 0.460 0.514 0.554 0.392 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
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Table 2.1 – continued: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Firm Characteristics
Summary Statistics Univariate Analysis
Full Sample Inactive Active CE only CE&D Inact-Active Inact-CE Inact-CE&D CE-CE&D
[0.00] [0.00] [1.00] [1.00] [0.00] (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
IndMedLBDR 0.185 0.186 0.184 0.163 0.227 0.002∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
[0.20] [0.20] [0.19] [0.15] [0.24] (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IndMedLMDR 0.167 0.168 0.165 0.141 0.213 0.003∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
[0.16] [0.17] [0.16] [0.12] [0.21] (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 95851 50500 45351 20230 17529 95851 70730 68029 45351
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Convertible Bond Design Terms
Summary statistics and univariate analysis for the offer details, conversion options terms, bond features, and provisions
of convertible bonds issued between 1990-2015.St−5 is market price of the underlying stock 5 trading days before issuance,
XCP is the conversion price at issuance, and conversion Premium is the percentage difference between the conversion price and
the issuers’ stock price. Offering Amount the total par value (in millions) of debt initially issued. NewEquity is the natural
logarithm of the number of shares issued to convertible bondholders under full conversion normalized by the total shares
outstanding on the month-end prior to issuance. Following Black-Scholes (1973), Delta is a measure of the sensitivity of the
conversion option to the underlying commodity (common stock). Pr( Conversion | t0) is the cumulative probability of reaching
the conversion strike price under the standard normal distribution, and Cv −OptV aluet0 is the value of the conversion option,
priced as a call on equity; Appendix A details the B.S. equations used. Coupon Rate is the current applicable annual interest
rate. Maturity is the number of year between the initial offer date and maturity date. Offer Price is the price as a percentage
of par at which the issue was originally sold to investors. Callable, Putable, Redeemable are indicator variables respectively
equal to 1 if the issue is callable, putable, or redeemable and 0 otherwise. Exchange Offer is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
the issue was sold on a public exchange and equal to 0 if the issue was sold in private negotiations. Rule-144A Offer, Rule-415
Offer are indicator variables respectively equal to 1 if the bond was issued pursuant to Rule-144a or Rule-415 and 0 otherwise.
Parenthesis report standard errors, ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Full Sample Book Dev: Under : Over |q1| : |q4| Market Dev: Under : Over |q1| : |q4|
mean median s.d. mean mean dmean dmean mean mean dmean dmean
St−5 32.273 23.102 57.244 34.705 28.431 6.274∗ 5.268 38.338 19.425 18.912∗∗∗ 6.899∗∗∗
(1.646) (3.072) (4.041) (2.502) (1.959)
XCPt0 43.355 29.771 87.729 47.103 37.435 9.668∗ 9.164 51.603 25.883 25.721∗∗∗ 8.610∗∗
(2.522) (4.580) (5.996) (3.796) (2.703)
Conv Prem 34.072 27.523 37.379 32.952 35.840 -2.888 -2.091 31.537 39.442 -7.905∗∗ -3.428
(1.075) (2.409) (3.316) (2.961) (3.054)
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Table 2.2 – continued: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Convertible Bond Design Terms
Full Sample Book Dev: Under : Over |q1| : |q4| Market Dev: Under : Over |q1| : |q4|
mean median s.d. mean mean dmean dmean mean mean dmean dmean
Offer Amount 279.475 175.000 348.717 286.213 268.827 17.386 91.804∗∗∗ 281.560 275.056 6.505 96.057∗∗∗
(10.025) (20.553) (27.268) (23.244) (26.618)
NewEquity 11.941 10.254 8.488 11.663 12.381 -0.717 -1.892∗∗ 11.313 13.273 -1.960∗∗∗ -5.264∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.528) (0.667) (0.579) (0.713)
Conversion Terms:
Delta 0.780 0.802 0.147 0.787 0.769 0.018∗ -0.032∗∗ 0.783 0.772 0.011 -0.029∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Pr(Conv| t0) 0.238 0.232 0.118 0.242 0.233 0.010 0.034∗∗∗ 0.251 0.213 0.038∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Cv Opt Valt0 31.294 22.406 49.624 33.617 27.624 5.992∗ 3.513 37.256 18.665 18.591∗∗∗ 5.860∗∗
(1.427) (2.746) (3.663) (2.189) (1.921)
Bond Terms:
Coupon Rate 3.723 3.500 2.424 3.686 3.781 -0.095 -0.595∗∗ 3.584 4.018 -0.434∗∗ -1.429∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.147) (0.198) (0.163) (0.201)
Maturity 11.313 7.030 7.929 10.956 11.877 -0.921 2.736∗∗∗ 11.087 11.792 -0.705 2.512∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.477) (0.644) (0.496) (0.638)
Offer Price 97.014 100.000 12.076 97.105 96.863 0.242 -3.003∗∗ 97.010 97.023 -0.013 -1.187
(0.371) (0.773) (0.999) (0.818) (1.033)
Binary Indicators:
Callable 0.570 1.000 0.495 0.565 0.578 -0.012 0.104∗ 0.574 0.562 0.012 -0.002
76
Table 2.2 – continued: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Convertible Bond Design Terms
Full Sample Book Dev: Under : Over |q1| : |q4| Market Dev: Under : Over |q1| : |q4|
mean median s.d. mean mean dmean dmean mean mean dmean dmean
(0.014) (0.029) (0.040) (0.031) (0.041)
Putable 0.272 0.000 0.445 0.242 0.320 -0.078∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.253 0.312 -0.059∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.013) (0.027) (0.036) (0.028) (0.036)
Redeemable 0.666 1.000 0.472 0.664 0.670 -0.006 0.087∗ 0.672 0.655 0.017 0.021
(0.014) (0.028) (0.039) (0.029) (0.038)
Exch. Offer 0.114 0.000 0.318 0.088 0.156 -0.068∗∗∗ -0.057∗ 0.092 0.160 -0.067∗∗ -0.064∗
(0.009) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.026)
R-144A Offer 0.627 1.000 0.484 0.652 0.588 0.063∗ 0.003 0.653 0.572 0.081∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.029) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040)
R-415 Offer 0.177 0.000 0.382 0.157 0.209 -0.052∗ 0.027 0.153 0.227 -0.074∗∗ -0.037
(0.011) (0.023) (0.030) (0.025) (0.032)
Observations 1210 741 469 1210 598 822 388 1210 599
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Convertible Bond Design Across Markets
Summary statistics and univariate analysis of convertible bond offer features across the Rule-144A private placement, Rule-415
shelf-registration, other private negotiation (Panel B), and public exchange markets (Panel B). Across Market columns
summarize all issues outside and inside the respective market. Within columns summarize issues in the respective market that
are offered by under-levered and over-levered firms. Appendix A details variable descriptions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Rule-144A Offers Rule-415 Offers
Across Markets Within, by DevDir Across Markets Within, by DevDir
meanout meanin dmean meanUL meanOL dmean meanout meanin dmean meanUL meanOL dmean
Conv Premium 36.428 32.659 3.768 32.153 33.466 -1.314 34.324 32.910 1.414 33.902 31.798 2.104
Offer Amount 264.283 287.465 -23.182 291.919 281.292 10.627 278.440 280.318 -1.878 306.192 248.120 58.073
NewEquity 13.659 10.929 2.730∗∗∗ 10.708 11.280 -0.572 11.926 12.076 -0.151 10.851 13.617 -2.766∗∗
Delta 0.771 0.786 -0.015∗ 0.790 0.778 0.012 0.786 0.752 0.035∗∗∗ 0.748 0.753 -0.005
Pr(Conv | t0) 0.253 0.229 0.024∗∗∗ 0.231 0.226 0.005 0.240 0.228 0.013 0.236 0.222 0.013
Cv Opt Valuet0 27.483 33.476 -5.992∗∗ 35.129 30.725 4.404 32.138 27.032 5.106∗∗ 31.952 21.268 10.684∗∗∗
Coupon Rate 4.705 3.148 1.558∗∗∗ 3.114 3.198 -0.084 3.645 4.135 -0.490∗∗∗ 4.175 4.063 0.111
Maturity 10.077 12.143 -2.066∗∗∗ 11.617 13.032 -1.416∗∗ 11.670 9.976 1.694∗∗∗ 8.781 10.823 -2.042∗
Offer Price 95.528 97.767 -2.239∗∗ 97.746 97.778 -0.032 97.034 97.049 -0.015 98.699 94.882 3.818∗
Overallotment 0.545 0.786 -0.241∗∗∗ 0.795 0.772 0.023 0.689 0.728 -0.039 0.767 0.673 0.094
Options: Pout Pin dP PUL POL dP Pout Pin dP PUL POL dP
Callable 0.676 0.509 0.167∗∗∗ 0.484 0.551 -0.066∗ 0.586 0.507 0.079∗∗ 0.500 0.510 -0.010
Callable in 3Y 0.379 0.034 0.345∗∗∗ 0.043 0.020 0.023 0.167 0.291 -0.124∗∗∗ 0.310 0.280 0.030
Putable 0.182 0.328 -0.146∗∗∗ 0.284 0.402 -0.119∗∗∗ 0.286 0.212 0.074∗∗ 0.155 0.276 -0.120∗∗
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Table 2.3 – continued: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Convertible Bond Design Across Markets
Rule-144A Offers Rule-415 Offers
Across Markets Within, by DevDir Across Markets Within, by DevDir
meanout meanin dmean meanUL meanOL dmean meanout meanin dmean meanUL meanOL dmean
Redeemable 0.766 0.608 0.158∗∗∗ 0.592 0.634 -0.042 0.675 0.631 0.043 0.621 0.643 -0.022
Observations 457 762 1219 483 276 759 1002 217 1219 116 98 214
Panel B: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Convertible Bond Design Across Markets
Conv Premium 34.899 28.437 6.462∗∗∗ 25.710 33.562 -7.852∗ 31.604 53.251 -21.647∗∗∗ 56.597 50.321 6.276
Offer Amount 286.192 228.229 57.963∗∗ 226.800 236.511 -9.710 284.630 233.274 51.357 261.645 209.711 51.934
NewEquity 11.291 16.462 -5.171∗∗∗ 17.239 14.874 2.366 11.766 13.405 -1.639 11.938 14.785 -2.847
Delta 0.777 0.801 -0.024∗∗ 0.816 0.773 0.043∗∗ 0.782 0.761 0.021 0.770 0.752 0.018
Pr(Conv | t0) 0.230 0.292 -0.061∗∗∗ 0.293 0.286 0.007 0.238 0.241 -0.003 0.252 0.233 0.019
Cv Opt Valuet0 31.745 27.716 4.029 29.512 24.713 4.800 32.263 23.192 9.072∗∗∗ 26.929 19.865 7.064∗∗
Coupon Rate 3.514 5.214 -1.700∗∗∗ 5.249 5.109 0.140 3.512 5.442 -1.931∗∗∗ 5.383 5.501 -0.117
Maturity 11.488 10.551 0.937∗ 11.130 9.529 1.601 11.696 8.827 2.869∗∗∗ 8.240 9.208 -0.968
Offer Price 97.355 95.144 2.210∗ 94.826 95.542 -0.716 97.245 83.308 13.937∗∗ 68.446 98.169 -29.723∗∗
Overallotment 0.713 0.577 0.136∗∗∗ 0.596 0.564 0.032 0.782 0.022 0.761∗∗∗ 0.031 0.014 0.017
Options: Pout Pin dP PUL POL dP Pout Pin dP PUL POL dP
Callable 0.532 0.846 -0.315∗∗∗ 0.899 0.745 0.154∗∗ 0.546 0.770 -0.223∗∗∗ 0.877 0.671 0.206∗∗∗
Callable in 3Y 0.166 0.273 -0.106∗∗∗ 0.326 0.146 0.180∗∗ 0.090 0.720 -0.630∗∗∗ 0.807 0.633 0.174∗∗
Putable 0.291 0.154 0.137∗∗∗ 0.172 0.127 0.044 0.288 0.158 0.130∗∗∗ 0.123 0.178 -0.055
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Table 2.3 Panel B – continued: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis- Convertible Bond Design Across Markets
Other Negotiated Offers Exchange Offers
Across Markets Within, by DevDir Across Markets Within, by DevDir
Options: Pout Pin dP PUL POL dP Pout Pin dP PUL POL dP
Redeemable 0.634 0.891 -0.257∗∗∗ 0.949 0.782 0.168∗∗∗ 0.641 0.871 -0.230∗∗∗ 0.923 0.822 0.101∗
Observations 1063 156 1219 99 55 154 1080 139 1219 65 73 138
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Table 2.4: Summary Statics- Variables used in Security Choice Models
Summary statistics for the firm, market, and macroeconomic variables used
throughout the analysis. Binomial Logit summarizes the annual measures included
in logit model of public security issuance reported Table 2.5, and McFadden’s Choice
Logit summarizes the annual measures included the discrete alternative-specific
multinomial logit, McFadden’s Choice model, reported in Table 2.6 and Appendix
B.2. The construction of each variable is described in Appendix B.
Binomial Logit McFadden’s Choice Logit
Base: No Issuance Base: No Issuance Base: Straight Bond
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Public Offering 0.095 0.294
Security Choice 0.250 0.433 0.333 0.471
|Dev|BDR 0.085 0.089 0.090 0.090 0.096 0.094
Dev2BDR 0.015 0.037 0.016 0.039 0.018 0.043
OverleveredBDR 0.424 0.494 0.428 0.495 0.494 0.500
EquityVolatility 0.557 0.292 0.502 0.280
EquityRunup 0.187 0.705 0.377 1.129
CashFlow -0.039 0.231 -0.028 0.217 -0.038 0.240
DebtMaturity 0.968 3.178 0.831 2.986 0.404 1.596
RatedFirm 0.202 0.402 0.389 0.488 0.646 0.478
AvgBDR3Y 0.214 0.200 0.231 0.201 0.304 0.204
LnTA 5.329 2.029 6.098 1.955 7.080 2.140
MB 1.775 1.708 1.834 1.661 1.820 1.649
PROF/TA 0.055 0.231 0.072 0.211 0.085 0.206
MarketRunup 0.032 0.120 0.028 0.051 0.152 0.067
MarketVolatility 0.164 0.108 0.145 0.052 0.036 0.069
Sentiment 19.747 5.770
MFFCD 0.007 0.051 0.009 0.037 0.010 0.046
MFFSD 0.012 0.031 0.016 0.023 0.019 0.031
MFFCE 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.017
InterestRate 4.378 1.746 4.007 1.592 3.873 1.731
TermSpread 1.823 1.109 1.954 1.108 2.005 1.082
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Table 2.5: Target Deviations and Pubic Financing
Mixed effects logit regression model of annual leverage deviation levels on the likelihood of issuing public securities.
Pr(PubIssueijk = 1) = β0 + δijk ∗ |Dev|ijk + βFCijk + α ∗MCi + ujk + vk for k = 1, ..., L independent industry clusters with
j = 1, ...,mk nested firm clusters spanning i=1,...,njk yearly observations. Public Offering is the binary outcome equal to one
if the firm publicly issued equity, straight debt, or convertible debt and 0 otherwise. |Dev|, FC, and MC are fixed effects
covariates for deviation size, firm-specific characteristics, as well as market and macroeconomic conditions. Conditioning on
two sets of random effects across industry clusters, vj, and firm clusters, ujk, the multi-level model accounts for endogeneity
concerns in the issuance decision and the modeled deviation measure through firm-level random effects. All Firms includes
the full sample of Compustat firms with complete information for the covariates. Coefficients from the full model in All
Firms predict the probability of issuance measure which serves as an instrument for target leverage deviations. Active Issuers
includes all firms with at least one public security offering during the 1990-2015 sample period. Table 2.1 and Table 2.4
detail summary statistics for the all covariates. Appendix B.1 details variable descriptions. Parentheses contain t-statistics,
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. respectively.
Public Offer All Firms Active Issuers
|Dev|BDR 2.234∗∗∗ 2.234∗∗∗ 2.086∗∗∗ 2.097∗∗∗ 1.312∗∗∗ 1.312∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗
(7.89) (7.89) (6.81) (6.94) (6.36) (6.36) (5.87) (6.05)
Dev2BDR -3.013∗∗∗ -3.013∗∗∗ -2.870∗∗∗ -2.885∗∗∗ -2.202∗∗∗ -2.202∗∗∗ -2.188∗∗∗ -2.183∗∗∗
(-7.26) (-7.26) (-6.42) (-6.38) (-6.16) (-6.16) (-6.33) (-6.08)
OverleveredBDR 0.129∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0932∗∗∗ 0.0932∗∗∗ 0.0807∗∗∗ 0.0776∗∗∗
(5.34) (5.34) (5.77) (5.70) (4.83) (4.83) (4.68) (4.69)
CashFlow -0.0587 -0.0587 -0.169 -0.151 -0.286 -0.286 -0.345 -0.351
(-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.39) (-0.34) (-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.92) (-0.93)
DebtMaturity -0.0533∗∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗ -0.0535∗∗∗ -0.0532∗∗∗ -0.0511∗∗∗ -0.0511∗∗∗ -0.0512∗∗∗ -0.0509∗∗∗
(-5.15) (-5.15) (-5.15) (-5.04) (-5.24) (-5.24) (-5.28) (-5.14)
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Table 2.5 – continued: Target Deviations and Pubic Financing
Public Offer All Firms Active Issuers
RatedFirm 1.681∗∗∗ 1.681∗∗∗ 1.663∗∗∗ 1.676∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(12.60) (12.60) (12.25) (12.41) (8.26) (8.26) (9.04) (8.66)
AvgBDR3Y 0.590∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗
(2.59) (2.59) (2.65) (2.55) (6.89) (6.89) (7.11) (6.97)
LnTA 0.228∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(9.80) (9.80) (13.70) (10.80) (4.73) (4.73) (6.03) (4.90)
MB 0.191∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(9.66) (9.66) (9.82) (9.25) (7.25) (7.25) (7.65) (7.23)
PROF/TA -0.799∗∗∗ -0.799∗∗∗ -0.689∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.794∗∗∗ -0.794∗∗∗ -0.664∗∗ -0.656∗∗
(-5.51) (-5.51) (-3.04) (-2.99) (-4.57) (-4.57) (-2.54) (-2.58)
MarketRunup 6.431∗∗∗ 2.205∗∗∗ 2.074∗∗∗ 6.367∗∗∗ 2.062∗∗∗ 2.001∗∗∗
(5.45) (20.43) (12.69) (5.63) (24.58) (13.30)
MarketVolatility -199.5∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗ 0.231 -190.1∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗ 0.0915
(-6.72) (2.28) (0.88) (-6.55) (2.33) (0.40)
Sentiment 4.329∗∗∗ -0.0364∗∗∗ -0.0312∗∗∗ 4.130∗∗∗ -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.0283∗∗∗
(6.74) (-4.15) (-2.87) (6.58) (-3.72) (-2.71)
MFFCD 4.703∗∗∗ 3.786∗∗∗ 4.126∗∗∗ 3.355∗∗∗
(9.93) (7.04) (8.53) (5.99)
MFFSD 1.467 1.310 1.710 1.522
(1.22) (1.20) (1.41) (1.37)
MFFCE -15.34∗∗∗ -14.19∗∗∗ -11.31∗∗∗ -11.81∗∗∗
(-8.86) (-4.68) (-6.08) (-3.74)
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Table 2.5 – continued: Target Deviations and Pubic Financing
Public Offer All Firms Active Issuers
InterestRate -0.0136 0.00907
(-0.62) (0.41)
TermSpread 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0918∗∗∗
(3.58) (3.46)
Constant -7.293∗∗∗ -43.00∗∗∗ -4.385∗∗∗ -4.520∗∗∗ -5.358∗∗∗ -39.47∗∗∗ -2.571∗∗∗ -2.761∗∗∗
(-22.22) (-7.76) (-18.34) (-17.57) (-14.18) (-7.27) (-10.20) (-9.33)
VARIndustry 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0975∗∗∗ 0.0964∗∗∗ 0.0266∗∗ 0.0266∗∗ 0.0235∗∗ 0.0236∗∗
(3.35) (3.35) (3.34) (3.34) (2.30) (2.30) (2.50) (2.44)
VARFirm 0.964∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(15.60) (15.60) (16.67) (17.20) (12.45) (12.45) (12.03) (11.83)
Year F.E. Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 74874 74874 74874 74874 37775 37775 37775 37775
Ind. Clusters 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
ICCIndustry 0.0235 0.0235 0.0226 0.00739 0.00739 0.00655 0.00657
ICCFirm 0.245 0.245 0.238 0.238 0.0861 0.0861 0.0824 0.0827
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Table 2.6: Target Deviations and Security Choice
McFadden’s Choice model, alternative specific logit regression of target leverage deviations on security choice. The
dependent variable (Security Selected) is equal to one when a firm is observed issuing equity, straight debt, convertible debt, or
having no issuance activity, and 0 otherwise. The security option No Issuance captures firm-years without public equity, debt, or
convertible debt offers. In the discrete choice setting, every observable issuance events is expanded to reflect all of the alternative
options the firm did not choose, this process requires mapping duplicate firm-year firm characteristics, market conditions,
and macroeconomic conditions. As such every firm-year includes at least one issuance event spanning the four alternative
securities, with identical contemporaneous firm characteristics, market conditions, and macroeconomic conditions, excluding
security-specific market demand,(MFFi=CD,SD,CD). Under the utility function for optimal security issuance, modeled as:
Uia = βiMD(CapitalSupply)ia + αSecurityOptionia + δa[FCi,MPi,MCi] + ia for i-firms and a=1,2,3,4 alternative outcomes.
βi case-specific random coefficients and α fixed coefficients load on the alternative-specific (security-specific) variable vectors
xia and wia respectively. deltaa security-specific fixed coefficients load on the vector of case-specific (firm-specific) variables zi.
Under maximum simulated likelihood, the estimated density function f(β) is used to determine choice probabilities under the
standard logistic probability function: Pia(β) = e(xiaβi + wiaα + ziδa)/
∑A
α=1 e(xiaβi + wiaα +i δa) In panel 1 No Issuance is
the base choice. In panel 2 the choice set excludes No Issuance, straight debt is the base choice. Appendix A details variable
descriptions. t statistics in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 2
Security Selected
Security-Specific
Characteristics SD CD CE
Security-Specific
Characteristics CD CE
MFFi 3.643∗∗ -0.343
(2.125) (-0.487)
∼ N(.),
ˆstd.dev.MFFi 14.73∗∗∗ 4.18e-08
(3.291) (0.170)
|Dev|BDR 1.014∗ 6.600∗∗∗ 0.174 5.648∗∗∗ -1.162
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Table 2.6 – continued: Target Deviations and Security Choice
Security Selected
Security-Specific
Characteristics SD CD CE
Security-Specific
Characteristics CD CE
(1.676) (5.595) (0.204) (4.624) (-0.887)
Dev2BDR -1.617 -8.937∗∗∗ -0.738 -8.285∗∗∗ 0.319
(-0.931) (-3.756) (-0.421) (-2.810) (0.094)
OverleveredBDR -0.254∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.0326 0.605∗∗∗
(-4.039) (-2.481) (3.799) (0.269) (5.177)
EquityVolatility 0.0137 1.232∗∗∗ 0.00433 1.722∗∗∗ 1.121∗∗∗
(0.061) (5.545) (0.008) (5.598) (3.710)
EquityRunup 0.179∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(1.743) (3.482) (4.901) (3.148) (5.972)
CashFlow -0.598∗ 0.699∗∗ -0.596∗ 1.643∗∗∗ 0.786∗
(-1.935) (2.324) (-1.700) (3.991) (1.812)
DebtMaturity -1.275∗∗∗ -0.719∗∗∗ -0.0132 0.221 0.559∗
(-7.154) (-2.833) (-1.442) (0.787) (1.904)
RatedFirm 2.483∗∗∗ -0.826∗∗∗ -0.117 -3.321∗∗∗ -2.723∗∗∗
(8.601) (-6.294) (-1.119) (-19.784) (-18.640)
AvgBDR3Y 2.464∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ -1.659∗∗∗ -1.484∗∗∗
(11.792) (3.673) (2.765) (-4.073) (-4.478)
LnTA 0.577∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.778∗∗∗
(14.936) (13.784) (-2.371) (-3.000) (-16.218)
MB -0.0331 0.0719∗∗∗ -0.0346 0.0953∗∗ -0.0263
(-0.970) (3.039) (-1.118) (2.189) (-0.581)
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Table 2.6 – continued: Target Deviations and Security Choice
Security Selected
Security-Specific
Characteristics SD CD CE
Security-Specific
Characteristics CD CE
PROF/TA 0.453 -1.010∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗∗ -1.916∗∗∗ -1.700∗∗∗
(0.926) (-3.758) (-2.629) (-2.958) (-2.587)
MarketVolatility -0.274 -2.519∗ -3.611∗∗∗ 1.361 0.172
(-0.233) (-1.788) (-3.152) (1.414) (0.161)
MarketRunup 2.628∗∗ 2.175 3.202∗ -1.766∗∗ -1.741∗∗
(2.233) (0.844) (1.716) (-2.247) (-2.181)
InterestRate -0.0529 -0.0957 0.132∗∗ -0.0206 0.189∗∗∗
(-1.529) (-1.302) (2.176) (-0.560) (5.183)
TermSpread 0.124∗ 0.0252 0.212∗∗ -0.0699 0.0882∗∗
(1.820) (0.241) (2.365) (-1.418) (2.028)
Sentiment -0.0360∗∗∗ -0.0232∗
(-2.626) (-1.702)
Constant -8.171∗∗∗ -5.438∗∗∗ -2.701∗∗∗ 2.507∗∗∗ 5.774∗∗∗
(-19.834) (-10.358) (-4.721) (4.958) (12.370)
Observations 138456 19842
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Table 2.7: Convertible Bond Design: New Equity, Maturity, Call Protections
Table 2.7 reports regression results for the simultaneous-equations, estimated in a 2SLS framework, for convertible
bond design terms: New Equity, Maturity, and Call Protection Period. Models 1-3 report second-stage results and first-stage
fit statistics for three applications of the I.V. equation framework:
ˆLogBookDev = pi00 + pi01Pr(NoPublicOffer) + pi02CAPXAT + Π0X + v1
ˆNewEquity = pi10 + pi11ConvPremium+ Π1X + v2
ˆMaturity = pi20 + Π21TermSpread+ Π32DebtMaturity + Π2X + v2
ˆCallPP = pi30 + pi31EPSgrowth+ Π3X + v3
NewEquity =β10+β11Y1+β12X + u1 Maturity =β20+β21Y2+β22X + u2 CallPP =β30+β31Y3+β32X + u3
where Yi is the vector of instrumented endogenous variables, relative to each design feature. Xi is the vector of firm
characteristics,market performance, market demand, and macroeconomic conditions used throughout the analysis excluding
(TermSpread and DebtMaturity). The measure of target leverage deviation,Log(BookDev), is excluded from Model 1, treated as
an exogenous variable in Model 2, and included in Yi in Model 3. The bottom panel reports fit statistics for the instrumental
variables used in the first-stage regressions. Appendix A details variable descriptions. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors are clustered by year. t statistics in parentheses.∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 2 3
New Equity Maturity Call PP New Equity Maturity Call PP New Equity Maturity Call PP
Log(BookDev) -14.80 -1.552 -0.113 -53.73 -6.569 -0.432
(-0.81) (-1.19) (-1.07) (-1.13) (-0.73) (-0.71)
NewEquity -0.0830 -0.00627 -0.0861 -0.00632 -0.0964 -0.00637
(-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.71) (-0.70) (-0.72) (-0.72)
Maturity -8.624 -0.0753∗∗∗ -9.078 -0.0733∗∗∗ -5.627 -0.0658∗∗∗
(-0.82) (-3.15) (-0.80) (-3.20) (-0.95) (-4.51)
Call PP -112.6 -13.02∗∗∗ -122.4 -13.46∗∗∗ -84.16 -14.88∗∗∗
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Table 2.7 – continued: Convertible Bond Design: New Equity, Maturity, Call Protections
1 2 3
New Equity Maturity Call PP New Equity Maturity Call PP New Equity Maturity Call PP
(-0.80) (-3.11) (-0.78) (-3.17) (-0.94) (-4.45)
Overallotment 13.63 1.606∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 14.52 1.618∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 9.067 1.654∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.76) (3.96) (2.38) (0.75) (4.01) (2.41) (0.88) (4.09) (2.92)
EquityVolatility -29.31 -3.586∗∗∗ -0.267∗ -29.90 -3.424∗∗∗ -0.248 -17.77 -3.438∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗
(-0.67) (-2.84) (-1.66) (-0.66) (-2.66) (-1.60) (-0.77) (-2.88) (-1.97)
EquityRunup 3.238 0.415∗ 0.0312 3.225 0.384 0.0281 1.704 0.392 0.0257
(0.57) (1.67) (1.46) (0.56) (1.55) (1.36) (0.54) (1.56) (1.44)
CashFlow -8.907 -0.934 -0.0731 -11.18 -1.150 -0.0861 -15.11 -2.051 -0.138
(-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.76) (-0.72) (-0.83) (-0.92) (-1.25) (-1.07) (-1.12)
RatedFirm 2.746 0.299 0.0210 3.844 0.405 0.0286 4.098 0.530 0.0333
(0.52) (0.56) (0.47) (0.63) (0.75) (0.63) (1.03) (0.76) (0.68)
AvgBDR3Y 18.30 1.925∗ 0.146 11.14 1.124 0.0829 -12.99 -1.292 -0.0842
(1.09) (1.76) (1.61) (0.87) (0.97) (0.97) (-0.57) (-0.30) (-0.30)
LnTA 4.589 0.632 0.0480 4.832 0.606 0.0447 1.292 0.519 0.0345
(0.48) (1.57) (1.54) (0.48) (1.47) (1.46) (0.25) (1.01) (1.02)
MB -1.690∗ -0.150 -0.0111 -1.366 -0.117 -0.00843 -1.139∗ -0.102 -0.00647
(-1.69) (-0.76) (-0.69) (-1.35) (-0.59) (-0.54) (-1.78) (-0.52) (-0.48)
PROF/TA 22.10 2.477 0.185 24.93 2.677∗ 0.195 19.55 3.030∗ 0.198
(0.80) (1.56) (1.30) (0.81) (1.68) (1.39) (1.11) (1.68) (1.52)
Rule-144A 17.35 2.051∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 18.55 2.071∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 11.08 2.045∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
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Table 2.7 – continued: Convertible Bond Design: New Equity, Maturity, Call Protections
1 2 3
New Equity Maturity Call PP New Equity Maturity Call PP New Equity Maturity Call PP
(0.75) (4.90) (2.53) (0.75) (4.98) (2.58) (0.86) (4.90) (3.15)
MarketVolatility 54.71 6.194∗ 0.476∗∗ 60.82 6.592∗ 0.490∗∗ 42.45 7.113∗∗ 0.478∗∗
(0.80) (1.73) (2.18) (0.79) (1.83) (2.31) (0.98) (2.10) (2.45)
MarketRunup -11.14 -1.170 -0.0948 -11.57 -1.193 -0.0921 -11.22 -1.819 -0.128
(-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.51) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.51) (-0.64) (-0.71) (-0.81)
Sentiment -0.998 -0.107 -0.00828∗ -1.090 -0.114 -0.00850∗∗ -0.779 -0.121∗ -0.00817∗∗
(-0.94) (-1.50) (-1.89) (-0.91) (-1.58) (-2.00) (-1.13) (-1.81) (-2.15)
MFFCD 82.09 9.168∗ 0.706∗∗ 87.98 9.442∗ 0.703∗∗ 63.23 10.46∗∗ 0.705∗∗
(0.83) (1.68) (2.16) (0.fccv ‘81) (1.74) (2.22) (1.00) (2.06) (2.46)
InterestRate -5.939 -0.690∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗ -6.390 -0.706∗∗ -0.0527∗∗∗ -4.109 -0.760∗∗∗ -0.0514∗∗∗
(-0.76) (-2.25) (-4.95) (-0.75) (-2.27) (-4.95) (-0.83) (-2.80) (-4.73)
Constant 175.9 19.18∗∗∗ 1.460∗∗∗ 187.8 19.79∗∗∗ 1.461∗∗∗ 144.5 22.21∗∗∗ 1.479∗∗∗
(1.02) (3.40) (3.68) (0.99) (3.47) (3.67) (1.33) (3.41) (3.57)
Observations 1123 1122 1116
F New Equity 0.764 0.665 1.622
F Maturity 20.52 19.64 19.96
F CallPP 8.720 8.781 11.13
R2 -32.13 -35.23 -13.59
R2adj 0.516 0.521 0.522
90
Table 2.8: Convertible Bond Design: Call, Put,and Redemption Options
Multinomial and binomial logit regressions of target leverage deviations on the use of call, put, and redemption options
Pr(Optioni >= j) = β0 + β1 ∗ Log(BookDev) + βIssueMarket + βX + , forj = 1, 2 Columns 1-4 report multinomial
logit results for three types of call options; non-callable, callable but not enforcible for three or more years, or callable
and enforcible within three years. Columns 5-6 and columns 7-8 report binomial logit results for put and redemption
options respectively. IssueMarket is a categorical ranking the most frequently used market; equaling 1-4 respectively
for Exchange offers, Other/Private negotiated offers, Rule-415 offers, and Rule-144A offers. Xi is the vector of firm
characteristics,market performance, market demand, and macroeconomic conditions used throughout the analysis. Appendix
A details variable descriptions. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by year. t statistics in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Call Level Putable Redeemable
Callable
After 3Y
Callable
Within 3Y
Callable
After 3Y
Callable
Within 3Y Putable Putable Redeemable Redeemable
Log(BookDev) -0.748∗ 1.334 -1.365 -0.683
(-1.97) (1.04) (-1.44) (-1.07)
|Dev|BDR -0.463 0.356 0.664 -1.180
(-0.42) (0.14) (0.70) (-1.65)
OverleveredBDR -0.109 -0.528 0.647∗ -0.383
(-0.46) (-1.17) (2.04) (-1.20)
|Dev|BDR x
OverleveredBDR 1.733 -1.233 -0.0674 2.856
(1.47) (-0.34) (-0.03) (1.85)
IssueMarket Rule-144A 0.0304 -4.592∗∗∗ 0.0397 -4.552∗∗∗ 0.289 0.240 -1.625∗∗∗
-1.606∗∗∗
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Table 2.8 – continued: Convertible Bond Design: Call, Put, and Redemption Options
Call Level Putable Redeemable
Callable
After 3Y
Callable
Within 3Y
Callable
After 3Y
Callable
Within 3Y Putable Putable Redeemable Redeemable
(0.09) (-8.62) (0.11) (-8.87) (0.94) (0.76) (-4.88) (-4.47)
Rule-415 0.372 -2.680∗∗∗ 0.373 -2.668∗∗∗ 0.520 0.559∗ -0.905∗∗∗
-0.899∗∗
(0.86) (-5.93) (0.89) (-5.99) (1.72) (1.96) (-3.30) (-3.09)
OPnegotiated 1.824∗∗∗ -1.167∗ 1.821∗∗∗ -1.174∗ -0.453 -0.499 0.731∗
0.722∗
(3.99) (-2.07) (3.99) (-2.11) (-1.02) (-1.15) (2.14) (2.02)
Log(OfferAmt) -0.450∗ -0.415 -0.436∗ -0.380 0.0455 0.00987 -0.658∗∗∗ -0.636∗∗∗
(-2.02) (-0.96) (-2.14) (-0.91) (0.29) (0.06) (-5.00) (-4.94)
Maturity 0.226∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(11.49) (3.04) (11.59) (3.10) (8.19) (8.36) (8.05) (8.17)
EquityVolatility -0.0662 0.425 -0.0459 0.546 -0.537 -0.595 -0.00691 0.0309
(-0.13) (0.64) (-0.09) (0.86) (-0.75) (-0.86) (-0.01) (0.06)
EquityRunup -0.188 -0.156 -0.187 -0.167 -0.0945 -0.0969 -0.111 -0.112
(-1.66) (-0.95) (-1.63) (-0.99) (-0.79) (-0.78) (-1.28) (-1.29)
CashFlow 0.700 1.119 0.685 1.061 1.308 1.341 -0.212 -0.208
(1.15) (1.27) (1.16) (1.23) (1.43) (1.52) (-0.44) (-0.44)
RatedFirm 0.477∗ 0.0994 0.484∗ 0.114 0.763∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.465 0.463
(2.32) (0.28) (2.38) (0.35) (3.16) (3.41) (1.90) (1.88)
AvgBDR3Y -1.013∗ 0.0880 -1.074∗ -0.0457 -0.674 -0.487 -1.185∗∗ -1.265∗∗∗
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Table 2.8 – continued: Convertible Bond Design: Call, Put, and Redemption Options
Call Level Putable Redeemable
Callable
After 3Y
Callable
Within 3Y
Callable
After 3Y
Callable
Within 3Y Putable Putable Redeemable Redeemable
(-2.08) (0.10) (-2.18) (-0.05) (-1.00) (-0.76) (-3.22) (-4.85)
LnTA 0.0409 -0.219 0.0261 -0.249 -0.200 -0.178 0.0432 0.0211
(0.33) (-0.67) (0.24) (-0.83) (-1.29) (-1.09) (0.49) (0.27)
MB -0.0173 -0.0384 -0.0167 -0.0363 -0.0382 -0.0359 0.0433 0.0423
(-0.31) (-0.33) (-0.29) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.29) (0.73) (0.69)
PROF/TA -0.765 -1.632 -0.752 -1.414 -1.064 -1.315 -0.234 -0.120
(-1.06) (-0.86) (-1.06) (-0.77) (-1.03) (-1.31) (-0.36) (-0.17)
MarketVolatility -10.83∗∗∗ -13.54∗∗ -10.72∗∗∗ -13.08∗∗∗ -5.035∗∗ -5.164∗∗ -9.449∗∗∗ -9.225∗∗∗
(-3.64) (-3.12) (-3.62) (-3.52) (-2.62) (-2.76) (-10.16) (-9.25)
Market Runup -3.144 -2.922 -3.135 -2.845 -2.239 -2.302 -0.0190 0.0306
(-1.07) (-0.98) (-1.07) (-0.98) (-1.65) (-1.78) (-0.02) (0.03)
Sentiment 0.305∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.130∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(5.35) (3.34) (5.32) (3.57) (2.51) (2.72) (10.68) (10.77)
MFFCD -19.34∗∗∗ -22.04∗∗ -19.34∗∗∗ -22.00∗∗ -11.26∗ -11.36∗ -15.90∗∗∗ -15.85∗∗∗
(-3.59) (-2.71) (-3.54) (-2.75) (-2.53) (-2.48) (-7.06) (-6.84)
MFFSD -15.79 -18.77 -15.68 -18.43 -10.72∗ -10.29∗ -11.09∗∗ -11.13∗∗
(-1.47) (-1.30) (-1.46) (-1.34) (-2.16) (-2.07) (-3.08) (-3.07)
MFFCE 73.74∗∗∗ 91.13∗∗ 73.92∗∗∗ 92.14∗∗ 40.31∗∗∗ 40.69∗∗ 34.54∗∗∗ 34.69∗∗∗
(3.47) (2.76) (3.47) (2.84) (3.30) (3.27) (4.84) (4.97)
InterestRate 0.436∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.434∗ 0.944∗∗∗ 0.0374 0.0334 0.295∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
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Table 2.8 – continued: Convertible Bond Design: Call, Put, and Redemption Options
Call Level Putable Redeemable
Callable
After 3Y
Callable
Within 3Y
Callable
After 3Y
Callable
Within 3Y Putable Putable Redeemable Redeemable
(2.57) (3.68) (2.57) (3.80) (0.42) (0.37) (6.04) (6.00)
Constant -6.714∗∗∗ -6.138∗ -6.685∗∗∗ -6.412∗∗ -6.997∗∗∗ -6.606∗∗∗ -1.770∗ -1.854∗
(-5.36) (-2.50) (-5.34) (-2.83) (-5.87) (-5.69) (-2.20) (-2.03)
Observations 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 1122
R2 0.485 0.485 0.608 0.606 0.403 0.402
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Chapter 3
Does the Market Value Innovative Ability?
Evidence from M&A
1
3.1 Introduction
Is the ability to convert innovation investments into a tangible valued output (e.g.
sales) a determinant of synergy value? Recent empirical evidence indicates that
although M&A is a value-destroying activity for acquirers on average, firms motivated
by the acquisition of innovation experience greater abnormal announcement and
long-run returns (Bernstein (2015) , Bena and Li (2014), Phillips and Zhdanov
(2013)). Yet, prior work has mainly focused on the characteristics and innovative
qualities of target firms. Our study focuses on the attributes of the firms acquiring
new asset management responsibilities. We examine how an acquirer’s ex-ante
ability to convert internal and external innovation investments contributes to
cross-sectional variations in M&A announcement returns. Our analysis illustrate
three considerations around innovation which help explain M&A announcement
reactions: we (1) highlight a new and pertinent measure for innovative ability, (2)
show the importance of distinguishing between investment types and outcomes when
determining innovation “success”, and (3) provide evidence of an additional factor
impacting abnormal short-run returns.
A firm’s ability to stay innovative is notoriously difficult to measure and thus
often misvalued by the market (Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013), Hirshleifer,
1Eldemire-Poindexter, A., Usman, A., and Weathers, J. To be submitted.
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Hsu, and Li (2013)). Market valuation of firm innovative success has historically
focused on the conversion of Research and Development expenditures (R&D) into
legal outputs such as patents. However, a “successful” innovation, generally defined
as a patentable output, does not routinely translate into relatively superior firm
sales and/or profitability; thereby innovations are clearly not created equally (Cohen
et al. (2013)). Firms must have the knowledge, skill set, and resources to transform
patentable innovation into commercial marketability and profit for a true indication
of success in terms of return on investment. Within human capital dependent firm
structures where innovation is a key component to maintain a competitive advantage,
understanding the impact of firm “innovativeness” on shareholder wealth denotes
evident economic importance.
In addition to internal innovation development, firms may also pursue innovation
externally through acquisitions. This increased focus on the abundance and relevance
of innovation-driven acquisition has prompted our examination of firm ability to
convert investment in innovation into a tangible measure of profit2. There are at
least two important considerations in determining the success of an innovation-driven
acquisition: the strength (or quality) of the innovation purchase and the strength (or
ability) of the acquirer to convert innovation into tangible profit. This analysis focuses
on the impact of the latter on the announcement returns to acquirers.
Existing neoclassical merger and agency theories explain the popularity of mergers
in spite of value-destroying evidence in the empirical literature, which typically
shows announcement returns being close to zero on average for acquiring firms 3.
Therefore, the motive behind merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, especially
2Bena and Li (2014) indicate two thirds of completed mergers during the period of 1984 to 2006
were motivated by pursuit of technological innovation.
3On average, the combined firm value post M&A rises 1% to 3%, whereas the target enjoys
a positive abnormal return as high as 15% to 30%, while the acquirer barely breaks even with
an average announcement return close to zero (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller,
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007)).
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for acquirers, is a popular debate in corporate finance. However, recent studies
reveal that sourcing innovation is not only a strong motive for M&A activity e.g.,
Phillips and Zhdanov (2013); Sevilir and Tian (2011), but also results in positive
returns to both the target and the acquirer. Sevilir and Tian (2011) show an
average positive acquirer return (both short- and long-run) to firms using M&A as a
means for acquiring innovation; acquirers of innovative target firms enjoy greater
announcement and 5-year post-acquisition returns than those of non-innovative
targets. Additionally, Bena and Li (2014) find innovation-driven acquisition provides
a positive shock to patent portfolios of the newly merged firms, especially when there
is a technological overlap between the acquirer and the target.
M&A transactions therefore provide a feasible channel for firms to increase
tangible profitability through the purchase of innovative human capital and/or
patentable innovation from other firms with or close to patentable innovation. This
is an optimal action for well-established, large firms as they have less flexibility
to innovate internally due to internal competition for firm resources (Brusco and
Panunzi (2005)). Bernstein (2015) identifies that once a firm goes public, the quality
of internal innovation declines causing a shift in strategy from innovation creation
to innovation acquisition. Yet, firms do continue to do one, the other or both and
an important unexplored distinction remains in the ability of the acquirer to convert
these investments in innovation, either internally or externally, to tangible profits.
Therefore, our research aims to understand how the market values a firms ability to
capitalize innovation investments.
We investigate this question using measures of acquirer innovation conversion
ability. In the M&A setting innovation conversion (IC), or perceived IC, is subject to
asymmetric information. As such, observable measures of IC serve as a differentiating
signal of firm performance. The proxy for IC ability must capture both a firm’s
internal and external investments in innovation, as we cannot know for certain when
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and how these strategies shift or combine. In this effort, we use the standard
innovation input measure, R&D expenditure, for a proxy of internal investment
in innovation. The accounting measure, Intangible Assets, proxies for external
investment in innovation. While internal efforts towards innovation must be expensed
as R&D costs, external efforts such as the procurement of patents, inventors, or
innovative target firms are capitalized as intangible assets (FASB ASC Topic 350-
Intangibles Goodwill and Other)4.
As a result of our findings, acquirers with higher IC ability as determined
by external investment conversion experience greater M&A announcement returns.
Additionally, our results not only indicate the market does not value internal
investment conversion positively, but also illustrates a nonlinear relationship between
internal-IC ability and short-run returns; despite the evidence that R&D investment
is positively related to sales growth. Findings from our study contribute to both the
value implications of mergers and acquisitions and to our collective understanding of
the importance of measuring both innovation investment via multiple channels and
firm ability to convert respective investment to profit. Our results also introduce
an additional barrier to entry consideration for firms intending on shifting to an
innovation growth strategy via acquisition and thus merits future exploration.
3.2 Analytical Framework
In this section, we review relevant literature surrounding firm innovation processes
and the links between innovation procurement and M&A motives. We also discuss our
measures of innovation conversion ability, and review the characteristic considerations
relevant for M&A event studies. Throughout, we develop predictions on the effect of
ex-ante acquirer IC ability on announcement returns.
4Intangible assets are often identified as the excess cost of an acquired firm that cannot be valued
as physical assets such as land, machinery, inventory, etc. (Canibano, Garcia-Ayuso, and Sanchez
(2000)).
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Innovation Processes & Mergers and Acquisitions
Measures of innovation investments
Innovation is vital for national economic growth (Solow (1957)) and to a
firm’s long-term competitive advantage (Zingales (2000)), but with the speed of
technological advancement increasing exponentially over time, firms must be open
to alternative pursuits of innovative success. Historically companies accustomed
to R&D expenditures as the best available innovation investment measure, as this
proxy has a proven positive correlation with future firm value (Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (2001),Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005)). However, innovation is a
lengthy process inherently riddled with false starts and failures, so with the option
to acquire innovation further along in the incubation process, R&D should no longer
serve as the main measure of innovation investment, but that R&D may be correlated
with other determinants of synergy value.
Firm innovation strategies now vary from in-house creation, corporate venture
capital, open innovation (e.g. crowdsourcing), direct patent purchase to whole- and
partial-firm acquisitions. Although there is general agreement of the positive impact
of R&D expenditure on firm value in the literature, there are also implications of
a negative R&D/acquisition strategy relationship within the M&A context. Some
empirical evidence indicates predictable and optimal firm positioning as acquirers or
targets through levels of R&D expenditure where firms with large patent portfolios
and low R&D expenses are more likely to be acquirers and firms with high R&D
expenses and small patent portfolios are more likely to be targets (Bena and Li (2014)
and Phillips and Zhdanov (2013)). Additionally, Bernstein (2015) finds a decreasing
effect on R&D investment paired with an increasing effect on external innovation
pursuits via acquisition upon IPO filings of firms. Firm innovation strategy appears
to shift throughout time, which is an additional indication that we must consider
both internal and external investment in innovation in order to fully understand firm
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innovation capacity.
Measurement of external investment in innovation has not historically demanded
attention in the finance literature. We have identified Goodwill as a feasible proxy.
Goodwill captures purchased intangible assets such as values for patents, proprietary
technology, brand recognition, reputation, etc. In the M&A context, it is the
difference between the net value of purchased assets, liabilities, and the price paid for
a target firm. Goodwill is the quantification of an acquirer’s willingness to pay for
the intangible value of the target; which includes, but is not limited to, innovation
potential and output. It is recorded as an intangible asset on an acquiring firm’s
balance sheet and allows us to exclude the values of tangible assets and liabilities
included in the transaction values of M&A deals.
U.S. GAAP requires immediate expensing of internally generated intangible
assets (e.g. intellectual property) due to the inherent uncertainty and information
asymmetry surrounding these types of activities. However, there is no such
requirement for externally acquired intangible assets. In fact, U.S. GAAP allows
intangible assets to be included on the balance sheet when those assets are acquired
and if there is an identifiable value that can be amortized. This means that firms have
an accounting choice when making acquisitions and we surmise that firms choose to
capitalize purchased “innovativeness” vs. expense it due to the short term benefit of
earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)).
Innovation Conversion Ability and M&As
According to the literature, firms investing heavily in R&D tend to be smaller
in size and their innovative capability more opaque relative to their counterparts
acquiring innovation. Thus, firms pursuing internal innovation are more likely,
and possibly expected, to position themselves as potential targets. M&A serves
other motives beyond the development of innovative output, such as impeding
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potential competition. An acquirer motivated by a “blocking” strategy has no ex-ante
discerning qualities from a similar firm purchasing innovation as a growth strategy.
The latter firm faces the potential of negative synergy through their effort towards
conversion to profit, whereas the former firm makes no effort in this direction, as
their objective is innovation suppression. Seru (2014) investigates the effect of firm
boundaries on innovation activity and finds that firms acquired in diversifying mergers
produced both less innovation output and less novel innovation. This effect proved
greater in mergers where acquiring firms exhibited an active internal capital market
and was largely driven by inventors becoming less productive. Further, as diversity in
resources and opportunities increase, firms can experience value distortion through
inefficient resource allocation (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)). As a result,
the future expected cash flows of a high IC ability firm could initially suffer more
than a low IC ability firm with less innovative diversity and competition for internal
resources.
Bidding alone may also indicate poor opportunities for internal investment (e.g.
Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004)), thus new information of an M&A announcement
would be considered “bad news”. Again, given the opacity of the success of investment
in innovation, the market is unable to determine if acquisition by an innovative
acquirer is motivated by a growth strategy or a failed research pipeline with no
new promising opportunities. Further, Margsiri, Mello, and Ruckes (2008) provide
a theoretical model showing acquiring firms with higher integration costs firms with
internal growth opportunities predict lower announcement returns. On the other
hand, a merger with an innovation procurement motive provides a positive shock to
the patent portfolio of the acquiring firm. Therefore, in an efficient market and ceteris
paribus, stock markets should respond positively to the acquisitions of innovation,
under the fundamental assumption that innovation enhances firm value.
There are two parties in a merger transaction and previous literature has focused
101
on the potential of patentable innovations (output), R&D expenditures (input), and
synergies provided by targets, however acquirers should also provide variation in value
through their ability to transform innovation into tangible profits. A firm’s ability,
in general, to produce patentable innovation, quality innovation (cited patents), and
profitable innovation (sales growth or profitability resulting from patents) adds value
to the firm (e.g. Hall et al. (2001), Hall et al. (2005); Cohen et al. (2013)). The
extensive innovation process from investment to output to sales is positively correlated
with firm value. Hirshleifer et al. (2013) find that innovative efficiency-patents or
citations scaled by R&D expense-is a positive predictor of future returns and Cohen
et al. (2013) uses a unique measurement of firm ability to convert innovation input
(R&D) to a valued outcome (sales or profitability) to find superior portfolio returns
by firms with greater ability. Hirshleifer et al. (2013) focuses on a measure of output
as an innovation success, whereas Cohen et al. (2013) extends it further to tangible
profit, which is inarguably the real definition of “success” for the firm and appears to
be valued by the market in the context of portfolio returns over time.
Yet, it is still unclear if IC ability is recognized in the context of M&A? If
innovative targets add value, shouldn’t acquirers with superior IC ability also add
value? Further, if acquirer IC ability is valued, will we see positive returns irrespective
of investment type? We explore these questions by distinguishing acquirers based on
IC ability and propose the following hypotheses:
Proposition 5. Merger announcement returns may be related to two dimensions of
IC ability:
1. The level of an acquirers’ demonstrated ability to realize revenue from innovation
investments
Hypothesis 1: Acquirers with the best (better) IC abilities should experience
greater announcement returns.
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2. The type of innovation conversion an acquirer has demonstrated a high capacity
for; while both measures capture a history of successful IC, internal and external
ability measures reflect different signals about performance and prospects
Hypothesis 2: Announcement returns will differ between the internal and
external measures of IC ability
Measures of Innovation Conversion Ability
We construct two measures of innovation conversion (IC) ability; internal-IC and
external-IC, to capture how well firms translate innovation investments into a
tangible and valued performance measure (i.e. sales growth). Standard in the
finance literature, R&D expenditure serve as our proxy for internal innovation
investments. Identifying a new measurement approach, intangible assets proxy
for external innovation investments. To standardize each measure, we use the
natural logarithm of annual R&D expense scaled by sales and the natural logarithm
of annual intangible assets scaled by total assets5. It is important to measure
internal and external innovation ability separately as R&D and intangible assets
capture different innovation strategies. The level of R&D expenses, as observed
on the income statement, directly reflect investment flows to internal innovation
production. However, the level of intangibles, a market based measure observed
on the balance sheet, can reflect changes in the quantity of underlying assets or
changes in the valuation of the underlying assets. As such, the level of intangible
assets alone may not reveal complete information about new investment activities.
Thus, for robustness and to more accurately capture external innovation investment,
we also employ a growth measure of intangible assets. Following the foundational
methodology provided in Cohen et al. (2013), we conduct separate firm-by-firm
rolling time-series regressions of sales growth on the proxies for internal and external
5We find similar results using a measure of R&D expenses scaled by assets, ln(R&D/Assets).
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innovation investment respectively, as:
ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= γ0 + γjln
(
1 + R&Di,t−j
Salesi,t−j
)
+ i,t (3.1)
ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= θ0 + θjln
(
1 + Intangiblesi,t−j
Assetsi,t−j
)
+ i,t (3.2)
ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= µ0 + µjln
(
1 + Intangiblesi,t/Assetsi,t
Intangiblesi,t−j/Assetsi,t−j
)
+ 
i,t
(3.3)
where i indexes firm, t indexes fiscal year, and j=1,2,3,4,5 lag periods. Annual internal
and external ability measures are respectively computed as the average value of the
coefficients on γj,θj, and µj from each individual lag j regression. By design, the
values of both of the IC ability measures quantify a firms’ historic and persistent
success in converting internal or external innovation investments into sales. As such,
to identify firms with high internal (external) IC abilities each ability measure is split
into quintiles. Acquirers in the top quintiles of each measure are defined as high IC
ability firms. Relative to the 80% of the sample of peer firms, High_Ability_R&D
denotes acquirers with the most success in converting internal innovation investments
into sales and High_Ability_Intan denotes acquirers with the most success converting
external innovation investments into sales.
CARs and M&A Characteristics
We measure cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over three time intervals: [0],
[-1,+1], and [-2,+2], where announcement date is on day 0. The CARs are computed
using the market model, ARt = Rs,t+Rm,t, estimated over 250 trading days ending 46
trading days prior to the announcement event with at least 100 non-missing trading
days.
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Consistent with existing innovation literature, control variables include: Firm size,
Total Assets (Size), measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; profitability,
ROA, measured by operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets;
leverage, Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets ratio; capital expenditure,
CapEx/Assets, measured by capital expenditures scaled by total assets; asset
tangibility, PPE/Assets, measured by plant, property and equipment scaled by total
assets; growth opportunity, Tobin’s Q, measured by market value to book value ratio;
industry competition intensity, Herfindahl, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index as indicated by annual sales; and firm age, Firm Age, measured by the natural
logarithm of number of list years in Compustat plus one. Again, following the
innovation literature, we also include the square of the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index,
Herfindahl’s q, to mitigate probable non-linear relation between industry competition
and firm innovation.
The extent M&A literature has established control variables for investigating
acquirer announcement returns around M&A. In addition to acquirer size,
profitability, leverage, Tobin’s Q, and age we control for specific deal variables: Tar
private, equal to one if the target reports as a private firm in SDC, and zero otherwise;
Deal Size, measured by deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of equity; equal
to one if the deal is classified as a merger of equals in SDC, and zero otherwise; Stock
Payment, equal to one if the deal is financed partially or fully with stock, and zero
otherwise; Merger of Equals, equal to one if the deal is classified as a merger of equals
in SDC, and zero otherwise; Diversity, equal to one if the acquirer and the target firm
operate in different two-digit SIC industries, and zero otherwise; and Hostile, equal
to one if the deal is classified as a hostile takeover in SDC, and zero otherwise. A
summary of variable descriptions is provided in Appendix B
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3.3 Data
The sample is filtered from all M&A deals by public U.S. acquirers announced between
January 1, 1984 to December 31, 2015 covered in the Mergers and Acquisitions
database of Thomson Financial-SDC Databases. Given the multiple types of M&As,
we only include deals coded as “merger”, “acquisition of assets”, or “acquisition of
majority interest” in order to exclude smaller deals. No preference is specified to
the location of the target; however, the transaction currency must be in U.S. dollars.
Further, since we examine announcement events, no preference is specified for the
completed status of the deal. All M&A data is merged with acquirer financial and
accounting data obtained from Compustat and stock return data obtained from The
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
3.3.1 Sample Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1, Panel A presents summary statistics of the main variables used for
verification of a positive relationship between sales growth and internal and external
innovation investment. This initial analysis uses the entire sample of Compustat U.S.
firms from 1984 to 2016. There are 8,843 unique public firms with 84,841 firm-year
observations. The mean (median) firm in this sample invests about 44.8% (3.4%) of
total sales in R&D and experiences 0.7% (0.0%) growth in intangible assets (scaled
by assets) over a one-year period . Sample firms have a mean (median) ROA of 1.6%
(9.3%), leverage of 21.9% (16.3%), Tobin’s Q of 2.27 (1.52), and first appeared in the
Compustat database 15.5 (12) years ago.
Table 3.2 reports average results of the rolling firm-by-firm regressions for our
innovation conversion proxy measures. Columns 1-5 report rolling window average
proxy measures estimated over the 1-5 year windows respectively. Row segments 1
and 2 report results for equations (1), the R&D to Sales proxy, and (2), the Intangibles
to Assets proxy. Segments 3 reports results for equation (3), the Intangibles Growth
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to Assets proxy at a three year growth period.
Table 3.1, Panel B highlights summary statistics of M&A event variables by
innovation investment type quintiles. The sample sizes for internal and external-IC
abilities differ due to missing values in respective ability measures. The internal-IC
ability sample represents 11,547 firm-event observations with 3,304 unique acquirers.
The external-IC ability sample represents 11,613 firm-event observations with 3,342
unique acquirers. Events are defined as the first announcement of a merger and
acquisition.
Table 3.1, Panel C shows the distribution of M&A events by innovation
investments type across the sample period. As expected, there are fewer events
in the earlier years (1986-1987) and an increase or wave of mergers in the late 90s
(1995-1999) (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001)).
3.4 Results & Discussion
Innovation Conversion Ability and M&A Announcement Returns
In this section, we examine the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns on and
around merger announcement dates to determine whether a distinction between
acquirers with high IC ability exist, and explore how that distinction varies between
internal and external innovation investment. In Table 3.3, we report the mean
values and univariate test of cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers with high
internal and external innovation conversion ability around M&A announcement
dates6. High ability firms are in the top quintile of the sample per respective ability
measure. Table 3.4 presents multivariate regressions where High_Ability_R&D
6Harrington and Shrider (2007) highlight how the short-horizon event study setting can induce
biased cross-sectional CAR effects if pre-existing cross-sectional variations in the sample are not fully
controlled. Accordingly, we account for several characteristics that vary across firms throughout our
analysis, and our results are robust to using heteroskedacity consistent standard errors. Consistent
with Harrington and Shrider (2007), we observe standard errors shifts in the 10−3 order of magnitude
but do not observe significantly different coefficient estimates.
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(High_Ability_Intan) is a dummy variable that equals one for acquirers with the
respective ability measure in the top quintile of the sample, and zero otherwise.
The univariate results in Table 3.3 demonstrates that IC ability does have an
impact on the immediate returns to announcements. However, the impact differs
depending on the investment dimension being examined. While firms in the top
quintile for internal-IC ability (measured by R&D) do not generate significantly higher
CARs on the announcement of M&A activity, firms with high external-IC ability
(measured by intangible assets) tend to over perform.
Looking at a [0] event window, high internal-IC ability acquirers produce CARs
that are 8.9 basis points higher than all other acquirers. This performance difference,
however is not statistically different from zero. Conversely, high external-IC ability
acquirers generate CARs that are, on average, a statistically significant 45.9 basis
points larger than all other firms. These findings are consistent across all event
windows.
These results illustrate that a firm’s ability to transform investment in external
innovation into a tangible benefit may capture a different feature of the innovation
process than that of internal investment conversion. These distinctive features are
observed and valued by market participants. In Table 3.4, we examine the effect
of IC ability on M&A announcement returns while controlling for factors than have
previously been shown to affect announcement performance. The dependent variable
in each regression is M&A announcement CAR defined over the event windows [0],
[-1,+1], and [-2,+2]. High_Ability_R&D (High_Ability_Intan) is a dummy variable
that equals one for acquirers with the respective ability measure in the top quintile
of the sample, and zero otherwise. Each model accounts for contemporaneous time
and industry fixed effects.
Regressions (1)-(3) show that across all specifications, the ability to convert
R&D investment into sales growth is not valued by the market. The coefficients on
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High_Ability_R&D are statistically insignificant, indicating that high internal-IC
ability acquirers do not generate superior announcement returns relative to other
firms. Regressions (4) - (6) illustrate that the ability to convert investment
in intangible assets does matter to investors. The CARs to acquirers with
high external-IC ability are significantly larger than those of all other firms.
High_Ability_Intan firms generate CARs between 53 to 81 basis points greater.
Alternative Measure and Analysis of External Innovation
Next, we define external-IC ability as the capacity to convert growth in intangible
assets into sales growth. We use the changes in intangible assets for years t-n to t to
define ability (where, n= 1,2,3,4,5), rather than the level of intangible assets. This
subtle distinction captures the flow dimension of intangible asset investment. The
change in intangible assets between years t-n to t represents the investment the firm
has made in that window of time in new intangible assets. Therefore, a firm with
a high external-IC ability measure, as defined by intangible asset growth, will have
demonstrated adeptness in converting new investment in intangible assets into sales
growth.
In Table 3.5, we use five different windows to examine the persistence of
external-IC ability and its relation to post-announcement returns to the acquirer.
Firms with a high capacity to convert near-term investments in intangible assets into
sales growth, tend to produce higher announcement CARs than all other firms. Using
intangible growth over a one year period to compute external-IC ability, we see that
firms with high ability have announcement day returns 49 basis points greater than
other firms. This finding is consistent when intangible asset growth is measured over
a two, three, and four-year window of time, with announcement day CARs of 50, 70,
and 66 basis points, respectively.
The effect of external-IC ability increases when the measurement of intangible
109
asset growth is stretched over a 2-4 year time windows. Suggesting high ability firms
with longer incubation periods for intangible asset growth produce announcement
day CARs that are significantly different than all other firms. However, the effect is
diminished when intangible asset growth is measured over a 5-year window.
3.5 Summary
We examine how an acquirer’s ex-ante ability to convert internal and external
innovation investment into a tangible valued output (e.g. sales) contributes to
cross-sectional variations in acquirer returns around M&A announcements. Our
analysis illustrates three key considerations in the exploration of market valuation of
innovation: (1) recognition of a new and pertinent measure for innovation investment,
(2) the importance of defined investment types and outcomes when determining
innovation “success”, and that (3) within the M&A context, acquirers have an
additional manageable variable which impacts short-run returns. Further, given the
dynamics of firm innovation strategies and the inability to measure the shifting firm
strategies directly, it is imperative to examine the innovation process beyond internal
investment and opportunities.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Firm Characteristics, M&A Events
Table 3.1-Panel A reports the summary statistics for variables constructed for
the universe of Compustat firms during the years 1984 to 2015. Panel B reports the
summary statistics for M&A event variables. Panel C illustrates M&A announcement
counts per year by IC ability quantile. High IC Ability quintiles are determined by
ranking γj , θj estimates from the respective regressions of innovation conversion
proxy measures on sales growth:ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= γ0 + γjln
(
1 + R&Di,t−j
Salesi,t−j
)
+ i,t, and
ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= θ0 + θjln
(
1 + Intangiblesi,t−j
Assetsi,t−j
)
+ i,t . Appendix B list variable
descriptions.
Panel A: Summary statistics of all variables
N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75
Internal Ability (beta) 84,841 3.422 26.31 -0.365 0.016 3.196
External Ability (beta) 75,219 0.496 13.86 -0.895 0.000 0.875
RD/Sales 83,506 0.448 2.298 0.003 0.034 0.128
Intan Growth 73,633 0.007 0.063 -0.006 0.000 0.004
Sales Growth 84,841 0.199 2.436 -0.033 0.080 0.231
Total Assets (Size) 84,841 3,431 19,426 34.73 158.2 913.7
ROA 84,841 0.016 0.571 0.000 0.093 0.159
Leverage 84,841 0.219 0.309 0.015 0.163 0.334
CapEx/Assets 84,841 0.051 0.059 0.015 0.034 0.066
PPE/Assets 84,841 0.216 0.190 0.071 0.166 0.309
Tobin’s Q 84,841 2.271 3.406 1.115 1.521 2.397
Herfindahl 84,841 0.078 0.083 0.039 0.050 0.085
Herfindahl Sq 84,841 0.013 0.043 0.002 0.003 0.007
Firm Age 84,841 15.51 12.32 6.000 12.00 21.00
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Table 3.1 – continued: Summary Statistics: Firm Characteristics, M&A Events
Panel B: Summary statistics of M&A event variables
Internal-IC ability (R&D) External-IC ability (Intangibles)
Qtile 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
N 2,621 3,546 907 2,227 2,246 2,183 2,853 2,158 2,484 1,935
Acq Size 8,768 2,264 3,862 5,105 6,849 4,997 5,345 3,361 6,690 5,851
Acq ROA 0.120 0.061 -0.049 0.065 0.129 0.081 0.095 0.051 0.089 0.093
Acq Leverage 0.195 0.308 0.141 0.164 0.225 0.259 0.201 0.264 0.222 0.246
Acq Tobin’s Q 2.468 2.064 3.163 2.681 2.034 2.066 2.543 2.293 2.119 1.964
Acq Age 20.03 12.45 11.34 16.03 24.01 18.30 15.95 14.23 19.44 21.65
Private Target 0.509 0.569 0.609 0.546 0.443 0.482 0.553 0.574 0.514 0.472
Relative
deal size 0.299 0.584 0.225 0.171 0.215 0.420 0.194 0.791 0.183 0.243
Stock Payment 0.291 0.244 0.401 0.334 0.221 0.248 0.307 0.234 0.246 0.271
Merger of Equals 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
Diversity .461 0.551 0.366 0.413 0.498 0.484 0.428 0.527 0.451 0.491
Hostile 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.008
112
Table 3.1 – continued: Summary Statistics: Firm Characteristics, M&A Events
Panel C: Event count by year
Internal-IC ability (R&D) External-IC ability (Intangibles)
Year; Qtile 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1984 5 2 2 6 5 7 3 3 3 6
1985 23 20 6 12 24 22 20 13 18 19
1986 25 30 4 35 39 43 37 15 25 26
1987 23 21 6 23 22 25 27 11 21 17
1988 26 38 7 25 39 37 33 24 36 28
1989 45 31 16 33 33 39 44 18 26 29
1990 34 37 8 40 35 31 57 20 22 28
1991 27 56 17 29 26 32 47 32 28 29
1992 33 60 25 59 47 41 59 43 39 39
1993 70 89 16 55 55 66 68 53 51 47
1994 89 129 16 72 72 72 82 85 63 68
1995 99 176 15 82 100 94 84 80 81 89
1996 115 245 25 92 108 103 118 115 105 88
1997 172 374 23 105 116 144 168 178 129 133
1998 167 438 37 100 139 178 182 200 131 117
1999 173 218 47 131 131 110 137 111 133 102
2000 164 151 68 151 116 104 175 85 95 84
2001 96 77 39 104 115 66 107 62 82 67
2002 102 87 42 88 92 82 105 84 87 69
2003 110 103 47 83 81 91 90 110 88 80
2004 129 83 56 109 72 88 114 69 138 84
2005 128 118 40 95 89 93 116 94 137 73
2006 123 130 45 82 99 70 133 104 124 85
2007 98 120 40 78 84 70 131 71 127 85
2008 67 97 39 70 66 50 107 71 96 61
2009 51 61 24 60 66 45 79 45 73 37
2010 66 67 35 74 59 62 76 57 71 65
2011 82 72 34 67 65 62 85 65 84 52
2012 71 72 43 81 61 61 91 62 92 53
2013 49 95 35 69 49 51 93 60 80 39
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Table 3.1 – continued: Summary Statistics: Firm Characteristics, M&A Events
Panel C: M&A Event count by year
Internal-IC ability (R&D) External-IC ability (Intangibles)
Year; Qtile 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
2014 75 121 30 60 84 72 89 65 96 82
2015 84 128 20 57 57 72 96 53 103 54
Total 2,621 3,546 907 2,227 2,246 2,183 2,853 2,158 2,484 1,935
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Table 3.2: Estimating Innovation Conversion Ability
Table 3.2 reports average results of rolling firm-by-firm regressions of innovation conversion proxy measures on sales
growth. Columns 1-5 report rolling window average proxy measures calculated over 1-5 year windows respectively. Row
segments 1 and 2 report results for equations (1) and (2), and segments 3-5 report results for equation (3) across alternate
growth periods: ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= γ0 + γjln
(
1 + R&Di,t−jSalesi,t−j
)
+ i,t (1) , ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= θ0 + θjln
(
1 + Intangiblesi,t−jAssetsi,t−j
)
+ i,t (2)
ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= µ0 + µjln
(
1 + Intangiblesi,t/Assetsi,t
Intangiblesi,t−j/Assetsi,t−j
)
+ i,t (3) . Appendix B list variable descriptions.
5 Yr-Rolling
Window
4 Yr-Rolling
Window
3 Yr-Rolling
Window
2 Yr-Rolling
Window 1 Yr-Lag
mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
R&D/Sales
(Internal Measure)
betaRDS 4.925 0.000 6.051 0.000 7.346 0.000 8.029 0.000 1.724 0.000
constant -0.055 0.029 -0.077 0.025 -0.097 0.020 -0.114 0.017 0.017 0.063
Observations 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 3.000 17.69 16.00
R2 0.195 0.091 0.232 0.118 0.294 0.175 0.416 0.348 0.137 0.038
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.044 0.000
Intan/Assets
(External Measure)
betaINAT 1.585 0.000 0.874 0.000 2.209 0.000 2.836 0.000 0.957 0.000
constant 0.057 0.069 0.051 0.070 0.044 0.071 0.023 0.073 0.180 0.085
Observations 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 3.000 17.59 16.00
R2 0.177 0.056 0.207 0.068 0.256 0.092 0.351 0.173 0.130 0.037
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Table 3.2 – continued: Decomposed Estimates of Innovation Conversion Ability
5 Yr-Rolling
Window
4 Yr-Rolling
Window
3 Yr-Rolling
Window
2 Yr-Rolling
Window 1 Yr-Lag
mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.047 0.000
1Y-Intan Growth
(External Measure)
betaINATGROW1 -4.880 0.000 -5.147 0.000 -13.135 0.000 -9.616 0.000 -11.542 0.048
constant 0.067 0.062 0.068 0.063 0.068 0.063 0.068 0.065 0.078 0.067
Observations 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 3.000 17.600 16.000
R2 0.165 0.047 0.193 0.057 0.241 0.081 0.342 0.162 0.114 0.027
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.027 0.000
2Y-Intan Growth
betaINATGROW2 -0.062 0.000 -0.329 0.000 -1.351 0.000 -16.356 0.000 -3.567 0.000
constant 0.066 0.061 0.066 0.062 0.067 0.064 0.066 0.066 0.061 0.065
Observations 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 3.000 17.680 16.000
R2 0.166 0.055 0.198 0.069 0.251 0.099 0.355 0.195 0.114 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.026 0.000
3Y-Intan Growth
betaINATGROW3 1.649 0.000 2.303 0.000 3.015 0.000 -4.307 0.000 -12.114 0.000
constant 0.065 0.061 0.066 0.062 0.067 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.065 0.063
Observations 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 3.000 17.774 16.000
R2 0.169 0.058 0.203 0.074 0.258 0.106 0.365 0.212 0.113 0.028
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Table 3.2 – continued: Decomposed Estimates of Innovation Conversion Ability
5 Yr-Rolling
Window
4 Yr-Rolling
Window
3 Yr-Rolling
Window
2 Yr-Rolling
Window 1 Yr-Lag
mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.025 0.000
4Y-Intan Growth
betaINATGROW4 -4.735 0.000 -4.531 0.000 0.054 0.000 9.794 0.000 -9.432 0.000
constant 0.064 0.059 0.065 0.061 0.060 0.061 0.059 0.062 0.060 0.061
Observations 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 3.000 17.803 16.000
R2 0.174 0.061 0.209 0.078 0.265 0.115 0.372 0.233 0.114 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.027 0.000
5Y-Intan Growth
betaINATGROW5 -5.776 0.000 -4.811 0.000 1.618 0.000 3.073 0.000 -13.265 0.000
constant 0.062 0.057 0.060 0.058 0.053 0.059 0.042 0.060 0.055 0.059
Observations 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 3.000 17.793 16.000
R2 0.177 0.064 0.212 0.082 0.268 0.122 0.376 0.243 0.116 0.032
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.027 0.000
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Table 3.3: Univariate Analysis-Innovation Conversion Ability and M&A
Announcement Returns
Table 3.3 reports mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for acquirers
around M&A announcements. Acquirers are ranked by innovation conversion (IC)
ability levels, where high IC Ability is defined by the 5th quintile of beta estimates
from equations (1) and (2), respectively. Univariate results are presented for the
CARs of high vs. not-high innovative ability acquirers. Cumulative abnormal
returns are computed using the standard market model, ARt = Rs,t + Rm,t ,
and an equally-weighted CRSP index for event windows [0], [-1,+1], and [-2,+2];
announcement is on day 0. The market model is estimated over 250 trading days,
ending 46 trading days prior to the event with at least 100 non-missing daily returns.
Appendix B list variable descriptions. P-values, based on robust standard errors, are
reported in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Internal-IC Ability (R&D) External-IC Ability (Intangibles)
[0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2]
Quintile Rank
1st Quintile 0.594 1.000 1.091 0.600 0.929 1.083
2nd Quintile 0.396 0.632 0.710 0.307 0.590 0.533
3rd Quintile 0.335 0.447 0.377 0.189 0.353 0.432
4th Quintile 0.396 0.745 0.685 0.645 1.199 1.274
5th Quintile
High Ability 0.596 1.020 1.184 0.914 1.516 1.581
(1st-4th Quintile)
Not High Ability 0.507 0.918 0.908 0.454 0.834 0.843
Difference: High Ability
dmean 0.089 0.102 0.275 0.459 0.682 0.738
t-stat 0.627 0.494 1.127 3.193∗∗∗ 3.252∗∗∗ 2.978∗∗∗
118
Table 3.4: Multivariate Analysis- Innovation Conversion Ability and M&A
Announcement Returns
Table 3.4 reports multivariate regression results of acquirer innovation conversion
ability on cumulative abnormal returns around M&A announcements. Synonymous
with High IC Ability, High_Ability_Intan is an indicator variable, with a base value
0, that is equal to 1 if the acquirer is in the 5th quintile of γj , θj estimates from the
respective regressions:
ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= γ0 + γjln
(
1 + R&Di,t−j
Salesi,t−j
)
+ i,t and
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= θ0 +
θjln
(
1 + Intangiblesi,t−j
Assetsi,t−j
)
+ i,t . The dependent variables are acquirer cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) for event windows [0], [-1 ,+1], and [-2,+2]; announcement
is on day 0. CARs are computed using the market model, ARt = Rs,t+Rm,t , and an
equally-weighted CRSP index. The market model is estimated over 250 trading days
ending 46 trading days prior to the event with at least 100 non-missing daily returns.
Year fixed effects, Year t, and industry fixed effects, Industry j, are included in all
multivariate regressions. Appendix B defines all other variables. P-values, based on
robust standard errors, are reported in parentheses.∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Internal-IC Ability (R&D) External-IC Ability (Intangibles)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2]
High_Ability
R&D 0.126 0.067 0.224
(0.419) (0.767) (0.404)
High_Ability
Intan 0.531∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Acq size -0.326∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗∗ -0.616∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.614∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acq roa -0.057 0.155 0.592 -0.054 0.149 0.599
(0.839) (0.701) (0.215) (0.845) (0.712) (0.210)
Acq lev 1.265∗∗∗ 2.470∗∗∗ 3.048∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 2.452∗∗∗ 3.027∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acq tq 0.020 0.043 0.042 0.022 0.047 0.046
(0.395) (0.201) (0.289) (0.340) (0.162) (0.251)
Private
target 0.259∗∗ 0.086 0.188 0.267∗∗ 0.099 0.199
(0.026) (0.613) (0.348) (0.022) (0.558) (0.319)
Relative
deal size -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001
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Table 3.4 – continued: Multivariate Analysis- Innovation Conversion Ability and
M&A Announcement Returns
Internal-IC Ability (R&D) External-IC Ability (Intangibles)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2]
(0.688) (0.484) (0.898) (0.697) (0.491) (0.907)
Stock deal -0.529∗∗∗ -0.654∗∗∗ -0.965∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -0.983∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Merger
of equals -3.156∗ -2.487 -2.279 -3.176∗ -2.522 -2.307
(0.066) (0.319) (0.440) (0.065) (0.312) (0.435)
Diversify 0.055 0.254 0.290 0.053 0.248 0.289
(0.641) (0.138) (0.151) (0.652) (0.147) (0.153)
Hostile -0.775 -1.870∗∗ -1.919∗ -0.759 -1.859∗∗ -1.893∗
(0.232) (0.047) (0.085) (0.241) (0.048) (0.089)
Constant 1.184 2.425 1.411 1.090 2.277 1.270
(0.365) (0.201) (0.530) (0.404) (0.230) (0.572)
Yr & Ind FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,675 13,675 13,670 13,675 13,675 13,670
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.019
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Table 3.5: Intangible Growth Measures of Innovation Conversion Ability and M&A Announcement Returns
Table 3.5 reports multivariate regression results of acquirer innovation conversion ability on cumulative abnormal
returns around M&A announcements. Synonymous with High IC Ability, High_Ability_Intan is an indicator variable,
with a base value 0, that is equal to 1 if the acquirer is in the 5th quintile of µj estimates from the regression:
ln
(
Salesi,t
Salesi,t−1
)
= µ0 + µjln
(
1 + Intangiblesi,t/Assetsi,t
Intangiblesi,t−j/Assetsi,t−j
)
+ 
i,t
Columns 1-5 report the results of IC ability measures with
growth rates calculated over 1-5 year periods respectively. The dependent variables are acquirer cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) for event windows [0], [-1,+1], and [-2,+2]; announcement is on day 0. CARs are computed using the market model,
ARt = Rs,t + Rm,t , and an equally-weighted CRSP index. The market model is estimated over 250 trading days ending 46
trading days prior to the event with at least 100 non-missing daily returns. Year fixed effects and Industry fixed effects are
included in all multivariate regressions. Appendix A defines all other variables. P-values, based on robust standard errors, are
in parentheses.∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Growth over 1 Year Growth over 2 Years Growth over 3 Years Growth over 4 Years Growth over 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
[0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2]
High Ability
Intan 0.496∗∗∗ 0.202 0.181 0.500∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗ 0.636∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 0.213 0.426 0.471
(0.002) (0.390) (0.516) (0.003) (0.037) (0.030) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.264) (0.125) (0.151)
Acq size -0.327∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.614∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.615∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ -0.616∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.547∗∗∗ -0.619∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ -0.616∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acq roa -0.041 0.163 0.613 -0.057 0.150 0.598 -0.048 0.158 0.609 -0.050 0.154 0.605 -0.049 0.155 0.604
(0.883) (0.687) (0.200) (0.838) (0.711) (0.211) (0.863) (0.695) (0.202) (0.857) (0.702) (0.205) (0.860) (0.702) (0.206)
Acq lev 1.250∗∗∗ 2.464∗∗∗ 3.041∗∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗ 2.452∗∗∗ 3.025∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗ 2.432∗∗∗ 3.009∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗ 2.446∗∗∗ 3.024∗∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗ 2.463∗∗∗ 3.039∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acq tq 0.022 0.044 0.042 0.021 0.045 0.044 0.022 0.047 0.045 0.022 0.048 0.046 0.020 0.045 0.043
(0.350) (0.193) (0.292) (0.361) (0.182) (0.273) (0.344) (0.169) (0.262) (0.346) (0.159) (0.254) (0.390) (0.186) (0.281)
Private
target 0.263∗∗ 0.087 0.186 0.266∗∗ 0.094 0.195 0.269∗∗ 0.099 0.199 0.266∗∗ 0.100 0.198 0.259∗∗ 0.090 0.190
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Table 3.5 – continued: Intangible Growth Measures of Innovation Conversion Ability and M&A Announcement Returns
Growth over 1 Year Growth over 2 Years Growth over 3 Years Growth over 4 Years Growth over 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
[0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2]
(0.024) (0.607) (0.353) (0.022) (0.579) (0.329) (0.021) (0.556) (0.320) (0.022) (0.555) (0.321) (0.026) (0.594) (0.342)
Relative
deal size -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001
(0.634) (0.471) (0.887) (0.646) (0.458) (0.865) (0.698) (0.491) (0.907) (0.691) (0.486) (0.902) (0.690) (0.486) (0.901)
Stock deal -0.532∗∗∗ -0.656∗∗∗ -0.971∗∗∗ -0.530∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗ -0.967∗∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗ -0.662∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -0.664∗∗∗ -0.979∗∗∗ -0.533∗∗∗ -0.657∗∗∗ -0.972∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Merger
of equals -3.212∗ -2.509 -2.288 -3.261∗ -2.599 -2.408 -3.159∗ -2.496 -2.278 -3.159∗ -2.500 -2.281 -3.156∗ -2.499 -2.282
(0.062) (0.315) (0.438) (0.058) (0.298) (0.415) (0.066) (0.317) (0.440) (0.066) (0.317) (0.440) (0.066) (0.317) (0.440)
Diversify 0.055 0.254 0.296 0.056 0.253 0.294 0.050 0.245 0.287 0.051 0.244 0.286 0.057 0.252 0.294
(0.642) (0.137) (0.143) (0.635) (0.139) (0.146) (0.668) (0.151) (0.155) (0.661) (0.153) (0.157) (0.627) (0.140) (0.146)
Hostile -0.747 -1.857∗∗ -1.892∗ -0.772 -1.873∗∗ -1.909∗ -0.743 -1.838∗ -1.873∗ -0.737 -1.820∗ -1.857∗ -0.753 -1.845∗ -1.877∗
(0.249) (0.049) (0.089) (0.234) (0.047) (0.086) (0.252) (0.051) (0.093) (0.256) (0.053) (0.095) (0.245) (0.050) (0.092)
Constant 1.035 2.366 1.379 1.073 2.302 1.277 1.018 2.206 1.210 1.056 2.196 1.212 1.177 2.386 1.387
(0.428) (0.213) (0.539) (0.411) (0.225) (0.569) (0.436) (0.245) (0.590) (0.419) (0.247) (0.589) (0.368) (0.209) (0.537)
Yr &
Ind FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 13,675 13,675 13,670 13,675 13,675 13,670 13,675 13,675 13,670 13,675 13,675 13,670 13,675 13,675 13,670
Adj. R2ˆ 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.019
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Appendix A
Variable Descriptions: Multilevel Inspection of
Target Capital Structure & Convertible Debt
Compustat provided annual financials, Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database
(FISD) provided bond issues, Thompson Reuters-SDC provided common equity
issues, and Federal Reserve Bank Reports (WRDS) provided treasury data. CRSP
provided daily stock prices and S&P 500 returns, as well as monthly fund data
from the CRSP-Survivorship-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database. Excluding annual
financials and target estimates, and unless otherwise stated, all variables are average
values of the three months (one quarter) preceding an issue date. Extent literature
discuss variable definitions, namely Faulkender et al. (2012), de Jong et al. (2013),
Choi et al. (2010), Lewis et al. (1999) and Erel et al. (2012).
Panel I: Firm Characteristics
L∗BDR, L
∗
MDR Book (Market) target leverage ratio estimated using the
methodology discussed in the analytical framework
|Dev|BDR , |Dev|MDR Absolute value of book (market) target leverage less the
book (market) leverage ratio of the preceding year
overlevered Binary indicator equal to 1 if L* is greater than lagged
leverage and 0 otherwise
LBDR Book leverage as total debt (dltt +dlc) normalized by the
book value of assets (at)
LMDR Market leverage as the book value of short-term plus
long-term debt relative to the market value of assets
(dltt+ dlc)/(dltt+ dlc+ (|prc| ∗ shrout/1000))
PROF/TA Profitability, income before depreciation (oibdp)
normalized by total assets
MB Market-to-Book, sum of book liabilities and market value
of equity normalized by total assets
DEP/TA Depreciation and amortization (dp) normalized by total
assets
LnTA Log total assets as the natural log of total assets deflated
by the consumer price
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Table A.1– continued: Variable Descriptions- Multilevel Inspection of
Target Capital Structure & Convertible Debt
FA/TA Net property, plant, and equipment (ppent) normalized
by total assets
R&D Exp/TA Research and development expense (xrd) normalized by
total assets
R&D Binary indicator equal to 1 if research and development
expense is greater than zero
IndMedLBDR Industry Median Book Leverage, Fama and French
(1997) industry median book leverage
IndMedLMDR Industry Median Market Leverage, Fama and French
(1997) industry median market leverage
CashFlow CF = oibdpi,t − txti,t − xinti,t
ati,t−1
− IndCapExt. IndCapExt,
Fama-French industry yearly average capital
expenditures
normalized by book assets of the preceding year
DebtMaturity long-term debt maturing in less than three years (dd1+
dd2 + dd3) normalized by total long-term debt
EPSgrowth percentage growth in Earnings per Share (epspx) between
year t-2 to t-1
Discrete Indicators
Active Active Issuer, = 1 if firm-panel includes at least one
common equity, straight bond, or convertible bond issue
CE Only Issued Common Equity Only, = 1 if firm-panel includes
common equity issues only
CE&D Issued Common Equity and Debt, = 1 if firm-panel
includes at least one straight or convertible bond issue
SD Only Issued Straight Debt Only, = 1 if firm-panel includes
common equity and straight bond issues
SD&CD Issued Straight and Convertible Debt, = 1 if firm-panel
includes common equity, straight and convertible bond
issues
Panel II: Convertible Bond Features
delta, ∆ = e−qTN(d1)
Pr(Conv| t0) = N(d2)
C-Option Value = Se−qTN(d1)−Xe−rtN(d2)
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Table A.1– continued: Variable Descriptions- Multilevel Inspection of
Target Capital Structure & Convertible Debt
with, s d1=
 ln(
S
XCP
) + (r − q + σ22 )T
σ
√
T
 and
d2=
 ln(
S
XCP
) + (r − q − σ22 )T
σ
√
T

N(.), the cumulative probability under a standard normal
distribution
q, continuously compounded dividend yield as ordinary
dividends (dvc) relative to
market value in the year preceding issuance
S, market price of the underlying stock -5 trading days
before issuance
r, yield on a ten-year US Treasury Bond measured at
issuance
XCP , conversion price at issuance
σ = EquityVolatilityi,t
T = Maturity
Maturity years to maturity measured at issuance ( instrumented
with TermSpread and DebtMaturity )
ConversionPrem at issuance percentage difference between XCP and S (
instrumented with NewEquity )
NewEquity Log(number of shares issued to convertible bondholders
under full conversion normalized by the total
shares outstanding on the month-end prior to issuance)
Call PP Call protection period length divided by maturity.
CallProtection is equal to one for noncallable convertibles
Discrete Indicators
Callable = 1 if the bond has a call provision
Putable = 1 if the bond has a put provision
Redeemable = 1 if the bond has a redemption provision
Rule-144A = 1 if the bond originated as a Rule-144A restricted
offering
Rule-415 = 1 if the bond originated as a Rule-415 shelf offering
OPnegotiated = 1 if the bond originated as a private (other) negotiated
offering
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Table A.1– continued: Variable Descriptions- Multilevel Inspection of
Target Capital Structure & Convertible Debt
Exchg = 1 if the bond originated as an exchange traded offering
Panel III: Issue, Market, and Macroeconomic Characteristics
EquityRunup Stock return over -240 to -40 trading days prior to an
issue date
EquityVolatility Annualized stock return volatility, estimated using daily
returns over -240 to -40 trading days prior to issuance
MarketRunup Total return of the S&P 500 Index across the three
months preceding issuance
MarketVolatility Annualized return volatility of the S&P 500 Index over
the three months preceding issuance, using daily returns
Mutual Fund Flows MFF = PercentageF lowt =
∑N
i=1Dollar F lowit∑N
i=1Assetsi,t−1
;
Dollar F lowi,t = Assetsi,t −Assetsi,t−1(1 + ri,t)
MFFCD Quarterly flows into corporate convertible bond mutual
funds with >50% convertible bond basis or
Strategic Index (SI)/ Lipper Objective (LO) codes: CVR
CV
MFFSD Quarterly flows into corporate straight bond mutual
funds with >50% straight bond basis or
SI/LO codes: CHQ CMQ CSM CIM CHY CGN CPR A
BBB CPB
MFFCE Quarterly flows into equity mutual funds with >50%
equity basis or SI/LO codes: AGG GRO GRI BAL G
GI B I
TermSpread Term premium, yield difference between ten-year
Treasury Bonds and three-month Treasury Bills
InterestRate Real interest rate, ten-year Treasury Bond yield less
concurrent Consumer Price Index inflation
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Appendix B
Variable Descriptions: Market Valuation of
Innovative Ability
Panel I: Dependent and independent variables
[0][-1,+1][-2,+2]
CARs
Cumulative abnormal return around the M&A
announcement. Daily abnormal returns are computed
using the market model for equally-weighted CRSP
index. Market model parameters are estimated over
250 trading days ending 50 trading days before
announcement with at least 100 non-missing daily
returns in the estimation period.
beta_RDS Rolling window average coefficients calculated over 1-5
lag year windows using regression results of R&D
expenditures scaled by sales on sales growth. At least
2 data points required for inclusion.
High_Ability_R&D Equal to one if internal ability beta (R&D) measure is in
the top quintile of the full Compustat sample, and zero
otherwise.
beta_INAT
beta_INATGROWTH
Rolling window average coefficients calculated over 1-5
lag year windows using regression results of intangible
assets scaled by total assets (or intangible asset growth)
on sales growth. Intangible asset growth measures are
calculated for multiple growth periods from t-n to t,
where n=1,2,3,4,5. At least 2 data points required for
inclusion.
High_Ability_Intan Equal to one if external ability beta (intangible assets)
measure is in the top quintile of the full Compustat
sample, and zero otherwise.
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Table B.1– continued: Variable Descriptions- Market Valuation of Innovative Ability
Sales Growth Natural logarithm of salesi,t/salesi,t−1 − 1
Panel II: Deal and financial variables
CapEx/Assets Capital expenditure/total assets
Diversify Equal to one if the acquirer and the target firm operate
in different two-digit SIC industries, and zero otherwise.
Firm Age Number of years since the firm appeared in Compustat
Hostile Equal to one if the deal is classified as hostile by SDC,
and zero otherwise.
Herfindahl
Herfindahlsq
Herfindahl index based on all Compustat firms within
the sample years, where industries are defined by 2 digit
SIC codes
Leverage (Acq) Total debt/total assets
Merger of equals Equal to one if the deal is classified as merger of equals
by SDC, and zero otherwise.
PPE/Assets Property, plant, & equipment/total assets
Private Target Equal to one if target classified as a private firm in SDC,
and zero otherwise.
ROA (Acq) Operating income before depreciation/total assets
RD/Sales R&D expenditures/sales
Relative deal size Deal value divided by acquirerŠs market value of equity.
Total Assets
Size (Acq Size) Natural logarithm of total assets
Stock deal Equal to one if the deal is financed partially or fully with
stock, and zero otherwise.
Tobin’s Q (Acq) Tobin’s Q (Total assets - common ordinary equity
+ (common shares outstanding * annual fiscal price
close))/total assets
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Appendix C
Characteristics of Target Leverage
Table C.1: Estimating Target Leverage (OLS)
Table C.1 presents coefficient estimates for the reduced form model of target leverage: Li,t = βXi,t−1 + ˜i,t
where, Xi,t−1, includes earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets, the market-to-book ratio of firm assets,
depreciation expense as a proportion of total assets, natural log of total assets,fixed assets as a proportion of total assets, a
dummy variable indicating that the firm did not report R&D expenses, R&D expenses as a proportion of total assets, and the
industry median leverage ratio. The coefficient vector β is estimated by an OLS regression. Columns 1-3 report book-leverage
estimates and columns 4-6 report market-leverage estimates for the full sample (1,4), firm-years where at least one convertible
bond is contractually outstanding (2,5), and the firm-year of a new convertible offer (3,6). Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
EBIT/TA -0.147∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.144‘ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.017) (0.032) (0.003) (0.016) (0.028)
Market to book -0.001∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
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Table C.1 – continued: Characteristics of Target Leverage
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Depreciation/TA 0.280∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.013 0.059∗∗ -0.049 -0.205
(0.020) (0.086) (0.168) (0.020) (0.081) (0.144)
Log total assets 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Fixed assets/TA 0.056∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.013) (0.027) (0.003) (0.012) (0.023)
R&D expense/TA -0.121∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.077
(0.010) (0.042) (0.078) (0.010) (0.040) (0.067)
R&D dummy -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.030∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗
(0.002) (0.007) (0.014) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012)
Industry Median
Book Leverage 0.579∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.031) (0.062)
Industry Median
Market Leverage 0.529∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.024) (0.046)
Fixed Effects No No No No No No
R2 0.592 0.745 0.805 0.608 0.726 0.776
Observations 93,872 6,412 1,436 93,872 6,412 1,436
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Table C.2: Estimating Target Leverage (LSDV)
With the restriction that Li,t∗ = βXi,t−1, Table C.2 presents coefficient estimates for the two-stage least squares dependent
variable partial adjustment model:Li,t+1 = (λβ)(Xi,t) − (1 − λ)(Li,t) + νi + ˜i,t where, the coefficient vector β is estimated
with time fixed-effects and firm-level clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009). Xi,t−1 is the vector of firm characteristics
summarized in Table 1.2. Columns 1-3 report book-leverage estimates and columns 4-6 report market-leverage estimates for
the full sample (1,4), firm-years where at least one convertible bond is contractually outstanding (2,5), and the firm-year of a
new convertible offer (3,6). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Book Leverage 0.821∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.013) (0.029)
Market Leverage 0.826∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.012) (0.027)
EBIT/TA -0.038∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.089∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.064∗
(0.004) (0.021) (0.039) (0.002) (0.014) (0.027)
Market to book -0.001∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.008∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Depreciation/TA -0.045∗ -0.127 -0.303∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.130 -0.328∗∗
(0.019) (0.084) (0.137) (0.015) (0.068) (0.107)
Log total assets 0.002∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Fixed assets/TA 0.014∗∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.033 0.022∗∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.040
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Table C.2 – continued: Estimating Target Leverage (LSDV)
Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year Full Sample Issuers (CD>0)
Issuers(CD>0)
Offer Year
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Book
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
Market
Leverage,t+1
(0.002) (0.011) (0.020) (0.002) (0.011) (0.021)
R&D expense/TA -0.023∗ 0.051 0.231∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.061∗ 0.045
(0.010) (0.045) (0.087) (0.006) (0.028) (0.050)
R&D dummy -0.007∗∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.008 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.010) (0.001) (0.004) (0.009)
Industry Median
Book Leverage 0.089∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.025) (0.051)
Industry Median
Market Leverage 0.066∗∗∗ 0.029 0.076∗
(0.005) (0.018) (0.038)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.698 0.675 0.553 0.729 0.703 0.645
Observations 93,872 6,412 1,436 93,872 6,412 1,436
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Appendix D
Target Leverage Deviations & Convertible Debt Design
Table D.1: Target Deviations and Security Choice-Robust Specification
A variation of McFadden’s Choice model, alternative specific conditional logit regression of target leverage deviations on discrete
security choice between common equity, straight debt,convertible debt, or no security issuance: Pr(yij = 1) = Xiβ + (ziA)′ for
i-firms and j=1,2,3,4 alternative outcomes. yij = 1 when security j is chosen and yij = 0 otherwise. In panel 1, columns 1-2,
the choice sets exclude the No Issuance option, straight debt is the base choice. In panel 2, columns 3-5, No Issuance is the base
choice. Both models account for annual market performance, market demand, and macroeconomic conditions controls used
throughout the analysis. Appendix A details variable descriptions. t statistics in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 2
Convertible Debt Common Equity Convertible Debt Common Equity Straight Debt
|Dev|BDR 5.725∗∗∗ -1.170 6.636∗∗∗ 0.0900 0.937
(4.64) (-0.90) (7.11) (0.12) (1.08)
Dev2BDR -8.214∗∗∗ 0.510 -8.825∗∗∗ -0.444 -0.762
(-2.78) (0.15) (-4.27) (-0.26) (-0.33)
OverleveredBDR 0.0266 0.610∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗
(0.22) (5.24) (-2.74) (3.63) (-3.59)
EquityVolatility 1.582∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 0.341∗ -0.588∗∗∗ -0.985∗∗∗
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Table D.1 – continued: Target Deviations and Security Choice-Robust Specification
1 2
Convertible Debt Common Equity Convertible Debt Common Equity Straight Debt
(5.79) (3.69) (1.76) (-3.36) (-6.01)
EquityRunup 0.270∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(2.99) (6.19) (7.95) (13.48) (5.54)
CashFlow 1.457∗∗∗ 0.516 0.382 -0.850∗∗∗ -0.865∗∗∗
(3.54) (1.20) (1.25) (-3.83) (-3.28)
DebtMaturity 0.221 0.552∗ -0.696∗∗∗ -0.00610 -1.220∗∗∗
(0.77) (1.86) (-3.05) (-0.54) (-7.37)
RatedFirm -3.348∗∗∗ -2.757∗∗∗ -0.939∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ 2.362∗∗∗
(-19.86) (-18.70) (-7.28) (-3.08) (15.44)
AvgBDR3Y -1.658∗∗∗ -1.554∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 2.483∗∗∗
(-4.02) (-4.63) (2.73) (4.44) (11.37)
LnTA -0.151∗∗∗ -0.762∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗
(-2.88) (-15.88) (8.78) (-5.34) (13.83)
MB 0.0915∗∗ -0.0162 0.0469∗∗ -0.0532∗∗∗ -0.0443
(2.05) (-0.35) (2.01) (-2.74) (-1.17)
PROF/TA -1.906∗∗∗ -1.632∗∗ -1.018∗∗∗ -0.617∗∗∗ 0.0654
(-2.93) (-2.53) (-3.89) (-2.66) (0.16)
MarketVolatility 0.504 -0.373 8.965∗∗∗ 5.907∗∗∗ 8.792∗∗∗
(0.58) (-0.35) (8.70) (5.02) (15.01)
MarketRunup -2.420∗∗∗ -2.271∗∗∗ 5.810∗∗∗ 5.379∗∗∗ 6.296∗∗∗
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Table D.1 – continued: Target Deviations and Security Choice-Robust Specification
1 2
Convertible Debt Common Equity Convertible Debt Common Equity Straight Debt
(-3.20) (-2.89) (6.51) (5.85) (10.59)
MFFCD 0.542 -1.272 -1.428 -1.606 -2.453∗∗∗
(0.51) (-1.06) (-1.30) (-1.31) (-3.26)
MFFSD -3.184∗ 1.084 1.976 7.351∗∗∗ 6.931∗∗∗
(-1.81) (0.67) (0.93) (4.46) (7.65)
MFFCE 11.23∗∗ 14.63∗∗∗ 11.79∗ 17.03∗∗∗ 0.0770
(2.56) (3.05) (1.93) (3.27) (0.02)
InterestRate -0.0503 0.138∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ 0.0265 -0.0887∗∗∗
(-1.15) (3.01) (-2.66) (0.53) (-2.92)
TermSpread -0.0592 0.101∗∗ -0.0172 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0431∗
(-1.20) (2.10) (-0.35) (2.78) (1.65)
Constant 1.962∗∗∗ 5.271∗∗∗ -6.390∗∗∗ -3.322∗∗∗ -8.446∗∗∗
(3.76) (11.01) (-15.55) (-10.22) (-21.25)
Observations 19842 138456
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Table D.2: Convertible Bond Design: New Equity, Maturity, Call Protections- Decomposed System of Equations
Standalone 2SLS regressions used in the full system of simultaneous-equations for convertible bond design terms:New
Equity, Maturity, and Call Protection Period. Models 1-3 report second-stage results and first-stage fit statistics for three
applications of the I.V. equation framework:
ˆLogBookDev = pi00 + pi01Pr(NoPublicOffer) + pi02CAPXAT + Π0X + v1
ˆNewEquity = pi10 + pi11ConvPremium+ Π1X + v2
ˆMaturity = pi20 + Π21TermSpread+ Π32DebtMaturity + Π2X + v2
ˆCallPP = pi30 + pi31EPSgrowth+ Π3X + v3
NewEquity =β10+β11Y1+β12X + u1 Maturity =β20+β21Y2+β22X + u2 CallPP =β30+β31Y3+β32X + u3
where Yi is the vector of instrumented endogenous variables, relative to each design feature. Xi is the vector of firm
characteristics,market performance, market demand, and macroeconomic conditions used throughout the analysis (excluding
TermSpread and DebtMaturity). The measure of target leverage deviation,Log(BookDev), is excluded from Model(s) 1, treated
as an exogenous variable in Model(s) 2, and included in Yi in Model(s) 3. The bottom panel reports fit statistics for the
instrumental variables used in the first-stage regressions. Appendix A details variable descriptions. Heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors are clustered by year. t statistics in parentheses.∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
NewEquity Maturity Call Protection Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log(BookDev) -11.79 -36.89∗∗ -1.701 -5.830 -0.112 -0.606
(-0.21) (-2.16) (-1.38) (-0.56) (-0.88) (-0.94)
NewEquity -0.111 -0.117 -0.0914 -0.00624 -0.00612 -0.00706
(-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.70) (-0.64) (-0.63) (-0.73)
Maturity 38.67 -6.752 -1.110 -0.0752 -0.0727∗ -0.0651∗∗∗
(0.05) (-0.17) (-0.44) (-1.59) (-1.66) (-3.09)
Call PP 464.9 -92.98 -21.10 -13.59 -12.19 -15.55∗∗
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Table D.2– continued: Convertible Bond Design: New Equity, Maturity, Call Protections- Decomposed
System of Equations
NewEquity Maturity Call Protection Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(0.05) (-0.19) (-0.56) (-1.19) (-1.02) (-2.29)
EquityVolatility 168.2 -20.54 0.122 -3.332∗ -3.497∗ -3.300∗∗ -0.266 -0.246 -0.224∗
(0.06) (-0.12) (0.01) (-1.88) (-1.78) (-2.11) (-1.05) (-1.04) (-1.92)
EquityRunup -21.12 2.089 -0.557 0.380∗ 0.351 0.394∗ 0.0312 0.0280 0.0249
(-0.06) (0.11) (-0.43) (1.77) (1.61) (1.76) (1.50) (1.45) (1.43)
CashFlow 19.05 -9.398 -9.321∗ -1.093 -1.087 -2.030 -0.0731 -0.0859 -0.164
(0.05) (-0.30) (-1.93) (-0.57) (-0.56) (-1.03) (-0.85) (-0.96) (-1.18)
RatedFirm -11.66 2.927 2.340∗ 0.273 0.528 0.440 0.0209 0.0277 0.0416
(-0.05) (0.15) (1.75) (0.27) (0.51) (0.49) (0.25) (0.33) (0.69)
AvgBDR3Y -48.75 9.445 -10.98∗ 2.104∗ 1.210 -0.938 0.145 0.0819 -0.169
(-0.05) (0.37) (-1.73) (1.65) (1.05) (-0.19) (1.39) (1.13) (-0.58)
LnTA -36.52 2.840 -2.482 0.558 0.484 0.558 0.0480 0.0450 0.0296
(-0.06) (0.08) (-1.10) (0.85) (0.70) (0.93) (1.52) (1.49) (0.73)
MB 0.398 -1.345 -1.176∗∗∗ -0.183 -0.177 -0.0889 -0.0111 -0.00805 -0.00655
(0.01) (-1.19) (-5.45) (-0.60) (-0.53) (-0.43) (-0.50) (-0.39) (-0.44)
PROF/TA -87.12 19.17 7.776 2.514 2.850 2.920 0.185 0.193 0.211
(-0.05) (0.19) (1.17) (1.19) (1.29) (1.37) (0.96) (1.01) (1.46)
MarketVolatility -204.1 47.25 14.30 6.591 6.076 7.395 0.476 0.490 0.488
(-0.05) (0.21) (0.77) (1.03) (0.91) (1.37) (1.36) (1.43) (1.56)
MarketRunup 18.52 -10.07 -5.431 -1.459 -0.859 -2.081 -0.0950 -0.0935 -0.123
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Table D.2– continued: Convertible Bond Design: New Equity, Maturity, Call Protections- Decomposed
System of Equations
NewEquity Maturity Call Protection Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(0.04) (-0.21) (-0.77) (-0.21) (-0.12) (-0.36) (-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.37)
Sentiment 2.741 -0.892 -0.365 -0.120 -0.109 -0.127 -0.00827 -0.00847 -0.00821
(0.05) (-0.25) (-1.23) (-0.77) (-0.68) (-0.99) (-1.05) (-1.12) (-1.20)
MFFCD -284.2 69.42 23.09 9.891 8.755 10.94 0.706 0.702 0.710
(-0.05) (0.23) (0.86) (1.04) (0.93) (1.08) (1.20) (1.23) (1.33)
Overallotment -65.61 10.59 1.312 1.581∗∗∗ 1.603∗∗ 1.648∗∗∗ 0.121 0.118 0.108∗∗
(-0.05) (0.15) (0.30) (2.63) (2.57) (2.65) (1.36) (1.39) (2.15)
Rule-144A -84.69 13.48 1.362 2.012∗∗∗ 2.047∗∗∗ 2.038∗∗∗ 0.154∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(-0.06) (0.16) (0.25) (2.77) (2.79) (2.67) (1.89) (1.98) (2.72)
InterestRate 24.77 -4.840 -0.785 -0.725 -0.617 -0.812 -0.0533∗∗ -0.0528∗∗ -0.0500∗∗∗
(0.05) (-0.19) (-0.39) (-0.98) (-0.80) (-1.53) (-2.26) (-2.29) (-2.66)
Constant -560.8 150.5 65.09 20.64∗∗ 19.94∗∗ 22.44∗∗∗ 1.459∗∗ 1.450∗∗ 1.527∗∗∗
(-0.05) (0.24) (1.41) (2.55) (2.40) (3.18) (2.31) (2.30) (2.90)
Observations 1123 1122 1116 1123 1122 1116 1123 1122 1116
Overall p-Fstat 0.134 0.105 0.115 0.738 0.747 0.936 0.202 0.209 0.0290
Overall Fstat 2.189 2.484 2.192 0.308 0.296 0.139 1.713 1.672 3.566
F ˆNewEquity 23.70 23.94 16.02 15.29 14.99 11.41
F ˆMaturity 0.487 0.497 2.997 0.561 0.587 3.589
F ˆCallPP 2.354 2.160 5.810 1.294 1.392 4.236
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Table D.2– continued: Convertible Bond Design: New Equity, Maturity, Call Protections- Decomposed
System of Equations
NewEquity Maturity Call Protection Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
F ˆLogBookDev . . 7.914 . . 8.455 . . 4.562
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Appendix E
Decomposed Estimates of Innovation Conversion Ability
Table E.1: Shocks to Intangible Growth Accounting - Innovation Conversion Ability and M&A Announcement Returns
1984-2001 2002-2007 2008-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
[0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2]
High_Ability
Intan 0.483∗∗ 0.807∗∗ 0.909∗∗ 0.140 0.436 0.617 0.998∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗ 0.897∗
(0.211) (0.322) (0.402) (0.250) (0.404) (0.453) (0.367) (0.464) (0.498)
Acq size -0.390∗∗∗ -0.632∗∗∗ -0.728∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.065) (0.081) (0.052) (0.084) (0.095) (0.077) (0.097) (0.104)
Acq roa -0.018 0.370 0.691 -0.793 -1.684∗∗ -0.384 1.169 1.701 1.733
(0.324) (0.495) (0.618) (0.503) (0.811) (0.910) (0.889) (1.126) (1.207)
Acq lev 1.096∗∗∗ 1.909∗∗∗ 2.753∗∗∗ 0.376 1.980∗∗ 3.226∗∗∗ 1.119 2.886∗∗∗ 3.124∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.594) (0.742) (0.503) (0.811) (0.911) (0.727) (0.920) (0.987)
Acq tq 0.020 0.032 0.033 -0.006 0.098 0.061 0.021 0.093 0.054
(0.024) (0.037) (0.046) (0.065) (0.105) (0.117) (0.107) (0.135) (0.145)
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Table E.1 – continued: Shocks to Intangible Growth Accounting - Innovation Conversion Ability
and M&A Announcement Returns
1984-2001 2002-2007 2008-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
[0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [0] [-1,+1] [-2,+2]
Private
target 0.270∗ 0.160 0.419 0.327∗ 0.307 0.400 0.358 0.005 -0.326
(0.151) (0.231) (0.288) (0.187) (0.301) (0.338) (0.277) (0.351) (0.376)
Relative
deal size -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.467∗∗∗ -0.349 0.027 1.096∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.320
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.138) (0.223) (0.250) (0.196) (0.248) (0.266)
Stock deal -0.537∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -1.093∗∗∗ -1.000∗∗∗ -0.941∗∗∗ -1.149∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.134 -0.341
(0.157) (0.240) (0.300) (0.224) (0.362) (0.406) (0.374) (0.473) (0.507)
Merger
of equals -0.018 -1.734 -2.538 -4.568∗∗ -3.645 -4.019 -4.438 0.420 4.348
(2.770) (4.226) (5.277) (2.005) (3.236) (3.633) (5.410) (6.848) (7.342)
Diversify 0.130 0.229 0.196 0.077 0.188 0.301 0.061 0.480 0.637
(0.150) (0.228) (0.285) (0.189) (0.305) (0.342) (0.291) (0.368) (0.395)
Hostile -0.830 -1.802∗ -1.726 1.038 -0.881 -0.468 -0.668 -1.953 -2.807
(0.679) (1.036) (1.294) (2.003) (3.233) (3.630) (2.558) (3.238) (3.471)
Constant 1.512 2.947 1.882 3.127∗∗∗ 4.104∗∗∗ 4.087∗∗∗ 1.247 3.023∗∗ 4.122∗∗∗
(1.297) (1.978) (2.470) (0.695) (1.122) (1.260) (0.963) (1.219) (1.307)
Yr & Ind FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,770 7,770 7,765 3,503 3,503 3,503 3,380 3,380 3,380
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.024 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.014
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